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ABSTRACT
The study examines the Chinese leadership's assessment of 
events in the Middle East in 1957-8, with reference to its 
line over Socialist Camp support for popular movements in 
response to US intervention.
Addressing Chinese categorisation of forces in world 
politics, it argues that this period was crucial in 
interpreting the changing role of the developing countries 
from an intermediate zone between two camps into the main 
progressive force.
Events in the area were seen as a historical turning point, 
the focus being regional trials of strength in opposition 
to US intervention. In this connection, different levels 
of conflict analysis are explored.
The study considers the foreign policy dilemma of uniting 
'from above' with regional regimes or 'from below' with 
mass movements, the theme of historic links with the Arabs 
as a precursor of 'third world' solidarity, and China's 
direct contacts with the area, including a detailed study 
of relations with Yemen as an early instance of 
'South-South' co-operation.
While Arab nationalism was applauded, the attitude to 
Nasserism was cool, and Islam very much downplayed. A 
survey of articles by Chinese specialists pinpoints 
differing trends in the analysis of social conditions in 
Arab states, particularly post-revolutionary Iraq.
Against the background of China's Great Leap Forward, links 
between radicalism in domestic and foreign policy spheres
are examined, including the nation-wide mass 
demonstrations, an unprecedented experiment in domestic 
social mobilisation on an international issue. This 
provides a context for the decision to bombard 
Nationalist-held offshore islands.
The study casts light on the issue of periodization in 
Chinese foreign policy, illustrates the origin of important 
themes which were to resurface in the Sino-Soviet polemic, 
and reflects problems confronting a radical actor having to 
adapt previously-held models to major changes in both 
domestic and international environments.
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INTR03DXJ0TI ON : SOME QUESTIONS
IN THE STUDY OE CHINESE
FOREIGN FOEICY
The object of this research is to examine the Communist 
Party of China's basic method of analysing the world system 
in the late 1950s and specifically the different levels at 
which it sought to promote the formation of relations of 
solidarity with other actors in the context of this system.
HISTORICAL CHARACTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
The interest of this period is that it was one of rapid 
change in the international system and the outcome of that 
change was not clear to most of the actors involved.
There were many important evolutions which any actor would 
need to take account of. The upsurge of national movements 
was making decolonisation appear inevitable in some form. 
Transition from the old pattern of conflictuel great-power 
relations to a new pattern of coalition under US hegemony 
was also a feature of this system, and could not be brought 
about entirely smooth ly, as the Suez War showed. An 
increasing tendency for the USA to be drawn into direct 
intervention in the developing world had already been 
anticipated in the Korean War.
Relations between the socialist countries and the rest of 
the world were also undergoing redefinition to some extent. 
The partial critique of the Stalin experience had created 
extraordinary tensions within the socialist bloc, but 
despite this instability the Soviet Union in particular was 
beginning to aspire to a new world role. The cold war was 
in the process of giving way to what was already, at the 
time of Suez, being spoken of as 'detente*. This implied 
both a certain common recognition of responsibilities by
the superpowers, especially on the nuclear issue, and at 
the same time a more active deployment of their power.
The above evolution created strong tendencies to bipolarity 
in the international system, which did not however develop 
unopposed. Such tendencies were viewed with some 
misgivings, especially by the emerging nations, and this 
sentiment gave rise to the philosophy of non-alignment, 
already clearly foreshadowed at the Bandung Conference in 
1955.
The post-war boom was underway in the Western 
industrialised countries. This posed considerable problems 
for the analysis of capitalist crisis, at least in terms of 
the traditional viewpoint within the official communist 
movement since the 1930s. At the same time, the 
application of Keynesian models had moved the industrial 
economies into uncharted territory, and it was not certain 
that the growth associated with post-war rehabilitation 
could find a smooth transition into a period of further 
sustained expansion. A fairly severe depression in the 
year 1958 added point to this question. The Soviet system, 
despite all the internal social problems of its bloc, had 
apparently achieved a technological advance, revealed in 
its successes in the space race.
The national movements appeared to be at a crossroads. It 
was by no means clear at that particular juncture that the 
industrial powers would find an acceptable solution to the 
problems of decolonisation and the transition to a new 
pattern of relations with developing countries.
The type of alignments or groupings between actors which 
could emerge in this period of change and flux was an 
important issue which concerned all the major actors. In 
this context it will be necessary to study how far the 
Communist Party of China (CPC) was capable of evolving
models encompassing system change, and specifically what 
type of alignments it would seek to promote, and which it 
would seek to counter.
CHINAIS ROLE WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
The People's Republic of China (PRC) itself, as a 
nationalist movement of the developing world under 
communist leadership, embodied some of the major forces for 
change in the world system, and to some extent owed its 
existence to the wider trends which they reflectedl Not yet 
well established in the international arena, the PRC's 
future seemed at that stage to be linked to the survival of 
these radical forces.
An added particularity of the Chinese situation at that 
time was that the PRC had only limited scope for 
international contacts at all, owing to the fact that the 
USA, as hegemonic power, had made it a major issue of its 
relations with states that they should refuse to deal with 
the PRC, and instead maintain links with the Nationalist 
regime in Taiwan.
An important question is to understand the factors 
influencing the selection of goals by the CPC leadership. 
While Chinese decision-makers were influenced by their 
perception of the international system, this perception was 
also filtered by important background factors. In the 
literature on Chinese foreign policy, two important factors 
which have been taken into account are the influence of 
China's long-term history, and the more 'ideological* 
influence of the CPC's communist ideals. Areas of debate 
include the relationship between history and present in 
determining Chinese foreign policy, and the relative 
influence of domestic and external factors. These issues 
may be linked, although it may be wiser not to assume a 
priori that they are linked in definite ways.
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ISSUES OF DEBATE OVER THE BASIS OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY
One issue which has been widely discussed is that of 
whether Chinese foreign policy is to be seen as 
'ideological', or else determined by factors such as 
national interest.
National interest may be taken on the surface to imply an 
individualist or 'selfish' orientation on the part of the 
state. This is in fact not necessarily so in all 
instances, since it is not altogether illogical to claim, 
as small and weak states often have done, that their 
national interest coincides to a considerable extent with 
the goal of an international system less subject to great- 
power diktat. Even so, in the case of a large state 
claiming to be socialist, it would clearly be wrong to take 
at face value any assertion that, simply because of its 
political label, it would automatically elevate the 
interests of the community above its individual interests.
Linked to this there is a separate problem as to whether 
Chinese policy should be seen as internally inspired or 
alternatively a response to the external environment. In 
understanding the linkage between these factors, another 
level of analysis can be invoked, that of the relation 
between long-term and immediate goals, or between strategy 
and tactics.
One school of thought tends to assert that historical, 
domestic, non-ldeological factors are responsible for the 
long-term orientations. A typical formulation might be the 
following:
"China's history suggests that domestic pressures and 
concerns were normally of greater weight than those 
derived externally; this is probably true of other 
great societies. There is thus good reason to expect 
such conditions to apply to contemporary China, and 
indeed this does seem largely to be the case. It is
almost as though the overall strategic motivation is 
domestic, whereas external factors have only tactical 
impact. Whatever the case it is clear that beneath 
the surface of transient diplomacy there lies the 
enormous weight of the historical China, which, though 
affected by developments abroad, exists in many 
respects in isolation from the world about it. If one 
discounts such factors as political or ideological 
motivations, being relatively unimportant and 
impermanent, one is forced into recognising the 
dominant role of native socio-economic factors quite 
distinct from outside pressure.
An alternative view likewise perceives the determining 
factor in long-term goals as domestic, but in this case 
equates the domestic with ideological factors. This is 
broadly the view of J.D. Armstrong, who argues that any 
changes which might take place in China's foreign policy 
"in response to external developments would be conceived of 
by Peking as merely tactical adjustments to exploit fresh 
opportunities or take account of new circumstances, with no 
alteration of long-term strategic aims.
With both these approaches, however, it is important not to 
be one-sided. In response to the notion of the united 
front strategy as essentially internally generated, it 
could plausibly be argued that the attempt by 
Asian-African countries to evolve a new pattern of 
relations was a logical outcome of the critique of an 
existing system of international relations unable to 
aocAMModate their aspirations for nationhood: it is thus
perfectly possible to view strategies of solidarity as a 
response to the realities of the world environment, and for 
the same reasons they need not necessarily be viewed as 
peculiarly Chinese or peculiarly Marxist.
 ^SIimONDS J.D. China's World, New York (Columbia U.P.) 1970 p. 129
 ^ARMSTRONG J.D. Revolutionary Diplomacy ^  China's Foreign Policy 
and the United Front Doctrine. Berkeley etc (Univeriîjty of California 
Press) 1977 p 56
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The view which emphasises historical factors also contains 
some truth but should not be read : in an exaggerated or 
one-sided way. China was indeed a secular empire, whose 
relations with surrounding nations and peoples had included 
elements of both d o m i n a t i o n/hegemony and 
co-operation/mutual benefit. This whole pattern had 
however been altered over a long period by the rise^ of 
Western influence which had imposed an external web of 
world-wide economic relations in place of the old patterns 
of trade and had also converted China from a regional- 
dominant nation into one subjected to external
intervention.
The manner of unfolding of the Chinese revolution had again 
altered the picture, and as far as internal social 
structure is concerned there had been major changes.
Without in any way denying the forces for a reassertion of 
some aspects of the old social relations, which were 
obviously considerable, it is a fact that the revolution 
and the period which immediately followed it deeply altered 
important aspects of China's traditional class relations 
and socio-economic organisation.
All foreign policies must be based on an assessment of 
conditions in the external world and incorporate feedback 
from it. The ideological element may come in where we are 
dealing with choices, such as the issue of whether to 
continue the strategy of mutual solidarity with other 
third-world countries once China's own nationhood had 
successfully been asserted. Even if we accept that there 
is potentially, opposition between the notions of 
ideologically generated foreign policy and national
interest, it is still possible for the two to co-exist as 
different tendencies within the same model. 'Line
struggles' in foreign policy have occurred in different 
states in different circumstances, and socialist countries 
are not unique in this.
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As with all foreign policy questions, we are concerned with 
the way in which a particular system was understood by 
those charged with the responsibility of creating the 
policy of a particular actor. This implies assessing the 
situation in relation to a set of goals espoused by those 
decision-makers.
ROLE OF NATIONALISM IN CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY
The overall study of policy-making contains a number of 
important issues: the definition of 'power', milieu goals, 
the relationship between conflict and co-operation, the 
role of subjective factors in policy-making and in relation 
to conflictual behaviour in particular, etc. These are all 
relevant issues which we will consider in the course of 
this study.
The emphasis on the crucial importance of national security 
sometimes associated with the 'realist' position appears to 
be applicable to the case under consideration. It should 
just be indicated that the concept cannot simply be 
transplanted from the analysis of the policies of the great 
powers to those of Asian-African states. In the latter 
case, national security is not incompatible with milieu 
goals, in other words with actions aimed at altering the 
structure of the system, just because it was actually the 
great-power system itself which denied the nationhood and 
security of these countries. Thus self-determination was 
not just a matter of fitting in with the system, on the 
contrary their security interest could well lead them to 
challenge the system itself and put forward new 'rules' as 
at Bandung.
Particularly significant from our point of view in 
connection with united front issues, is the fact that in 
taking a 'realist' position on security goals it is not 
necessary to assume that these are pursued in an
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individualistic way. For third world countries,
co-operation could well appear as a prerequisite to making 
any impact on the system at all.
The definition of nationalism in Asia as "a multi­
dimensional search for the most appropriate and workable 
vehicles for the Asian response to western dominance"* is 
broadly acceptable. On the other hand we should recognise 
the possibility of a different form of nationalism which 
may arise particularly in a large country once it has 
managed to make a breakthrough into acceptance by the 
system: this would have the form of taking advantage of the 
system's rules in pursuit of at least a regional power 
position for itself.
This indicates that there may be different possible 
directions in a country's foreign policy, even within the 
terms of a model which recognises the central importance of 
national goals.
The former, essentially defensive type is not in
contradiction with a certain reading of Marxism. Such a
view would emphasise the common elements in both Marxism
and Asian-African nationalism insofar as both could be seen
as movements of actors with some interest in promoting
system-change. This concordance is well put in Schram's
statement that
"Whereas in relations with the Soviet Union
nationalist and revolutionary motives may frequently 
come into conflict, in dealings with the West the 
visceral reaction of the Asian national and the 
systematic anti-imperialism of the Leninist
revolutionary are in full harmony."*
* HARRISON, Selig S. The Widening Gulf - Asian nationalism and 
American Policy, New York (The Free Press) 1978 p. 422
* SCHRAM S. The Political Thought of ttao Tse-tung, p. 76
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On the other hand, the historical evolution of Soviet 
foreign policy shows that the vocabulary of Marxism can 
well be used to embody a form of national interest which 
seeks to maximise national goals within a system which 
naturally favours great powers, rather than seeking to 
subvert or change it. It could perhaps be argued that one 
or other line of conduct is not 'authentically' Marxist, 
but it is not necessary to enter into this discussion here. 
The point is simply that it is not necessarily helpful to 
argue along the lines that 'Chinese policy is essentially 
nationalist and Marxism is only superficial', or indeed the 
opposite.
However important the distinctions between ideology and 
nationalism may have been at a certain level, it should be 
recognised that in the specific historical period we are 
dealing with, any contradiction between the two was to a 
certain extent placed in suspension owing to the effects of 
the US policy of ostracising China. Potentially one of 
the handful of major actors in the world system, China 
could not completcley be ignored, as the 1954 Geneva 
conference on Indochina showed. Still the USA was using 
its very considerable influence to urge upon other states 
a policy of isolating China. Hence China's opportunities 
for mainstream diplomatic activity were very restricted, 
and this had the ^ e c t  of severely limiting any temptation 
for that country to relax into a comfortable role of an 
actor which had 'arrived' in the international system. The 
closeness of China's own revolutionary experience at that 
time was undoubtedly an important factor limiting this 
option as well.
Thus whether from necessity or choice, it is a fact that 
China was at that time drawn towards the forces tending to 
destabilize the system. The CPC's overall view of the 
nature and dynamics of the world system and of China's 
place within it was a radical one.
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PROBLEMS DEMANDING CHOICE OF STRATEGIES
Even though the choice of a radical approach to world 
affairs may have been relatively clear-cut at that time, 
this does not mean to say that the specific policy choices 
facing China within these broad parameters were in any way 
straightforward. There was a range of problems associated 
with the relationship between being a member of the 
socialist camp and being part of the Asian-African 
movement. If these two forces could be brought into some 
kind of conjuncture, a major impact on the world system 
could be expected to result. But such a convergence was by 
no means automatic. The Soviet Union was not by any means 
unequivocal ly an actor seeking radical system-change, since 
it was a superpower which was considered to have 
responsibilities for at least maintaining the world system 
in some condition of stability.
There was also a longer-term historic problem connected 
with the way the official communist movement had, at least 
soon after the death of Lenin, started subordinating the 
anti-colonial movements to a strategy geared primarily to 
defending the Soviet Union and preventing the rise of
fascism in Europe. This had probably contributed to a weak 
implantation of communism in many parts of the developing
world, including the Middle East (Iraq being perhaps an
exception) and possibly also to the rise of a form of
nationalism which, while opposed to Western domination, was 
also hostile to communism.
A crucial and very difficult problem was that of how the 
communist countries were to come to terms with this 
nationalism, whose classic expression of this at the time 
was Nasserism. This situation raised difficult choices in 
foreign policy decision-making. In dealing with the Middle 
East, China was also approaching the problems of an area 
where its existing links were quite weak, owing both to the
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fragmentation of Asia and Africa in the colonial period and 
to the more recent US policy of ostracism. The rebuilding 
of relations among Asian-African nations on a new basis, as 
projected at Bandung, was only just getting under way.
The concrete problems of coming to terms with such a 
situation raise important issues, for example, the question 
of whether the united front which is sought should be one 
of governments or of popular movements which may in fact 
suffer at the hands of such governments.
Thus it is essential to view the theoretical issues of 
Chinese foreign policy in a concrete way in relation to 
the kind of choices which decision-makers were called upon 
to make in this specific period. When we take the argument 
to this level, an important issue arises as to how the 
characteristics of this particular period were understood 
by Chinese leaders. The literature on Chinese foreign 
policy has tended to raise two important interlinked 
issues, namely the question of how Chinese foreign policy 
can be periodized, and the question of the link between 
domestic and foreign policy.
PERIODIZATION OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY AND LINKS WITH 
DOMESTIC POLICIES
It is generally recognised that Chinese domestic policy 
went through several big shifts in the 1950s, and it is 
common to distinguish different periods according to 
whether the prevailing line was 'left* or 'right', 'hard' 
or 'soft'. So it has to be asked, how far can a 
periodization be established in foreign policy, what if any 
is its correlation with the periodization in domestic 
politics, and how precisely can it be established? In 
relation to the specific period 1957-8, there are also 
particular issues, such as that of how optimistic the
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Chinese leadership felt about the character of the world 
system and its likely evolution.
In arriving at concrete policies, Chinese decision makers 
go through a process of development both with regard to 
their assessment of the world situation and to their image 
of their own role in relation to that system. As Yahuda 
has pointed out both these elements are very important.^
A background to understanding the specific period in 
question is to see it in relation to the overall evolution 
of Chinese foreign policy, particularly in the preceding 
period. There is probably a fair amount of agreement on 
certain broad criteria. Two examples of periodization may 
be taken. H.C Hinton's main headings for his chronological 
treatment are:* "Armed struggle" (1948-51); Search for an 
alternative policy (1951-5); Bandung phase (1955-7); The 
East Wind prevails over the West Wind (1957-9); The 
Campaign against Khrushchev (1960-63); "Third World" Policy 
(1963-). Another author. Van Ness, divides the periods as 
follows:? Communist internationalism (1949-52); Peaceful 
co-existence (1953-7); Militant anti-imperialism and the 
emergence of anti-revisionism (1958-65).
A common point in these categorisations, which other 
authors seem to share, is that in later 1957-early 1958 
Chinese policy underwent a major shift in the direction of 
an assessment by the leadership that the situation was 
appropriate for more radical forms of action. This issue 
is linked to the question of united front work in an
see YAHUDA M. "Chinese Foreign Policy: A Process of Interaction" 
in WILSON I (ed) China and the World Community Sidney etc (Angus and 
Robertson) 1973 p. 46
* HINTON H.C. Communist China in World Politics London etc 
(Macmillan) 1966 pp 23-49
? VAN NESS P. Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy Berkeley etc 
(Univ. of California Press) 1971 pp 10-18
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important way, because of the assumption that even if there 
is consistency of goals, these may be approached in 
different ways.
An image sometimes employed is that of a 'swing' between 
different methods, of which the following description could 
serve as an example:
"Chinese foreign policy since 1949 shows a dichotomous 
tactical pattern whose phases have alternated every 
few years with the regularity of the swing of a 
pendulum. These two sides of tactics, alternately 
employed, can be seen as direct and indirect 
approaches to achieving strategic goals."®
On this basis a periodization can be put forward involving 
phases which could be characterised as Militant up to the 
end of the Korean war. Peaceful (1954-7), Militant 
(1957-8), Peaceful, (1960-6), Militant (1966-9) etc.*
Concretely, the assumption may be that in radical phases, 
the range of forces to unite with could be different. Such 
a perspective could lead to a more concrete understanding 
of the 'swings'. One author, J. Camilleri, has argued that 
China was
"confronted by the difficult choice of either leading 
a reformist third world trade union of governments or 
mobilising and co-ordinating the often weak and 
scattered forces of revolutionary insurgency 
throughout the world. . .
In concrete terms the choice of policy, according to this 
view, is between a united front from above or a united
" McCRAW D Chinese Foreign Policy - An Ideological Approach, 
Wellington (Price Hilburn for New Zealand Inst, of International 
Affairs), pp. 7, 16
* ibid. 
CAM
1980 p. 93
ILLERI J. China’s Foreign Policy Oxford, (Martin Robertson)
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front from below. More specifically, the author sees the 
change in 1957-8 as one in which the Chinese were tending 
to try to replace a Bandung-style united front from above 
(based on governments) by a united front from below (based 
on peoples)
A critical issue in understanding the major shifts would 
thus seem to be that of definition of the united front. 
This view is close to the analysis put forward by Gittings, 
who also stresses that the shifts are a response to the 
external environment, or at least to decision-makers' 
perception of it. Speaking of the situation in 1953-4 he 
proposes an argument, which could be of wider 
applicability, to the effect that Chinese decision-makers 
saw this as a period of greater relaxation, where broader 
alignments could be formed:
"when the imperialist heat was on, this analysis 
implied, and armed struggle was the order of the day, 
the bourgeoisie was more apt to 'waver', and the 
anti-imperialist front would be defined more narrowly. 
This concertina-like analysis would recur in the late 
1950s and again during the Cultural Revolution.
Applying this perspective to the period we are directly 
concerned with, Gittings regards the change in 1957 - which 
he dates to earlier in that year than many other authors - 
as one whereby the CPC leadership was
"shifting towards a much cooler view of the 
anti-imperialist potential of the neutralist
countries.
210
ibid p. 84
12 (jittings j. The World and China London (Eyre Methuen) 1974 p. 
ibid pp. 212-3
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Speaking more specifically in relation to the Middle East 
in this period, Shichor follows a line of reasoning which 
appears quite close to that of Gittings in asserting that
"Neutralism, which had been tolerated in peacetime, 
could no longer be approved in face of persistent 
western aggression"**
Hence, from the Chinese angle, the Asian African countries
"were advised to abandon their middle-of-the-road 
position and co-operate closely with the Soviet Union 
and the socialist camp."“
It could be remarked that there is no logical necessity for 
the anti-imperialist front to be defined more narrowly by 
a socialist state in a period when the 'heat is on'. A 
sense of acute threat could in fact lead to a less 
' choosy^ approach in the search for allies and the 
definition of the progressive camp. Nor would it 
necessarily be true that radical phases in domestic and 
foreign policy would coincide, since it could, for example, 
be logical to take advantage of a relaxed situation 
internationally to pursue more radical goals domestically.
The next step will thus be for us to examine concretely how
the CPC perceived the international system in the period
under consideration, including their perception of forces 
for change within it, to look at possible linkages with
domestic policy, and to examine how 'threatening' the
situation was perceived to be from China's own angle, since 
these are all crucial parameters for united front policies.
SHICHOR Y. The ttiddle East in China's Foreign Policy, Cambridge 
etc. (Cambridge UP) 1979 p. 79
" ibid.
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OHAJRTER 1 : IS SUES EOR THE
0-T>.0 - ■ S ANAL Y S I S OE THE
WORLD SYSTEM IN THE LATER 
I 9 5 0 S
SOME FEATURES OF THE MAOIST DIALECTICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE 
WORLD SYSTEM
We will now set out to provide a framework for analysing 
the Chinese leadership's view of the Middle East in this 
period, and will first establish some of the background 
factors in terms of the CPC's major policy concerns, as 
well as some overall characteristics of their world-view.
Our basic understanding is that according to the 
dialectical viewpoint held by the Chinese leadership at 
that time, the essential characteristics of a phenomenon - 
its contradictions, the struggles between different forces 
which characterised it - also at the same time constituted 
the factors which served to make it change into something 
different. The phenomenon we are concerned with here is 
the international system in a particular period of its 
history. The system at this period was characterised by a 
particular pattern of relationships which governed its 
history during a certain length of time. But this history 
was also the history of its changing into something 
else, because the contradictions which gave it its 
character by their own nature pushed it to a certain 
resolution which was a change into a system with different 
characteristics.
The post World War II system was characterised, at least 
from a political point of view, by three outstanding 
features: the hegemony of one actor, the USA, within the 
industrial world; the existence of a fairly coherent bloc 
of socialist states headed by the USSR; and the growth of
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national movements which made the old colonial system 
untenable in the long term.
None of these elements was stable, each element possessed 
its own internal dynamic, and also related to other 
elements in certain ways. There were processes of 
differentiation within each, as well as change in their 
position relative to other actors.
It would appear that the CPC considered that the 
international situation as it existed in 1957-8 was part of 
the same basic system which had emerged following World War 
II, but at the same time, it had reached a stage in which 
forces for of change had built up to a point where major 
structural shifts were likely.
It is crucial to grasp that from the Maoist point of view, 
there were different possible outcomes to this process of 
change. History did not move through stages in a linear or 
predetermined manner. There were thus opportunities for 
forces in the system to pursue milieu-orientated goals, to 
seek to alter the structure of the system, rather than 
simply maximise their interests within it.
This was the most important single parameter for united 
front policies: the Chinese were aiming to consolidate
alignments of forces which shared, at least for a time, 
common interests in a particular structural outcome which 
would favour them.
A BASIC PARADIGM FOR THE RELATION OF FORCES AT A WORLD 
LEVEL - MAO ZEDONG'S INTERVIEW WITH A.L, STRONG
It is possible to show that the CPC considered that the 
basic characteristics of international politics - the type 
of forces at work and the relations between them - retained
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an important degree of continuity as far as their essential 
characteristics were concerned between the time of the 
emergence of the post-War system, and the period 1957-8, 
which directly concern us.
The point of reference for this assertion is the remarkable 
importance attached by the CPC to one particular statement 
outlining the structural issues of the international system 
as it emerged following World War II and the main 
tendencies within that system.
The statement in question was that delivered by CPC 
Chairman Mao Zedong in the course of an interview with the 
US journalist Anna Louise Strong in August 1946. The
importance attached to this text in the period under 
consideration is such that we must first summarise its main 
points.
In the text in question Mao was asked about the possibility 
of the United States starting a war against the Soviet 
Union, and replied as follows:
"There are two aspects to the propaganda about an 
anti-Soviet war. On the one hand, US imperialism is 
indeed preparing a war against the Soviet Union; the 
current propaganda about an anti-Soviet war, as well 
as other anti-Soviet propaganda, is political 
preparation for such a war. On the other hand, this 
propaganda is a smoke-screen put up by the US
reactionaries to cover many actual contradictions
immediately confronting US imperialism. These are the 
contradictions between the US reactionaries and the 
American people and the contradictions of US 
imperialism with other capitalist countries and with 
the colonial and semi-colonial countries."
He went on to say:
"The United States and the Soviet Union are separated
by a vast zone which includes many capitalist,
colonial and semi-colonial countries in Europe, Asia 
and Africa. Before the US reactionaries have 
subjugated these countries, an attack on the Soviet 
Union is out of the question . . . Using various 
pretexts, the United States is making large scale
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military arrangements and setting up military bases in 
many countries. The US reactionaries say that the 
military bases they have set up and are preparing to 
set up all over the world are aimed against the Soviet 
Union. True, these military bases are directed 
against the Soviet Union. At present, however, it is 
not the Soviet Union but the countries in which these 
military bases are located that are the first to 
suffer US aggression. I believe it won't be long 
before these countries come to realise who is really 
oppressing them, the Soviet Union or the United 
States. The day will come when the US reactionaries 
find themselves opposed by the people of the whole 
world." ^
In the same text, Mao described the atomic bomb as a paper 
tiger, his first published use of the phrase, before going 
on to develop the view that all "reactionaries" are paper 
tigers.
The implication is quite striking - that the USA might 
accept de facto the cold-war division, and, as a corrolary 
of its abandonment of rollback, concentrate on building its 
positions in the developing world. One of the central 
themes to emerge from this text is the idea that the main, 
or at least most immediate focal point of world politics is 
not the clash between the two superpowers - as many people 
on both sides of the divide probably believed - but rather 
the conflict between on the one hand American attempts to 
establish their interests in the remainder of the world - 
the "vast zone", sometimes referred to in later 
formulations as "intermediate" - and on the other the 
popular movements which were attempting to prevent the 
realisation of these attempts.
This was the main 'line struggle' over the structural 
outcome of the conflicts engendered by the basic 
contradictions of the post-World War II international 
system, a process which, as we will argue, the CPC 
considered to be well underway by the period 1957-8 and
 ^ MAO Tse-tung Selected Works Vol IV Peking (EXP) 1969 pp 97-101
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indeed to have entered into a critical phase. In
particular, in the period under study it was felt that the
day "when the US reactionaries find themselves opposed by 
the people of the whole world" was starting to come close.
THE A.L. STRONG INTERVIEW AS A POINT OF REFERENCE IN 1957-8
This text remained an explicit point of reference in the 
latter part of the 1950s.
To begin with, Mao himself was still using and developing 
the same set of concepts, particularly when major questions 
of world strategy were being discussed. The beginning of 
the period under consideration was a critical one from the 
CPC's point of view, because there took place the Moscow 
Meeting of ruling communist parties in November 1957, which
we will discuss in more detail in the next chapter. On
that occas ion Mao was given the possibility of addressing 
the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and he took the opportunity 
to emphasise that the United States particularly rabid
in interfering in the internal affairs of those countries 
situated in the area between the US and the socialist 
camp"
In his first speech at the Moscow Meeting itself, Mao then 
outlined what is in effect a summary of the main points in 
the Anna Louise Strong interview, before proceeding to 
develop another idea which was not explicitly present in 
the interview but which immediately came to be associated 
with the whole cluster of ideas involved in the paper tiger 
concept. This was the thesis that "strategically we should 
slight all enemies, and tactically we should take full
 ^ MAO Tse-timg "Speech to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR" Nov 6 
1957; text in People's China Dec 1 1957 p. 7
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account of them", ^ which was to prove to be one of the 
central ideas developed by the CPC in discussing world 
issues during the remainder of the period in question.
Another stage in the elevation of the Anna Louise Strong 
interview to the status of a central point of reference 
occurred in September 1958 when Mao Zedong employed the 
same basic terminology in addressing the Chinese Supreme 
State Conference, and immediately afterwards the foreign 
affairs journal Shijie Zhishi published extracts from Mao's 
various speeches on the subject of "Imperialism and All 
Reactionaries are Paper Tigers". This collection was 
republished by Renmin Ribao and also as a pamphlet, and 
became the focus of a major mass study campaign.* In a 
speech to the Propaganda Department of the CPC Central 
Committee in November of the same year, Zhou Enlai made a 
statement to the effect that
"'Comrade Mao Tse-tung on Imperialism and All 
Reactionaries are Paper Tigers' is an extremely 
important political document which systematically, 
profoundly, and correctly solves the problem of how to 
recognise revolutionary forces and reactionary 
forces.":
The "problem" referred to here is one which can be 
considered a key issue in united front questions.
It is thus reasonable to conclude that the ideas put 
forward in the Anna Louise Strong interview and their
 ^Text in Peking Review 1956 Nov 11, p 9; see also Quotations from 
Chairman ttao Tsetung Peking FLP 1968 p. 75
* Comrade Rao Tse-tung on Imperialism and all Reactionaries are 
Paper Tigers Peking FLP 1st ed. 1958. Our references are to 3rd ed, 
second revised translation, 1966
 ^Renmin Ribao, Nov. 12, 1958, quoted in POLLACK J.D., Perception 
and Action in Chinese Foreign Policy - The Quemoy Decision, University 
of Michigan Dissertation 1976, p. 254
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subsequent development constituted a central theoretical 
point of reference on major issues of the interrelation of 
world forces throughout the period in question, whom to 
unite with and whom to oppose.
DYNAMIC ELEMENTS IN THE MODEL
While it has thus been possible to demonstrate that there 
was continuity at a basic level in the Chinese leadership's 
model of the international system, it is equally important 
to recognise that some of the characteristic contradictions 
embodied in that model had matured to a point where they 
were considered to imply the possibility of radical change. 
The individual elements within the model had in fact all 
undergone significant modifications, and this in turn 
implied changes in the relative balance of relations 
between them.
The text of the A.L. Strong interview reflected the period 
at which it was written in that the two camps are seen as 
overwhelmingly the most important active elements. In this 
respect the CPC's world view was anything but static. 
Major changes were introduced in their model, the most 
important being the evolution in the Chinese perception of 
the Asian-African countries from the status of an amorphous 
"area between" the two camps - where they were moreover 
banded together conceptually with the European industrial 
countries! - into a distinct and active force operating 
upon and working to change the world system.
Thus while the ingredients may have been the same, their 
relative importance was seen differently, and this 
signifies a qualitative shift which in turn necessarily 
influenced the role played by the other two main forces, 
the camps headed respectively by the USA and the Soviet 
Union.
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Of crucial significance to the united front aspect of 
China's foreign policy was the dynamic manner in which the 
balance of forces was conceived. It has correctly been 
stated that the Chinese decision-makers had a 
"predisposition .... to maintain a continuing calculation 
of the world balance of power",* although it would be 
preferable to say 'balance of forces' in order to 
distinguish the essentially dynamic Chinese view from the 
static, system-maintaining function of the balance of power 
as classically defined.
Without giving a detailed account of this evolution, it 
will be useful to refer to two major watersheds in the 
process, which were considered of immediate relevance to 
Chinese policy-makers in the course of the year 1958: 
firstly the experience of the Bandung Conference, and 
secondly the set of ideas expressed in the phrase "The East 
Wind is Prevailing over the West Wind".
THE ‘BANDUNG SPIRIT’
The Bandung Conference held in Indonesia in 1955 was a 
historic point of departure for the formation of an Afro- 
Asian (later 'third world') standpoint as a distinct 
current in international affairs. China's leaders played 
a strong role at that conference, and in turn the 
experience led to a new understanding on their part. Of 
particular significance for our purposes is the implication 
of what Bandung represents for united front policies: 
firstly a qualitative emergence of a new force in the world 
system, and secondly the articulation of milieu goals 
implying a restructuring of the rules according to which 
international relations were conducted.
* HALPERN A.M. "The foreign policy uses of the Chinese 
revolutionary model" China Quarterly J\ilY~Se^ t 1961 p.4
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At the Eighth National Congress of the CPC in September 
1956, Foreign Minister Chen Yi delivered a major speech "On 
the present international situation and our foreign policy" 
which was still considered topical by the Chinese 
leadership during the period we are directly concerned 
with.? In this text, Chen accorded central significance to 
the Bandung Conference, and remarked, speaking of the 
colonial countries and the national independence movement, 
that:
"they no longer form the massive rear of imperialism; 
on the contrary, they are becoming a positive force in 
promoting the progress of mankind."*
In connection with China's united front strategy, 
particularly important was the new input into international 
relations constituted by the so-called Five Principles,* 
which seek to promulgate a new approach to relations 
between states:
"To China, these five principles are by no means 
temporary or a matter of tactics or expediency. They
 ^ It was, for example, included in an important collection of 
documents on Chinese foreign policy with special reference to the 
Middle East, CHINESE PEOPLE'S INSTITUTE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, China 
Supports the Arab People’s Struggle for National Independence Peking 
(FLP) 1958 (heareafter, China Supports...), in preference to later 
texts such as Zhou Enlai's foreign policy report to the NPC of Feb 8, 
1958. Our references are to the translation of Chen Yi's speech which 
appears in China Supports...
* China Supports op. cit p. 34
* The Five Principles are: mutual respect for sovereignty and 
teritorial integrity, non-aggression, non-intervention in internal 
affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence. These 
principles were originally put forwaurd jointly by China and India, and 
they were expanded at Bandung into ten principles which formed a fuller 
code of conduct in international relations. China played a leading 
role in drafting these. See FARAJALLAH, S. Le Groupe afro-asiatique 
dans le Cadre des Nations unis Geneva (Droz) 1963 pp 102-3
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are our basic policy in the conduct of foreign
relations."W
This issue illustrates a point to which we will attach 
considerable importance in our argument: the idea that, at 
one level, the struggle of the developing countries tended 
to subvert the overall logic of the power-system as it 
existed, and impose a new set of 'rules', to restructure 
international relations, perhaps in the image of a new 
pattern of less conflictuel relationships which they were 
initially trying to build among themselves. Thus, in a 
major foreign policy report on March 5, 1957, Zhou Enlai
stated a common principle of some of the developing 
countries, including China, that "we are against the 
establishment of antagonistic military blocs, against the 
theory of the so-called 'vacuum', and against power 
politics" .
In the context of Bandung, the notion of the awakening of 
the East is already foreshadowed in the Chinese world view:
"Certain top-ranking leaders of the western countries 
are not willing to face the reality of the awakening 
of the East, the awakening of Asia and Africa, and 
this has led them to commit serious mistakes. If they 
still do not correct their perverted view, they will 
make mistakes that are still more serious. It might 
be of benefit to them if I stress this point here, for 
the purpose of opening their eyes."*
•THE EAST WIND PREVAILS OVER THE WEST WIND*
If the view of the Chinese leadership after Bandung was 
that the Asian-African countries had developed from an
China Supports op cit p 45
** CHOU En-lai (ZHOU Enlai), "A Report on Visits to Eleven 
Countries in Asia and Europe", March 5 1957, People's China Supplement 
April 1
** China Supports op cit p. 35
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"area between" into a position of ""becoming a positive 
force" [our emphasis], a further step was negotiated at the 
beginning of 1958 when the CPC, in employing the term "the 
East Wind prevails over the West Wind", clearly stated that 
these countries had now definitely become a separate 
category in their own right. Thus the Chinese concept of
"the East Wind prevailing over the West Wind" is a 
statement of the 'current balance" of forces in world 
politics, but also more importantly it refers to the 
direction of change:
"The countries of the world now fall into three 
categories: socialist countries; former colonies which 
are* now independent sovereign states and countries 
still fighting for independence or full independence; 
and countries of the imperialist camp." ^
This in effect signifies an assessment that an important 
step had been negotiated. An explicit three-force model is 
now unambiguously promoted. This can only imply a shift in 
the dynamic of the other forces as well.
Here we will simply draw attention to a few significant 
implications of the above statement. To begin with, the 
European countries are here included in the imperialist 
camp instead of the intermediate zone. In this formulation 
they are no longer seen as a potentially favourable force, 
although there was some debate on this question, and we 
will return to it in more detail subsequently.
Secondly, by recognising three distinct forces, the Chinese 
leaders were demarcating themselves from the cold-war 
dualism which was still prevalent at that time, even 
though, as we will argue in a moment, this does not mean 
that they accepted the definition which saw the developing
LIN Hai, "The East Wind Prevails Over the West Wind" Peking 
Review march 18 1958 pp 6-8, our emphasis.
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countries as occupying an intermediate position between two 
power-blocs vying to dominate them.
Thirdly, the analysis we have referred to brings together, 
within a single category, the independent, not yet 
independent and not yet fully independent countries of what 
would later be thought of as the third world. The Chinese 
critique of the Soviet tendency to consider countries no 
longer oppressed once they were decolonised was later to 
emerge as one of the most significant lines of demarcation 
between the leaderships of the two parties.^ During the 
period under discussion the concept of a third-world 
movement uniting these disparate elements had not yet 
crystallised in world opinion, but at the same time it was 
in the process of crystallising, and the Chinese analysis 
reflects this fact.
A NEW DYNAMIC IN THE WORLD SYSTEM
Given that the Chinese model of the basic forces in the 
system and their relations with one another was changing, 
what deductions could be drawn in policy terms? The most 
important issue in this respect was the relationship 
between the two forces which China itself spanned, namely 
the socialist movement and the nationalist movement in the 
developing countries.
In 1958 the Asian-African movement was viewed as a distinct 
current in world affairs, not in the sense of being opposed 
to the socialist camp but nevertheless not to be confused 
with or subordinated to it. If we look at the dynamic of 
change between the situation as analysed at the time of the 
Anna Louise Strong interview and that described in the 
"East Wind" concept, it would appear that - in the Chinese
see A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International 
Communist Ifovement Peking FLP 1963
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perception - the Asian-African movement did not simply 
'emerge' purely under its own steam as a distinct current. 
Rather, it emerged under the conditions of the system as it 
then was, a system in which the socialist camp constituted 
the leading progressive force. What was described as the 
socialist and peace forces were considered to exercise an 
important influence over the world system. A typical 
article of the period refers to the growing superiority of 
these forces, and goes on to say:
"Under these new circumstances the independence 
movement of the oppressed peoples of the world had 
greatly developed, so as to constitute one of the most 
important characteristics of the contemporary era."
There is thus, firstly recognition of the historical role 
of the socialist camp in creating conditions for the 
emergence of this trend, and secondly a statement that the 
new movement was now perceived to be standing on its own 
feet. This did not necessarily mean that the Socialist 
Camp was now considered redundant. The dynamics of the 
model would imply this as at least a possible outcome. 
However, in late 1957 and early 1958 this was not yet the 
conclusion drawn. On the contrary, emphasis was placed 
rather on the fact that the socialist system had also 
changed and developed in ways which gave it favourable 
openings.
In order to establish the overall context of Chinese 
foreign policy it will be necessary for us to devote some 
attention to how the CPC viewed the possibilities for 
socialist construction in this period. In an important 
sense, such construction was conceived as influencing the 
whole course of development of the world system. But we 
must first address a very important issue raised in the 
Anna Louise Strong interview, namely the crucial
Shijie Zbishi 1958 IV, p. 6 (editorial)
33
distinction between a threat to the socialist countries 
themselves, and threat to a wider revolutionary process.
This is an extremely important parameter for united front 
policies, because, for example, some commentators have 
drawn attention to the question of whether the 'heat is on' 
as a factor influencing them. The Strong interview 
precisely implies that the focus of conflict lay in the 
area which was not part of either 'camp' . It might thus 
appear that the CPC did not consider itself and the 
socialist camp to be an object of immediate threat at the 
time.
Was the radical line, then, a product of a feeling that the 
'heat' was not so much on, and that China was thus 
relatively more free to act in the international arena?
THE TAIWAN STRAITS CRISIS - WAS CHINA UNDER DIRECT THREAT?
There was one particular event which focused this question 
at the time, the Taiwan Straits crisis of 1958. As the 
event with the strongest international implications for 
which China was directly responsible during the period in 
question, it will be useful to discuss the issue briefly at 
this point.
In August 1958 the CPC took the decision to launch a 
bombardment of small offshore islands which were in the 
hands of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist regime entrenched in 
Taiwan. Intense shelling began on August 23 and continued 
for two weeks, whereupon the USA stepped in with a strong 
commitment of armed force. The issue remained acute for 
another month, after which it was defused; the CPC 
initiated a ceasefire, although a token bombardment was 
subsequently resumed.
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This crisis has been discussed by a number of authors. To 
begin with, it is a fact that the USA maintained, up to and 
including the period under consideration, a posture with 
regard to China which could be regarded as threatening. 
Sittings has given considerable evidence to show that 
China's overall anti-imperialist line was a response to a 
genuine threat from the United States, particularly in the 
earlier '50s when even nuclear attacks were considered. 
In the later 1950s, although the policy of rollback had 
abated somewhat, the American leadership was still adopting 
a threatening posture, at least verbally. And on June 28 
1957 Secretary of State Dulles delivered a statement that 
the United States would contribute to the process of the 
dissolution of the Communist regime in China.
Following this, Taiwan began to be used increasingly as a 
centre for activities of Guomindang agents in various 
areas, including Tibet, as well as serving as a base for 
actions in support of US objectives in other parts of Asia, 
notably for air support for forces combatting the radical 
nationalist regime of President Sukarno in Indonesia. 
There was talk of installing missiles in south Korea. The 
study by Gurtov and Hwang asserts that
"... had it not been for American actions - in Taiwan, 
elsewhere in Asia, and in the Middle East - Mao would 
have had no reason to order the bombardment of the 
offshore islands on August 23, 1958."
GITTINGS op. cit. p. 20 note, lists a series of warnings 
implying a nuclear threat issued by the USA to China in the period 
1953-4 in connection with events in Korea, the offshore islands, and 
Indochina.
GURTOV H and HWANG B-M, China Under Threat, Baltimore etc
(Johns Hopkins UP) 1980 pp 76-7
ibid. p 63
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In particular, events in the Middle East, specifically the 
US military intervention in Lebanon
"may have convinced Mao and his colleagues that the 
GMD's [Guomindang's] activities in the Taiwan Straits 
and elsewhere in Asia, far from being isolated events, 
were part of a pattern of anticommunist pressure 
engineered from Washington."
The strength of Gurtov and Hwang's study is that the 
Chinese leadership did indeed take a global view of the 
struggle with the USA and did conceive of China's own 
policy against the background of world trends. The 
subsequent development of our own analysis will confirm 
this point. The problem in the above statement is however, 
that it weakens the distinction between US threat to the 
socialist camp, on the one hand, and to the national 
movements on the other, which was one of the most important 
distinctions the CPC maintained.
The overall mood of Chinese foreign policy at the time 
scarcely indicated a fear of impending American attack on 
China itself. Sittings' analysis clearly implies that the 
Chinese leadership made an optimistic assessment of the 
situation in 1956, based on Mao's conviction that the USA 
did not want war at that time.
This provides a context in which to interpret the Chinese 
leadership's motives in starting the shelling. Pollack has 
proposed five possible levels of analysis: as a 'probe' to 
test both US and Soviet responses; as a reaction to a real 
threat from the Chiang forces; in connection with domestic 
mobilisation; as a means of testing the Sino-Soviet 
alliance; and finally as part of a struggle in the sphere
ibid. p. 84
GITTINGS, op. cit. p. 226
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of military policy-making, at a time when there were 
significant shifts in military line.^^
It is worth remarking that these levels are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive. It is probable that countries usually 
frame their policies with a view to maximising advantage 
accross a number of different spheres. However, in 
practice. Pollack would seem to regard the explanation of 
a real US-Chiang threat as the least likely.**
The possibility would still be open to argue that Beijing 
was taking advantage of a particular set of international 
circumstances in order to maximise its interests over 
Taiwan. This is the view expressed by Stolper, who 
stresses that the United States was quite isolated over the 
China recognition issue at that time. Arguing that it was 
Taiwan which was at stake, and not the offshore islands 
themselves, he sees the crisis as being initiated by 
Beijing, but not in response to a threat from the USA.**
While it is probably correct to see the crisis as being 
initiated by the CPC, we will argue that it is still 
necessary to place the analysis in a wider context.
The issue is referred to on a number of occasions in the 
material attributed to Mao which was published during the 
Cultural Revolution under the title Mao Zedong Sixiang 
Wansui, However, the imprecision of the texts makes their 
interpretation far from straightforward. There has been 
some controversy, for example, between Gittings, who argued
*^ POLLACK, J.D. Perception and Action in Chinese Foreign Policy - 
The Quemoy Decision, University of Michigan Dissertation, 1976; Chapter 
2.
** ibid., pp. 274 ff.
** STOLPER, Thomas E., China, Taiwan and the Offshore Islands, 
Armonk N.Y. (M.E. Sharpe) 1985, Ch. VIII.
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that Mao Zedong was expressing a satisfied verdict on 
having proved that it was easy to stir up a crisis and 
perturb the Americans; and Whiting, who argued that there 
were significant miscalculations, in that the United States 
did not back down, and Mao thereby left himself open to 
some domestic criticism.
It does at least appear from the material published in that 
source that direct threat to China was not perceived as so 
much of an issue. Towards the end of 1958 Mao seems to 
have argued that NATO was mainly defensive with regard to 
the socialist camp, while being offensive with regard to 
the nationalist movements, and to domestic communism. 
Such an assessment obviously fits in with the overall model 
put forward in the A.L. Strong Interview, a text whose 
topicality was reaffirmed strongly in the Chinese media at 
exactly the time of the bombardment of the offshore 
islands.
This, however, raises the possibility of a further 
hypothesis which deserves to be taken into consideration, 
namely that the decision was a response to a perceived 
threat from the USA, but not a threat directly against 
China or the Socialist Camp. The logic of the A.L. Strong 
interview would in fact be that if the intermediate zone 
had to be subjugated before a direct attack on the 
socialist countries was possible, it would be in the 
interests of the latter to defend it, if necessary by 
opening up a new 'front* against the West.
The idea that there was a perceived threat from the USA, 
but not directly a threat to China, is an important point 
and we will examine this hypothesis later when discussing 
the CPC's global view at the time of the critical events in
see China Quarterly, 1974 p. 755; 1975, pp. 263 ff. 
tiiscellany of Hao Tse-tung Thought Vol. I pp 135-6
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Iraq and Lebanon in the summer of 1958. However there is 
another relevant issue, which is the question of response 
to threat. The "paper tiger" concept in fact carries the 
implication that even if there is a real threat, the 
solution is to "despise" it, or in other words that threats 
are meant to be resisted.
A previous phase of heightened tension in the Taiwan 
Straits as early as 1954 had led the Chinese press to 
criticise "some people" who held that attempts to liberate 
Taiwan would create tension,^ and in the summer of 1958 
the CPC went further, in a mood which anticipates something 
of the flavour of the later Sino-Soviet polemic, or even 
the Cultural Revolution:
"All the US antics can only cow those opportunists who 
are ready to yield at any time to the blackmail of the 
atomic and hydrogen bombs, wheat and dollars of the 
US, but in the eyes of the indomitable people, the 
creators of new history, this is purely stinking 
rubbish to be swept away on the road of human 
progress.
This stress on the people as creators of history clearly 
points to a connection between a way of viewing world 
politics and the domestic policy of the Great Leap Forward. 
By uniting progressive forces, threats can be surmounted. 
In both areas it was necessary to 'seize the time'. In the 
minds of the Chinese leadership, particularly Mao, there 
was a dialectical connection between on the one hand threat 
and on the other hand possibilities for decisive advance. 
Threat can thus be viewed as a kind of penalty for failing 
to grasp the opportunities offered. In Mao's words, "Lenin
GITTINGS op cit. p 199
[CHINA Government] Oppose US Uilitary Provocation in Taiwan 
Straits Area Peking (FLP) 1958 p. 49
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constantly said: 'A nation always has two possibilities:
success or destruction. III 28
During the ultra-radical phase of the summer of 1958 there 
was an evident one-sidedness in the treatment of the paper 
tiger idea, in the sense that most of the emphasis was on 
despising the enemy strategically and little on taking the 
enemy seriously from a tactical point of view. This may be 
related to the overall climate of voluntarism which 
affected domestic policy as well during the period, and it 
was possibly in order to redress this problem that Mao 
further developed the paper tiger idea in a speech to the 
Political Bureau of the CPC in December of the same year, 
when he gave considerable attention to questions of 
tactics.^
We will return to this issue in examining the Chinese view 
of the crisis in the Middle East in the summer of 1958. 
The main issue at this stage is that the point of the model 
embodied in the A.L, Strong interview was not to see 
everything being played out in terms of a direct 
confrontation between the two camps.
DOMESTIC-FOREIGN POLICY LINKAGES - THE DECISION TO LAUNCH 
THE GREAT LEAP FORWARD
A corollary of the fact that the 'heat' was not so much 
directly on the socialist countries at that time was that 
they had the possibility to make important advances in 
their own construction. This possibility was also seen as 
a responsibility or necessity, because in Mao's perception, 
if you failed to 'seize' favourable opportunities you would 
not simply mark time, you would degenerate. This point
Miscellany of Mao Tse-Tung Thought, op. cit.
MAO Tse-tung, speech of Dec 1 1958 quoted in footnote to MAO
Tse-tung Sel Works Vol IV pp 98-9
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could be considered applicable to the Socialist world as a 
whole, but we will first examine the specific case of 
China's construction before looking into the wider 
Socialist Camp context of Chinese foreign policy in the 
following chapter.
The relevant issue from the united front point of view is 
that the Chinese leadership was seeking to advance domestic 
construction on the basis of certain social alignments, and 
was also looking to promote an international environment 
which would provide a favourable context for such a goal, 
while conversely socialist construction was also envisaged 
as a factor feeding back into the international 
environment, by promoting the strength of the 'forces' with 
which China identified. The question of domestic-foreign 
linkage is clearly particularly relevant when we are 
discussing such a period, in which major policy shifts in 
both fields coincided.
From a social angle, it is likely that one of the key 
aspects of seizing favourable circumstances was - from the 
CPC's perspective - to engineer the appropriate alignments 
of social forces, to bring about popular mobilisation. 
This view underlies the idea behind the Great Leap Forward, 
itself an expression of the East Wind model in terms of 
China's domestic policy.
The Great Leap Forward launched at the beginning of 1958 
was one of the most extraordinary experiments ever 
attempted at development strategy. We will deal 
subsequently with certain specific links with policy in the 
Middle East, notably in relation to the mass demonstrations 
in China in the summer of 1958, but at this point it will 
be useful to concentrate upon two aspects which may be 
considered directly relevant to foreign policy issues: 
arguments about how to assess the potentialities of a given 
situation, and domestic united front issues.
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The decision to launch the Leap Forward was a controversial 
one. One of the issues central to the leadership debate 
was that of balance, and as Zagoria has argued, sectoral 
balance within the economy was an important aspect of this. 
But there were wider implications as well, because the 
manner in which the dialectical concept of balance was 
discussed by Mao Zedong could be considered applicable also 
to wider issues of the assessment of the balance of forces 
as a context for building unity between certain of them.
Ih fact, the notion of balance is an important one in any 
form of systems-theory because it is relevant to how stable 
the system can be considered to be, and the strength of the 
forces of change within it. In one of the most influential 
texts of the period, Mao Zedong's On the Correct Handling 
of Contradictions Among the People, the issue is discussed 
as follows:
"Balance is nothing but a temporary, relative unity of 
opposites; by the end of each year, this balance, 
taken as a whole, is upset by the struggle of 
opposites. The unity undergoes a change, balance 
becomes imbalance, unity becomes disunity, and once 
again it is necessary to work out a balance and unity 
for the next year"^^
The launching of the Leap Forward was predicated on an 
assumption that one could not be nostalgic about preserving 
a certain mode of operation of the system, but had to move 
on to recognise the potentialities in new alignments. The 
fundamental orientation is towards change rather than 
system-preservation.
This basic philosophical attitude to systems was certainly 
applied to both domestic and foreign policy fields. In 
both fields there was a sense that there was an opportunity 
to make decisive advances if only it could be seized. In
MAO Tse-tung (MAO Zedong) Four Essays on Philosophy op. cit p.
95
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both fields the role of the masses was stressed, 
particularly their consciousness, as a material force. 
This does not mean that an understanding of the 
specificities of the two fields was necessarily lost sight 
of, but in practice the Leap Forward generated a definite 
'mood' of "going all out and aiming high" from which it 
would have been hard to insulate foreign policy entirely.
It is interesting that one of the important Renmin Ribao 
editorials which ushered in the radical phase of the Leap 
Forward is entitled, "Away with the Old Balance, On to a 
New Balance.". In that article it is argued that during 
1956, "Many people.... erroneously raised the slogan 'oppose 
too hasty progress', which threw cold water on the 
enthusiasm of the masses."^ The official view in the Leap 
Forward period was that circumstances had been right for an 
upsurge in 1956 but this had not materialised. At the 
time, in 1956, the CPC Central Committee already argued 
that the criticism of rightist, conservative ideas carried 
out at its 6th plenary session had created conditions for 
a development in socialist transformation.^^ This 
perspective, which we also find in Mao's comments on the 
co-operative movement, already anticipates the view put 
forward in 1958 that the role of ideology is critical.
In November 1957, when the left line had probably won out, 
Liu Shaoqi put forward the analysis that the real 
possibility for a Leap Forward had been frustrated in 1956 
because of "vague doubt and r e j e c t i o n " L a t e r ,  he argued
Remain Ribao Editorial Feb. 28 1958; PR 1958, 2, p 9.
CHINA State Statistical Bureau, Report on the Fulfilment of the 
National Economic Plan of the PRC in 1955, Peking (FLP) 1956 p. 5
sec Socialist Upsurge in China's Countryside Peking (FLP) 1957.
LIU Shao-ch'i, "Speech at the Peking Rally in Celebration of the 
40th Anniversary of the October Socialist Revolution (Nov. 6 1957"; 
Xinhua Supplement No. 3 Nov 11 1957 p. 8
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that China's development had shown a U-shaped curve during 
this period, with growth in 1956 and 1958 punctuated by a 
downturn in 1957.^^
These discussions were highly specific to the domestic 
field, but at the same time the general overall approach of 
'seizing' upon favourable circumstances - including a 
certain popular 'mood' which communists had a 
responsibility to give leadership to in order to realise a 
decisive advance - was prevalent in the foreign policy 
sphere as well. Moreover, the domestic debate was not 
economistic, it centred on the contrary on the assessment 
of social forces - how to recognise the possibilities which 
existed for uniting radical elements in order to push the 
system decisively in a certain direction.
This is not to deny that the CPC preserved some sense of 
the distinctness of the two spheres, but this takes us to 
another very important level of analysis: domestic and
foreign affairs were indeed regarded as two distinct 
spheres, but ones which interacted with one another in a
historically specific manner. In assessing the
characteristics of a given situation and the tasks it 
required, the CPC took account of both domestic and 
internal factors. The relationship could be understood In 
terms of Mao Zedong's proposition that internal causes are 
the basis of change and external causes the condition of
change. The decision to launch the Leap Forward was thus
taken against the background of a particular set of 
international circumstances.
The conception of an international balance of forces 
serving as a backgrround to construction in China was
LIU Shao-ch'i "Report to the Second Plenary Session of the VIII 
Party Congress of the CPC", May 5th 1958, Collected Works of Liu Shao- 
ch’i, Hong Kong (Union Res. Inst.) 1968, p. 18
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clearly established. Speaking at the Eighth Party Congress 
in September 1956, Mao Zedong said: "At present,
developments in the international situation have become 
even more favourable to the work of construction in our 
c o u n t r y . P a r t i c u l a r l y  interesting for our purposes is 
the existence of an optic in which in a certain sense 
international and domestic united front forces are seen as 
being intertwined. This emerges strongly from the 
following official statement published in the early part of 
1957:
"The general international situation is tending toward 
ease and toward progress. Inside the country, our 
socialist construction has already been attended by 
gigantic achievements, our socialist revolution has 
won decisive victory, and class relations have 
undergone basic changes. The people of our country 
nnift utilize this favourable situation and all 
favourable factors to unite with all forces inside and 
outside the country that may be united with, struggle 
assiduously to build the country into a socialist 
industrial nation."^'
However, it is equally important to note that the process 
was, in the CPC's perception - a two-way one. The Great
Leap could in turn have been expected to exercise an
influence upon the international environment, if it proved 
a successful experiment. Via socialist construction, the 
Leap Forward was designed to strengthen the progressive
camp in the world balance of forces, possibly to cement
links between socialism and the developing world by 
demonstrating in a striking manner the applicability of 
socialist models to the latter. Thus it could influence
MAO Tse-tung, "Address to the Eighth Congress of the CPC" in 
China Supports op. cit. pp. 20-1
CPC, Political Resolution Adopted by the third session of the 
Second Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, National 
Committee, March 20 1957; Renmin Ribao March 21. Text in Current 
Background No 450 April 15 1957 p 1.
45
alignments and create new possibilities for united fronts. 
It is probable that in the course of the year 1958 this 
aspect became increasingly important as criticisms of the 
Soviet Union made the CPC feel it had a responsibility to 
make a decisive impact upon the world system by 
regenerating communism.
Zagoria has pointed out that
"Once the left gained the ascendancy, there was 
persistent criticism of Right-wing economic views, but 
virtually no criticism of Right-wing views on foreign 
policy. It is therefore possible that intra-party 
dispute was confined to domestic policy."
It can be hypothesised that the grounds of agreement were 
that the international situation was such that China had 
both the possibility and the responsibility to push ahead 
with its domestic construction. This still left the 
internal debate over how to do this, and how far one should 
for example neglect factors like the balance of different 
sectors in the economy in doing so. As we will argue in 
the body of this research, although the left-right line 
struggle on international questions may have been muted 
within China, it did occur at a different level, in the 
form of more or less veiled criticisms of the Soviet line.
SOCIAL ALIGNMENTS WITHIN CHINA IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
The identification of goals can be considered an important 
element in united front policies, because how goals are 
defined at each stage influences the assessment of which 
social forces can be united and around which lines.
ZAGORIA D.S. The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956-61, Princeton N.J, 
(Princeton UP) 1962 p 72
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One of the themes which strongly characterised the Leap 
Forward period was a picture of a revolution boldly 
advancing by continually identifying and attaining new 
goals. However, there was a very strong trend to replace 
social analysis with stereotyped political labels. 
Increasingly, with the predominance of the strongly 'left' 
line, the term 'bourgeois' was used as a negative point of 
reference.
This issue became implicated in debates within the 
international communist movement, at least once Mao started 
stressing the class dimension of such conflicts. This can 
be seen in a passage from the Moscow Declaration of 1957, 
which clearly bears the imprint not just of the Chinese 
delegation, but of Mao himself:
"The existence of bourgeois influence is an internal 
source of revisionism, while surrender to imperialist 
pressure is its external source. "3*
There was a real problem for the CPC, once the goal was 
formulated unambiguously in terms of socialism, to conceive 
of the domestic united front as a real unity of disparate 
forces. The tendency to homogenisation in practice became 
extremely strong. It was thus frequently emphasised that 
the current goal was that of socialism, and only those who 
supported this could be classified as progressives. One 
interesting point which was often made is that in these 
circumstances there was no room for a middle or neutral 
position:
"During the period of the democratic revolution, 
anyone who opposed imperialism, feudalism and 
bureaucrat-capital ism was revolutionary. But today, 
during the socialist revolution, anyone who wants to 
be a revolutionary must oppose capitalism and go the 
socialist way. If you want to go the capitalist way
Survey of China Mainland Press No 1801 p.2
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you are a reactionary. The choice lies between the 
two: there is no middle way.
One issue which served to crystallise the debate about the 
•middle of the road' position was that of the democratic 
parties - political groupings distinct from the communist 
party which had broadly supported the goals of the 
revolution in the early period. In what was at least 
nominally a multi-party system there was obviously a risk 
that these entities would recruit a new following, which 
was a problem for the Communist Party leadership. Hence 
the emphasis on the non-viability of a 'middle road'. It 
was argued that in the course of the year 1957 "rightists" 
had sought to "usurp the leadership" of these 
o rganisations,and had suffered defeat. Withering 
criticisms were made of "super-political neutralist third 
persons".*^ The process was one whereby it was hoped that 
most of the "neutralists" would choose to move towards the 
left :
"1 he national bourgeoisie, the bourgeois intellectuals 
and the members of the various democratic parties, who 
sl-jnd in the middle of the road and are half-hearted 
about socialism, have changed or are changing to a 
greater or lesser degree, their old political
outlooks Most of these people, sensing 'the
compelling force of circumstances,' now feel that they
^ CHOU Yang (ZHOU Yang) "The Great Debate on the Literary Front" 
(Feb 28 1958), Peking Review flarch 18 1958
KUO Ho-jo (GUO Homo), Speech at a rally of democratic 
personages, Peking, in Peking Review Jlarch 25 1958 p. 10
CHANG Chi-yi, "The nature, function and political position of 
the democratic parties", Guangming Ribao 15-20 March 1958 in JPRS DC 
366. The sense of the original would probably be "supra-political".
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must make further progress and must not remain in 
their middle-of-the-road position as before..."^
If we are considering the significance of the above ideas 
for foreign policy, an immediate response might be that 
there was a clear sense of difference between the way the 
united front was assessed in the two fields. At a state- 
to-state level, Chinese decision-makers strongly affirmed 
the Bandung spirit, with its implications of neutralism, 
even though neutralism was a major target of attack 
domestically.
However, the significance of this latter distinction should 
not be over-emphasised. The Chinese interpretation of the 
Asian-African movement was not as a middle force between 
the two camps, on the contrary they saw that movement as 
standing on the front lines in opposing the main enemy, 
imperialism. At the time of Yugoslavia's expulsion from 
Cominform the Chinese had condemned Tito in violent terms 
for suggesting such an idea.^^ This was one issue on which 
their line remained unchanged from the 1940s to the period 
under consideration, and they spared no pains to resist any 
Soviet tendency to revise the verdict over Yugoslavia.^
Another aspect of the domestic situation where the Chinese 
leadership was concerned with assessing the balance of 
forces in this period was in the field of nationalities 
policy. Here the forces concerned were national rather
LIU Shao-ch'i Report to Second Plenary Session, Eighth Party 
Congress, Coll. Works op cit. p. 6
^ see LIU Shao-ch'i (LIU Shaoqi), Nationalism and Internationalism 
Peking FLP, ND, p. 21
see CH'EN Po-ta's (CHEN Boda's) article in Hongqi June 1 1958 
trans. in Peking Review 3\sne 17 1958 p. 10
49
than class ones, and in this field the linkage with foreign 
policy would be particularly interesting.
The nationality question was a very important one for the 
Chinese leadership, in their quest to unite the state as an 
actor within the world environment. Even though minority 
nationalities made up only about 6% of the population, 
areas predominantly inhabited by them made up as much as 
60% of the country’s surface area. From a foreign policy 
point of view, it is interesting to note that, as a 
developing country, China had a breadth of experience 
spanning different conditions and even different historical 
eras of socio-economic structure It could thus be
argued that China had direct experience of practically 
every different problem faced by developing countries.
In general, the line followed on this question during the 
Leap Forward period apj^ tars to be analogous with that 
pursued with relation to social forces - one was either 
with socialism or against it.
A political movement was thus initiated particularly in the 
minority areas, entitled "giving hearts to the Party".^ 
More specifically there was a strongly anti-religious 
tendency during this period. The attack on religion was 
presented as part of the general stress on a daring and 
emancipated mental outlook, and in this sense it appears
^ see JÜNYRO N "China's Cultural Revolution and Technical 
Reforms", Chugoken Shiryo Geppo Nov. 1958 in JPRS 673 D
see for example WANG Chia-hsiang (WANG Jiaxiang), "The 
International significance of the Chinese people's victory" in Ten 
Glorious Years Peking (FLP) 1960 p. 272
see the articles from the paper directed towards Muslims, 
Zhongguo Musi1in translated in JPRS 1453 N, particularly the issue of 
August 10, 1958
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simply as a particular expression of the overall 
ideological policy prevalent during the Leap Forward 
period. In rationalistic terms, it was argued, for example 
that land given over to burial-places could advantageously 
be turned over to productive uses But this line,
applied to minority nationalities, actually carries 
particular, and quite threatening, implications of denial 
of national particularity and attempted cultural 
homogenisation within the majority Chinese entity which was 
being built as a powerful world actor.
Particularly relevant in our context was the line pursued 
with regard to the Moslem nationalities:
"After the removal of feudal superstitions and the 
supernatural outlook, there remained many old customs 
which created contradictions with the new economic 
fundamentals and which tended to hinder the immediate 
expansion of productive potentials. With this problem 
before us, it was the general desire of the great 
people speedily to increase production towards the 
immediate establishment of socialism.... Confronted 
with this essential and common matter, it was 
necessary that .... traditions which had impeded 
productive expansion be extraced from their vet y
roots.
However, this homogenizing trend, threatening though it 
was, does not provide the whole truth about nationalities 
policy during the period. It would be a mistake to see the 
Maoist line on social development, which formed the basis 
of the experiment of the Leap Forward, as a line of ironing 
out differences. On the contrary it was a position which 
stressed that those conventionally considered the most 
backward or primitive, because they were poor and 
marginalised, had a great potential for changing the world
CHEN Chung-1i, "Brilliant victory of Chairman Mao's theory of 
Atheism", Guangming Ribao Aug. 17 1958 in JPBS 681 D p 47
Zhongguo ttusilin Aug. 10 1958 in JPRS 1453 N pp 15-16. The 
English text should be taken with some reserve because the standard of 
translation in this source was poor at the time.
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because they needed change the most, and could thus leap 
directly into the forefront of the revolutionary process. 
For example, with respect to Inner Mongolia, it was argued:
"...Those who exaggerate its backwardness regard 
backwardness as a liability and feel inferior to 
others, no matter where they are or what they do. 
They always follow in the path of others, having no 
courage to think ahead, to do much or to create 
anything....
"The remnants of self-abasement characteristic of 
semi-colonial states that beset many of us have 
clouded accurate assessment of Inner Mongolia. We 
have suffered from imperialist insults and aggressions 
for over one hundred years. When the imperialists 
robbed our economic resources and ruined our culture, 
thry also did all they could to inculcate in us many 
Stj vile ideologies to help safeguard their reactionary 
rule...[which].... produced corrosive and damaging 
effects on our own racial self-esteem. These made us 
too timid to stand on our own feet."^^
These remarks have a very clear relevance to the Chinese 
perception of the role of the Asian-African peoples within 
the overall context of system-change at a world level.
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN DOMESTIC-FOREIGN POLICY LINKAGES
The question of the relationship between domestic and 
foreign policy during this period is certainly one which 
would repay more detailed study, but this would be beyond 
our scope here. All that can be done here is to make some 
points which will be worth retaining when looking at the 
Chinese analysis of events in the Middle East.
The first aspect of interaction appears to be at the level 
of methodology: The Chinese leadership applied a similar 
overall approach to analysing both domestic and foreign 
affairs. They applied the dialectical view of the
FAX Chih-pin, "On the talk about the backwardness of Inner 
Mongolia", Neimengge Ribao June 19 1958, in JPRS 681 Dp. 27
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transformation of opposites, of the backward becoming 
advanced, and of development through qualitative leaps.
In particular, the CPC stressed the importance of ideas in 
influencing material reality. At one level, they gave 
particular weight, in assessing a situation - domestic or 
international - to a factor like the state of consciousness 
of the masses, which might be accorded much less 
importance in other analytical frames of reference,
including those widely employed in the West or even in the
Soviet Union.
At another level, the Chinese leaders also stressed the 
ideological dimension in connection with decision-making. 
They considered that decision-makers had a responsibility 
correctly to appraise and thus to 'grasp' the opportunities 
presented by a particular set of favourable circumstances.
The second form of interaction can be seen in terms of the 
practical interrelationship between domestic and foreign 
environments, as part of a two-way process. On the one 
hand a certain international situation provided conditions, 
favourable or otherwise, for the unfolding of particular 
domestic policies. On the other hand, the success of those 
policies would materially influence the world system at 
large.
Another specific level of this direct interaction would be 
in connection with national minorities which share
characteristics (cultural etc) with other nations; in the
case we are concerned with, Moslems would be the most 
important example, although in a different context the 
question of the overseas Chinese would have to be 
considered.
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Thirdly, there is the question of certain specific methods 
which would have a common applicability to different 
situations, domestic or foreign. This is the level at 
which united front strategies are most directly relevant.
Fourthly, the Chinese leadership was conscious that 
despite all these levels of interaction, the domestic and 
foreign environments were specific, and different 
conditions might prevail in the two departments. A 
concrete example of this point is that there was apparently 
a greater consensus in the Chinese leadership on foreign 
policy issues than on domestic ones. Moreover, the united 
front, for example, could be defined differently in the two 
spheres. Having said this, though, it seems probable that 
during the Leap Forward a certain 'mood' took hold of the 
Chinese leadership - the need for favourable circumstances 
to be taken advantage of, for opportunities to be 
'grasped', the image of risk, with 'threat' materialising 
as the penalty for failure to seize favourable chances. 
This percolated between the domestic and foreign policy 
spheres and may have rendered it difficult to maintain the 
detachment necessary in order to assess the two in the 
sense in which they were separate and distinct.
The next stage of our enquiry into the parameters of 
China's international line necessitates an examination of 
the wider context in which China was seeking to contribute 
to the building of socialism as a component in the 
international alignment of forces - that is China's role 
within the grouping then known as the Socialist Camp.
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2 : OH IN A ■ S ROLE IN
THE INTERNATIONAL SOOIALItiT 
I^OVEMENT AS A CONTEXT EOR 
UNITER FRONT ROLICIES
A démonstration of the vitality of socialism was considered 
an important aspect of the East Wind trend, and more 
specifically, China's membership of a socialist grouping 
provided a major focus for the action which the CPC was 
seeling to deploy in order to influence the world balance 
of forces. As we will argue, one of the most important 
changes to the overall model espoused by the Chinese 
leadership during this period concerned the role of the 
Socialist Camp, so it will be necessary to broaden the 
discussion to embrace this dimension here.
There is a significant sense in which the CPC was first and 
foremost not putting forward simply a Chinese foreign 
policy, but a policy for the Socialist Camp as a whole. 
The importance of this dimension is reinforced by a number 
of other levels of relationship: in terms of state-to-state 
relations, China's post-1949 policy of leaning to one side 
wan only reinforced by the American blockade at that time, 
and the economic relationship with the Soviet Union was a 
major influence - positive or negative - upon models 
employed in domestic economic construction. The socialist 
camp constituted an international subsystem, and was in 
fact a significant forum for united front relations in its 
own right. It is also to be noted that a number of Chinese 
sources can be read as an expression of veiled critiques 
with respect to Soviet policy, and these provide an 
important context where the CPC was most conscious of 
questions of 'line'. In the remainder of this chapter we 
will refer to a few of these issues from the point of view 
of establishing the overall context of Chinese foreign 
policy during the period.
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Issues relevant to united front policies include both 
internal relations within the Camp, and the question of its 
relations as a body with other forces. The two are in fact 
interconnected, because the question of strategy or 'line' 
vis-a-vis other actors in the world system was precisely 
one of the the major issues around which the CPC sought to 
unite forces within the Camp.
It may appear that 'united front' concepts could not 
directly be applied within the communist movement, for the 
reason that this movement was supposed to reflect a 
homogeneous social or class orientation. The Third 
International had indeed adopted norms very similar to the 
democratic centralism which prevailed within individual 
communist parties. After World War II, there was no such 
formal structure. The Communist Information Bureau, set up 
in 1947, was a purely European body, and even that was 
wound up in 1956. Perhaps from the angle of the 
traditional Soviet view, an organ for ironing out 
differences should have been superfluous if there was unity 
of class stance, but practice had shown this to be quite 
untrue, with the events of 1956 in Hungary and Poland, 
which in turn had repercussions throughout the bloc.
Thus it must have appeared an urgent question to hammer out 
some unity of line, particularly in a context where, 
despite problems at the time of the Suez War, the 
capitalist world enjoyed a fairly significant degree of co­
ordination in their foreign policy, under US auspices. 
However, even in terms of bilateral relations between China 
and the USSR it seems that there was a shortage of 
functioning mechanisms for resolving differences through 
discussion. This may indeed help to explain why the 
Chinese relied to a considerable extent upon innuendo 
contained in their public policy statements to make their 
points.
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In order to repair this anomaly somewhat, the ruling 
communist parties held a summit conference, known as the 
Moscow Meeting, in November 1957. Our period runs between 
this important landmark and another summit, bilateral this 
time, between the Chinese and Soviet leaderships in the 
summer of 1958.
The only actor other than the USSR which could possibly 
aspire to contribute significant initiatives in terms of 
the guiding orientation of the Socialist Camp was obviously 
China, and in fact the CPC invested very heavily in the 
Moscow meeting.
Even though China's independence of action was unique, the 
existence of an independent Chinese role in itself also 
exercised a certain influence over the other actors. China 
had been influential in preventing the USSR invading Poland 
in 1956, for example. Although from the beginning of the 
'sixties the CPSU was to be quite successful in isolating 
China, this was not yet the case in 1957-8, and it is 
important to remember the specificities of that period. At 
this point in time polycentrism within what was still a 
single socialist grouping provided a possible basis for a 
measure of independence for other actors within it. Mao 
Zedong was officially regarded as a great Marxist-Leninist 
at this time, and he held a status and prestige within the 
international communist movement which no-one in the Soviet 
Union could begin to match - certainly not Khrushchev who 
had only begun to consolidate his leadership after a 
struggle with the Molotov-Malenkov group as recently as 
June 1957.
DYNAMICS OF THE ALIGNMENT OF FORCES - SOCIALISM TRIUMPHANT 
OVER CAPITALISM
A significant theme for the Chinese Party was to restore 
confidence in socialism and stress that, despite the
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problems of 1956, it was a triumphant force at a world 
level because it constituted a more successful 
socio-economic system than capitalism. The Soviet line at 
that time was one which stressed peaceful economic 
competition between the two camps. The CPC agreed that 
"The socialist camp is confident that it does not have to 
rely on missiles, rockets and nuclear weapons to defeat the 
imperialist camp. Its victory will be achieved through 
peaceful economic competition."  ^ Despite later Soviet 
allegations, it does not appear that the Chinese leadership 
cheerfully contemplated, still less advocated, military 
conflict between socialist and capitalist states. They 
believed that the superiority of socialism would 
demonstrate itself in developmental terms.
This process of socialism demonstrating its superiority was 
seen as part of the shifting balance of world forces away 
from the imperialist camp which characterised, from the 
Chinese angle, the newly favourable circumstances around 
late 1957. This was seen as a major shift in the world 
system influencing all other forces. An article published 
following the Moscow meeting of November 1957 put it this 
way :
"The socialist system plus a certain level of material 
strength gives us superiority in the entire balance of 
forces.
Because of the dynamic character of the analysis, what was 
being discussed was not just a balance - in a static sense 
- but a trend. Everything was in motion and the important 
point was to grasp not just who was stronger at a 
particular time, but above all the direction of change.
 ^V-jong Bao editorial. May 25 1958 in Peking Review 1958 14 p 26 
 ^People's China Dec 16 1957, quoted in GITTINGS op cit p 218
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Thus developments in the time-span immediately succeeding 
the Moscow Meeting were read as confirming a trend towards 
accentuated superiority of socialist forces. This 
constituted a very important parameter for Chinese policy 
overall in the period.
One specific event which, through deliberate timing, made 
a massive international impact on the eve of the Moscow 
Meeting was the Soviet launching of the first artificial 
satellite on October 4th 1957.  ^ The Chinese press gave 
this enormous coverage, implying that it demonstrated a 
clear technological superiority over capitalism.
In early 1958 the western industrial countries began to 
experience a cyclical slump due to a sharp downturn in the 
business cycle which interrupted - temporarily as it turned 
out - the progress of the post-war boom. Chinese policy­
makers jumped to the conclusion that this represented a 
long-term weakening of capitalist growth. A major 
editorial written in May 1958 referred to a point six 
months previously when the situation took an important turn 
for the better, linked together the beginnings of the Loap 
Forward in China, the Moscow Meeting, and the launching of 
the Soviet artifical satellite, and added that in the 
succeeding half year
"thh:re have been new developments in the international 
situation in favour of the socialist camp. Of special 
significance are the opposite trends in the economic 
developments.
So a point in time around November 1957 was identified as 
a major turning point, with favourable developments in the
 ^It '. as immediately followed by the launch of a second satellite 
on November 3, just before the 40th Anniversary of the October 
Revolution (November 6) which was the focal point of the Moscow 
Meeting.
 ^Hrr dn Eibao editorial May 16 1958; Peking Review 1958 12 p 19
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socialist world constituting an important parameter for the 
development of other social and national forces of a 
progressive nature. In this context, international 
economics, socialist bloc relations, and Chinese domestic 
trends were all considered to interact with one another. 
While the Chinese gave considerable play to the superiority 
of the socialist system, it is important to note that they 
avoided an economistic interpretation, emphasising instead 
how economic progress was affected by, and in turn its 
effects were mediated through, political and ideological 
factors. Economic superiority did not by itself cause 
favourable changes in the international system, it only 
created conditions in which such changes could be brought 
about politically, and this in turn implied the need foj. a 
high degree of unity, of organisation.
INTERNAL SOCIALIST CAMP UNITY
A unified strategy would have obvious advantages in such a 
context, for socialism to be able to demonstrate its 
superiority, and maximise its influence.^ For the CPC the 
primary question was that of 'line'. However the 
cultivation of unity around this line was seen as an 
important technique in its own right. Rather than simply 
assuming unity as emanating automatically from a common 
class position, the CPC viewed it rather as something to be 
worked for - or, to use their terminology, struggled for.
From the CPC's angle it would thus not be correct to view 
inter-communist relations as occupying an entirely 
different sphere from united front relations. The CPC, 
under Mao's influence, espoused a fundamentally different 
conception of relations, even within a communist party 
itself, to that which prevailed in the Soviet conception,
V: will examine later, in the context of the Middle East, how 
far the Chinese believed the other two world 'forces' to be capable of 
arriving at a unified position
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one which accepted the existence of differing views and 
aimed to solve them, proceeding from the desire for unity. 
Unity was the major theme of the CPC in connection with the 
Moscow Meeting, and was reiterated, perhaps less 
convincingly, following the hastily-arranged Sino-Soviet 
summit in the summer of 1958.*
The form of unity which the CPC had in mind was thus not a 
monolithic conception which denied differences, but one 
arrived at through recognising the existence of 
contradictions, and seeking to resolve them. This 
approach, spelled out in general terms in Mao's On the 
Correct Handlingr of Contradictions among the People, was 
explicitly applied by him to socialist-camp affairs in a 
passage from one of his speeches at the Moscow Meeting, not 
published until twenty years later.^ In it, he uses the 
example of the drafting of the Moscow declaration to 
illustrate the process of give and take in arriving at a 
unified position. This provides an interesting case study 
in collective decision-making, in the sense that the 
Declaration embodied certain key ideas which were basically 
in conformity with Chinese theses, even though the number 
of parties which openly supported the Chinese line was 
probably quite small.® This may be because the pragmatic 
approach of the Soviet leadership at the time was such that 
they found it difficult to advance coherent lines to rival 
with the CPC.
This whole area is interesting in relation to united front 
policies. Unity sought with relation to the Socialist Camp
* sec the summit communique in Xinhua August 3 1958
 ^"The Dialectical Approach to Inner-Party Unity" in MAO Tsetung 
Sel Works Vol V, Peking (FLP) 1977
A rimilar point could even to some extent be made in relation to 
the Statement of the 1960 Moscow Meeting.
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was relatively more 'monolithic' than anything which could 
be contemplated with nationalist countries, but even here 
there is recognition of diversity and give-and-take: "At
each tactical stage, it is necessary to be good at making 
compromises as well as at waging struggles."*
It is thus surely justifiable, while taking account of the 
specificities of relations within the Socialist Camp, to 
consider that they were not considered by the CPC to be 
conducted according to a fundamentally different set of 
principles to other aspects of united front work. The CPC 
did not in fact see monolithic unity in this field as 
attainable, or even desirable.
RELATIONS BETWEEN SOCIALIST CAMP AND OTHER WORLD FORCES
What the CPC sought, and this seems to be a fairly general 
orientation of their united front work in other fields, was 
a working unity determined by a common struggle around key 
goals, in other words the starting point in the struggle 
for unity was that of line. in practice - at least in 
terms of the international issues which are our main 
concern - the most important single issue in determining 
the line around which unity could be built was the correct 
identification of the adversary against whom this working 
unity was to operate.
The struggle on international line in the Socialist Camp 
thus centred, from the Chinese point of view, around the 
issue of firmness with respect to imperialism. In this 
context, the leadership style of the Soviet Union during 
the Khrushchev period was indecisive, and different writers 
have referred to his "gambling instinct", or on the other
* ÏÎA > Tse-tung, Selected Works, Volume y Peking (FLP) 1977 p. 515
10 e.g. ULAM A.B. Expansionism and Coexistence London 1965 p 615
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hand to his preference for a low-risk a p p r o a c h . F r o m  
the CPC's point of view these judgements would not be 
mutually exclusive. In the open polemic of the early '60s 
they were later to accuse the Soviet leader of both 
adventurism and capitulationism at the moment of the Cuba 
missile crisis. Both these errors, as they saw it, would 
run counter to the CPCs ideal approach: a bold, consistent 
and scientifically worked-out overall line, realised 
through flexible policies. In another part of Mao's Moscow 
speech which in this case was published contemporaneously, 
he argued that "with regard to the whole we must despise 
the enemy, but with regard to each specific problem we must
take him seriously."^
Once this fundamental issue was determined, the next 
logical question to consider would be that of relations 
between the socialist camp and the Asian-African movement. 
Lenin had characterised the question of links with the 
"Peoples of the East" as the most important issue in Soviet 
international relations, but this strategy was eventually 
abandoned under Stalin in favour of a Eurocentric approach 
geared to neutralising threats against the USSR. As late 
as 1952 Stalin had produced a survey of the international 
situation which failed to pay serious attention to the non- 
European nationalist current. This clearly had to be 
rectified in the interests of a realistic assessment of 
world forces. Post-Stalin leadership changes in the USSR 
coincided with an accentuation of the nationalist movement.
e.g. TRISKA J.F. and FINLAY D.D. Soviet Foreign Policy York 
(Macmillan) 1968.
see Comrade Mao Tse-tung on Imperialism.. .op cit pp 24-5; later 
published under the title "All Reactionaries are Paper Tigers" in MAO 
Sel Works Vol V op. cit.
see STALIN'S Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSP (first 
published 1952)
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leading up to and beyond Bandung. On the diplomatic front, 
Khrushchev and Bulganin toured India, Burma and Afghanistan 
in 1955. On the ideological front there was a revision of 
the earlier negative judgements on nationalist policies, 
and the delayed impact of déstalinisation was beginning to 
express itself, for example, in the publication of somewhat 
favourable articles on Indian economic development in the 
course of the year 1958.^^ However, in terms of their 
appreciation of the focus of the main forces in the world 
system, the Soviet Union was still at this period 
concentrating to a considerable degree on the situation in 
Europe, "where the armed forces of the two military 
groupings are in contact and where local conflicts can most 
easily grow into major ones."
While the CPC did not neglect the importance of Europe, and 
indeed played a significant role in Eastern Europe in the 
context of the conflicts of 1956, they were clearly moving 
towards a different view of the main focus. The idea later 
set out in the open polemic that "the various types of 
contradictions in the contemporary world are concentrated 
in the vast areas of Asia, Africa and Latin America..." 
is foreshadowed in many of the positions in the period we 
are considering.
As the CPC saw it, it was a major goal of US policy to 
attempt "by all means to obstruct the joining of the
see CLARKSON, S. The Soviet Theory of Development, London 
(Macmillan) 1979
USSR Government "Reply to the Government of Poland concerning 
the Rapacki Plan" (March 3 1958) in Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, Documents on International Affairs 1958 p 132
A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International 
Communist hovement Peking FLP 1963 p. 12
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socialist, anti-colonialist and anti-war forces". The
convergence of these forces could certainly have a dynamic 
effect upon the world system.
This was the biggest single united front issue, and at 
least at the outset of the period under consideration it 
was regarded not primarily as an issue for Chinese foreign 
policy but as an issue for China to urge as a priority for 
joint Socialist Camp policy.
Of crucial importance in terms of China’s position is the 
fact that she was in a sense part of both groupings and 
sought to make unity with both forces - the Soviet Union 
and the socialist camp and movement on the one hand, and 
the colonial and former colonial countries on the other - 
the cornerstone of her foreign policy. As Mao said in 1957, 
"United with these two forces, we shall not stand alone". 
The process of seeking unity with both would also imply a 
bridging role between them. A key instance which we will 
examine subsequently is the relationship with Egypt from 
the time of the Bandung conference. But the general 
implications of this question are worth looking into more 
closely at this point. Clearly, the Chinese, because of 
their historical position, could make a major contribution 
on the issue, but presumably in return would have some 
justification for demanding an input into collective 
decision-making.
What China aimed for was a situation where "The forces of 
socialism and the forces of national revolution are 
converging to become an irresistble historical current that 
is violently shaking the last bastions of imperialist
131
J^ cnmin Ribao Editorial August 8, 1958
haO Tse-tung, Four Essays on Philosophy, Peking (FLP) 1968 p.
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reactionary rule" and became increasingly critical of 
the Soviet stance in general terms, as we will argue later 
in discussing the crisis in the Middle East in the summer 
of 1958.
THE QUESTION OF •SPHERES' WITHIN THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT
One interesting question which arises in connection with 
the hypothesis of a 'bridging' role, is that of a possible 
division of spheres of influence within the communist 
movement, with China perhaps concentrating on the third 
world.
The Soviet leadership did to a certain extent exploit the 
potential of the Chinese example for building links with 
the third world, and Mao's theory of the New Democratic 
revolution was affirmed as a contribution to the national 
liberation movement. On the other hand the overall goal 
of Soviet policy at the time seems to have been to contain 
violent revolution so as not to destabilise the world 
system. In this context, the idea of containing Chinese 
influence to a given geographical zone may possible have 
been attractive as an exercise in damage-1 imitation.
As we mentioned above, there was no formal structure in ihe 
communist movement at that time. There are accounts of a 
plan to give a few of the major parties responsibility for 
co-ordinating policy on a regional basis, with the USSR 
responsible for Europe (including north Korea and
Reimin Ribao editorial, Nov. 12 1958, in PR Nov 18 pp 11-12
scv the article by Y. ZHUKOV in World Marxist Review Vol I No. 
3, quoted and discussed in DAWISHA K. Soviet Foreign Policy Towa rds 
Egypt London (Macmillan) 1979 p 126
see the argument in GIRLING J.L.S. People's War London (Allen 
and Unwin) 1969
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Mongolia), China for East and South-East Asia, and the 
Communist Party of Italy for North Africa. It is argued 
that this plan influenced policy to some extent, and indeed 
we do find evidence of a special role played by the CPI in 
promoting the formation of a single communist party in 
Egypt. If such a division of spheres did in fact exist, 
then China's intense interest in the Middle East in 1957-8 
would be interesting as a signal of refusal to accept it. 
In terms of economic development as well, there is some 
evidence of a policy of regional specialisation: "It must 
be assumed that the European Socialist countries, united 
into one Economic Council of Mutual Assistance [CMEA], will 
build a special economic zone and will be the first to 
enter communism. The socialist countries of Asia, which 
have much in common in their economic and cultural 
developments, will constitute another regional zone and 
will also jointly enter Communism"
However from China's point of view, there is no evidence 
that the CPC ever did recognise any such limitation. Nor 
could it be said that the Soviet Union, for its part, ever 
exercised any restraint characteristic of a recognition of 
a Chinese 'sphere' in East Asia. In Burma, for example, 
the CPSU intervened directly to create a communist grouping 
loyal to it, something which provoked a split even as early 
as the period under consideration.
DA!.LIN D. J. Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin Philadelphia 1961
p. 463
l.ACQUEUP W.Z. The Hiddle East and Soviet Foreign Policy London 
1969 p. 170. Immediately following this, there was a setback with the 
formation of the UAH.
24 Voprosi Filosofii Oct 1958 quoted in DALLIN op. cit p. 492
DiNTON H.C. China’s Selations with Burma and Vietnam Bew York 
(Institute of Pacific Relations) 1958 p. 42
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There was also at this point some evidence of Soviet 
factional manoeuvring in East Asia in the attempt to build 
up a loyal faction in north Korea. This reached its
height around the time of the Moscow meeting, although in 
fact a pro-Soviet trend never did manage to become dominant 
there
During this period, the CPC was not, for its part, 
apparently manoeuvring to create pro-Chinese groupings. 
But their particular standpoint on encouraging revolution 
could well lead them to pay more attention to the potential 
of 'unfashionable' areas of the third world than the Soviet 
leadership did. This practice was, however, in no way 
confined to any special region of East Asia. For example, 
the CPSU paid little attention to the revolutionary 
potential of Latin America at the time, and delegates from 
that continent to the CPSU's XX Congress in 1956 were not 
even received by any member of the CPSU Central Committee. 
Immediately afterwards, however, they were invited to Ch1 na 
and had a long meeting with Mao himself.
In the period of the Moscow Meeting and again in the 
course of the year 1958 some of the Latin American CP 
leaders, even including a personality like the Chilean Luis 
Corvalan who for most of his career was pro-Soviet, held a 
discourse similar to that of the Chinese, making explicit 
references to the East Wind and Paper Tiger concepts. 
This point is interesting, in that there was an important 
evolution in the Chinese model from an 'Afro-Asian' view of
DALLIN op. cit. p. 461
see CHO M.Y. Die Entwicklung der Beziehungen zwishchen Peking 
und PPyongyang Wiesbaden (Otto Harassowitz Verlag -Institut fur 
An! ' ide) 1967
klCHER P La Chine et le Tiers honde 1949-69 Paris, Payot, 1971
pp 94-5.
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the united front of developing countries, into a more 
generalised view anticipating the image of the 'third 
world' - an evolution which occurred just in the period we 
are studying.
A significant facet of the period under consideration is 
that this was a transitional period in the emergence of 
clear alternative Chinese and Soviet 'lines'. At this 
point they were not regarded as mutually exclusive. Hence 
the possibility of the influence of the Chinese line 
'percolating' to unexpected areas of the movement. On the 
other hand, differences were in the process of 
crystallising to a point where they would be difficult to 
reconci1e .
THE CPC AS GUARDIANS OF LINE
Th^ importance of the Socialist Camp and socialist 
construction in influencing the world balance of forces 
overall has already been referred to. But this begs the 
question of the nature of the system within the socialist 
states - would it remain on the correct course? This is 
precisely what concerned the CPC and Mao himself, 
especially since the XX Congress of the CPSU in 1956. This 
was to be a major issue in determining the line aro^nid 
which to promote the unity of forces, both within 
individual socialist countries, and between them.
In fact, far from accepting any limitation of their sphere 
of action, either geographically to East Asia or 
functionally as proponents of the "Chinese road" or the New 
Democratic revolution, the tendency of the Chinese 
leadership in this period was to take an up-front position 
on all questions of revolutionary theory. What is 
sometimes thought of as the 'Chinese' line was conceived by 
the Chinese leadership itself not so much as something 
peculiarly Chinese, but just as much as a Itue
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interpretation of the Soviet experience. They saw 
themselves as guardians of this - if necessary in 
contradiction to the Soviet leaders themselves.
Already, after the XX CPSU Congress Mao had remarked to the 
CPC Central Committee: "Is the October Revolution still
valid? Can it still be the example for all countries? 
Khrushchev's report at the 20th Congress of the CPSU
says it is no longer necessary for all countries to
learn from the October Revolution. Once this gate is
opened, Leninism by and large is thrown out." He did not 
put the point quite so bluntly in public, but he did make 
an interesting statement in his major public speech at 
Moscow in November 1957 to the effect that "... after the 
October Revolution, if a proletarian revolutionary of any 
country should overlook or not seriously study the 
experience of the Russian revolution.... He would either 
commit doctrinaire or revisionist mistakes. We must oppose 
both these deviations simultaneously, but at present to 
oppose revisionism is a particularly urgent task." 
Certainly at one level this stateme nt can be seen as an 
affirmation of the need to learn flexibly from Soviet 
experience; but at another level it functions also as an 
assertion that Soviet experience is common property of the 
movement, and not the prerogative or monopoly of the Soviet 
leaders themselves. If the balance of forces between 
sr I;ilism and capitalism influenced the rest of the world 
system, it would clearly be of crucial importance for tlie 
forces of socialism to be united on the correct lines.
KAO Tse-tung "Speech at the Second Plenary Session of the Eighth 
Central Committee of the CPC" November 15 1956; Peking Seview 1970, 17, 
p. 6
ïii-j Tse-tung "Speech at a Joint Meeting of the Supreme Soviet of 
the USSP" Nov 6 1957; People's China Dec 1, p 6
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In these circumstances, the point made above about a Soviet 
desire to contain the influence of the Chinese line in 
order to contain violent revolution probably does not go 
far enough. At stake was also the CPSU's ideological 
leadership within its own bloc, and even its guardianship 
of the Soviet historical experience itself.
CHINESE AND SOVIET ECONOMIC GROKTH AND ITS IMPACT ON THE 
WORLD SYSTEM
A specific illustration is provided by the line on economic 
construction. If the socialist community were able jointly 
to sustain a period of rapid and impressive growth, this 
would undoubtedly change the world balance of forces. It 
could serve firstly to withdraw a larger proportion of 
world economic activity from the US-dominated area, 
secondly to provide a model for the nationalist movements 
and, thirdly to aid developing countries concretely in 
breaking their ties with the opposing system. This would 
be of critical significance to the overall alignment of 
forces, and provide a material basis for the anti­
imperialist united front.
Thus the stake was considerable. The Soviets and the 
Chinese both spoke of the importance of economic 
development during this period. But in using the same 
vocabulary they were not necessarily talking about the same 
thing.
Th-^  main point is that whereas the Soviet leadership 
thought successful economic construction would replace the 
nt;. d for violent revolution in the third world, the Chinese 
thought it would provide favourable conditions for a policy 
in support of violent revolution. For the CPC the era was 
a major historical turning-point which confronted the 
Socialist Camp with both immense opportunities and immense 
responsibilities. Decisive advances both could and had /o
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be made. Hence the argument for forcing the pace of
economic construction. The Soviet leadership looked at the 
question essentially in pragmatic terms, relative to the 
domestic economy. Indeed it is likely that they actually 
resisted the excesses of Chinese emphasis on the 
achievements of the Soviet economy in comparison to the 
West, pointing out that the latter was still superior in 
pT' ' ive t e r m s . I n  some instances, China's emphasis on 
Soviet economic strength can thus actually be read as one 
of the indicators of line differences.
Given the importance of divergent economic trends between 
the two social systems, capitalist and socialist, what did 
this concretely mean for the policies of the socialist 
states themselves? In the context of a dynamic conception 
of the world balance of forces, characterised by opposite 
motion of rising and declining forces, it is not surprising 
that developmental goals were conceived in terms of 
outstripping the opposition. Sino-Soviet co-operation was 
thus, at one level, defined in terms of the similarity of 
the line they were pursuing:
"The two socialist countries now find themselves in a 
great period when their economies are leaping forward, 
lo help these forward leaps and to ensure that they 
wi'l fulfill ahead of time their historical task of 
defeating the principal capitalist countries in 
proceful competitions, it is necessary for them to 
develop economic co-operation further."
The Soviet Union was following a plan designed to overtake 
the USA in steel production, while China pursued its own 
target of overtaking Britain, within fifteen years. The 
specific form of the Leap Forward follows from this, 
something which formed overwhelmingly the most important
S( : FEJTO F Chine-URSS - Le Conflit Paris (Pion) 1966
22 Pcnmin Ribao April 24 1958 in Peking Review 1958 9 p 18
see for example Peking Review 1958 1, editorial
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domestic parameter for Chinese foreign policy during the 
period in question. During the Leap Forward the goal of 
overtaking Britain was made a day-to-day issue of 
propaganda, being evidently considered to have a 
significant mobilising role, and also to be realisable. It 
is extensively discussed in Mao Zedong's report "SixLy 
Points on Working M e t h o d s " , w h i l e  Mao had also already 
put forward a goal of overtaking the USA by the end of the 
century.^
The degree of emphasis on steel production as an index of 
development could perhaps appear as a reflection of the 
somewhat one-sided way in which development was generally 
defined at that time, and could have the effect of making 
development appear a quantitative process. At times during 
the Leap Forward, the debate crystallised around a 
quantitative issue which seems in contradiction with what 
would normally be thought of as a more qualitative 
'Chinese' approach, namely that of speed. Liu Shaoqi put 
the issue very clearly in May 1958 when he said, "The 
speed of construction has been the most important question 
confronting us since the victory of the socialist 
revolution."
This perspective was not necessarily as economistic as it 
might appear, because the commanding role of ideology was 
stressed in realising such development. As Liu again put 
it, Marxism can produce grain and steel. But it was an
CH'EN J Uao Papers London (Oxford UP) 1970 pp 57 ff
35 K?.{) Zedong Xuanji Vol V Peking (Renmin Chubanshe) 1977 pp 193f
ZA{40RIA op. cit. p. 70
I-iii Shao-ch'i Speech to the second session of the Eighth Party 
Congress of the CPC, May 5 1958 in Peking Review 1958 14
73
emphasis which may have contributed to divert attention 0 ay 
from concrete development models.
Despite this, it is possible to discern something 
idf:;H I fiable as a more distinctive Chinese line in terms of 
content. In fact, even at that time the Chinese did 
clearly grasp, in certain respects very far-sightedly, the 
fact that development is a qualitative and not simply a 
quantitative process. The main points of the qualitative 
difference relate to the overall issue of the respective 
role of industry and agriculture, as set out in Mao's work 
on "The Ten Major Relationships". It is quite probable 
that Mao himself, as the main proponent of that model, 
urged more caution on the question of speed, and to ;:oine 
extent resisted the voluntarist tendencies of Liu Shaoqi 
and Deng Xiaoping during this specific period.'*
THE LEAP FORWARD AS MODEL FOR OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES
A realistic line on economic development and planning was 
clearly of crucial significance in the world balance of 
forces, and had important implications with regard to the 
developing countries. The significant point is that, just 
as the CPC was seeking to put itself forward as a guardian 
of orthodoxy in the political sphere, so its line on 
economic construction was conceived as embodying principles 
of universal applicability, and not merely as a line 
appropriate to China's own particular conditions.
At the high point of the cold war the USSR rigidly imposed 
its own economic model upon other socialist countries.
"What does it matter if it takes a year longer? It may even be 
a bit better". MAO Zedong, "Talk at the Chengdu Conference, March 10 
1958"in SHRAM S. (ed) Nao Tse-tung Unrehearsed, Harmondsworth (Penguin) 
1974 p. 105
ZAGORIA op. cit. p. 70
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Wit II the beginning of déstalinisation the demand for a more 
flexible, nationally specific approach resurfaced, as for 
example with the return to power of Wladislaw Gomulka in 
Poland. The CPC exerted its influence in Gomulka’s favour 
in 1956. It has been a fairly consistent theme of CPC 
policy from the 1920s onwards to stress the right of each 
party to determine a line appropriate to its own 
conditions, so long as this was within the general 
framework of Marxism-Leninism, so it would be tempting to 
see the Leap Forward as an assertion of this right to a 
nationally-specific line on China's own behalf - a right 
which would by implication apply to other actors as well.
The issue of simply affirming plurality, the right of 
countries to determine their own developmental options, 
coulfi be a significant point in relation to united front 
questions, insofar as a genuine recognition of plurality 
would seem to be an important basis for building meaningful 
unity with other forces. Such an interpretation of Chinese 
policy would, however, probably be one-sided. In fact, as 
Zagoria has pointed out, with the victory of the Left line 
in China in the late fifties, a different strand in policy 
came to the fore. With revisionism identified as the main 
danrj.' r , the Chinese became more concerned with stressing 
Marxist orthodoxy within the socialist camp as a whole than 
Ihty were with pluralism.
Thus the 'Leap Forward' philosophy was put forward not only 
in the name of China's approach to its own concrete 
conditions, but also more importantly as a more orthodox 
line than that of the Soviet leaders who had "let part of 
Leninism go by the b o a r d s " . I t  was thus potentially 
applicable to other socialist countries as well, rather 
than being seen as something explicitly Chinese.
KAO Zedong, "Talk at Chengdu" op. cit. p. 105
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Eventually, when the line on the People's Communes moved 
further and further to the left, Khrushchev was obliged to 
gird himself up for an ideological counter-attack, but 
until this happened it was still official policy to refer 
to the CPC as a creative source of Marxism. In June 1958, 
for example, Khrushchev told the Bulgarian Party Congress,
"what an enormous contribution to the theory and 
practice of the socialist revolution is being made by 
the Communist Party of China, which is masterfully 
combining the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with 
the concrete practice of revolution and of building 
socialism in its country."
Thf existence of an alternative Chinese line, however much 
it sought to impose itself as a new orthodoxy, was 
n(V,rtheless a factor which could potentially have worked 
in favour of greater independence of socialist countries. 
3i is an interesting fact that the concept of the Leap 
Forward was actually taken up with some enthusiasm by 
ser i i r.ns of the leadership in other parts of the socialist 
camp and its example influenced policy for a while in some 
countries, notably Bulgaria and East Germany.^ This was 
llii beginning of a polycentrist trend which could have 
allowed more leeway to states previously under Soviet 
dot' 'fiance, and the Soviet leadership was soon to clamp down 
on it.
PJ;or,LEMS OF SING-SOVIET ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION
In discussing the specificity of the Chinese line on 
development, an important point of reference - from a 
negative angle - was provided by the Sino-Soviet 
coin, ition as an example of a dependency relationship.
quoted in ZAGORIA op. cit.
see GRIFFITH W.E. (ed) Communism in Europe Cambridge Mass. (MIT) 
1964, Vol I esp. pp. 43-154
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The Sino-Soviet relationship was a factor in everything to 
do wJih China's strategy of economic development. On the 
one hand, the Soviet experience, both positive and
nogotive, was a constant point of reference in the 
articulation of China's own path to development; on the 
oihf-r hand there was also a web of actual economic ties
between the two states. China's development projects
were intimately linked with Soviet assistance at many
levels, and there were tendencies toward a co-ordinated 
development of the socialist camp as an economic subsystem.
Inherent in Sino-Soviet co-operation were two divergent 
teiiil;Mcies. On the one hand it could create conditions for 
increased self-reliance. Mao had said in 1956 that the aim 
Wc:'- "to mobilise all positive factors, both inside and 
outside the Party, both at home and abroad, both direct and 
indirect, and make China a powerful socialist country."
On {he other hand there was also a dependance-inducing 
aspect, and the two were in conflict throughout the long- 
dr rt. :i-out process of attempting to arrive at a second five- 
year-plan.
China's degree of dependence on the Soviet Union was 
necessarily quite close in the early post-1949 period, 
give il the fact that there was no other country China could 
turn to. One way of presenting the issue is that a certain 
degj ee of dependence at an initial stage could create the 
conditions for more independence later - a familiar 
argument in the development debate, but it did make some 
sense in this case. The paying-off of Soviet loans from 
the Stalin period by 1955 could create conditions for more 
self-reliance in the coming period.^ By the time of the
MAO Tse-tung (MAO Zedong) Selected Works Vol. V Peking FLP 1977
p 306
Bi:c’HTOLDT H Per Allianz mit der Armut Freiburg (Rombach Verlag) 
1967 p. 57
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Great Leap Forward, such conditions had been created. The 
Sinn-Soviet agreement on co-operation in the field of heavy 
industry concluded in August 1958 provided for most of the 
projects to be carried out by the Chinese themselves. It 
war> stated that "With the unstinted and decisive aid of the 
Soviet Union we have completed our first Five Year Plan. 
This is an important victory, the magnitude of which can be 
judged by the fact that, for our second Five Year Plan 
about to begin, we ourselves can supply most of our 
industrial needs."
This view has a certain superficial consistency, but to 
depict the historical process as a smooth and logical 
progression would in reality be quite false.
Certainly, the official idea was, as Mao argued in his "On 
tho Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People" 
that China was learning from the USSR in such a way as to 
promote "China's path to industrialisation,"
PiH this implied a process of criticism, in other words, 
the constant theme of learning from the Soviet Union meant 
no*, just 'learning selectively' in the sense of picking out 
what was useful to China, but 'learning critically' in the 
SODsa of summing up from what was wrong.
This carried major implications for how the Chinese 
leadership perceived the development process worldwide. In 
a sense we can see the political debates of this period as 
part of a process which generated certain ideas expressed 
in the documents of the Sino-Soviet polemic of the
Asian Recorder 1958 p. 2197
SOONG Ching-ling (Song Qingling), article in Renmin Ribao 
January 1 1958 in Survey of Mainland China Press 1684
MAO Four Essays.,, op. cit p. 131
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sixties....Whether the critique of dependent relationships 
in "Apologists of Neo-colonialism" or the discussion of the 
model of socialism itself in "On Khrushchev's Phoney 
Communism".
It is important to bear in mind that Sino-Soviet 
co-operation during the period was intense. Perhaps just 
because of this closeness China had to assert its 
individuality, simply to avoid the trap of dependency. Tn 
doing this, the Chinese were creating the domestic basis 
for a more independent foreign policy, as well as shaping 
a new model of development which would have implications in 
the foreign policy sphere as well. The longer-term 
implications of the relationship could be seen as posing 
certain severe constraints which would tend to run counter 
to tlu self-reliant orientation. These two trends 
confronted one another in the Leap Forward period. They 
can be summed up under two aspects, the imposition of the 
Soviet model, and actual integration.
In 1 orms of the critique of the Soviet model, the period of 
the Great Leap Forward had some rather peculiar 
characteristics. Although the problem of excessive 
accumulation was one of the areas of Soviet policy which 
tin CPC was to examine critically, the desire in the Leap 
Forward period to make rapid and decisive advances led to 
an arcumulation rate which was itself by any definition 
exc»;:i:'.ive. The notion of sectoral balance, which played 
an important role in "On the Ten Major Relationships" 
tended to be pushed aside. On the other hand, in terms of 
the grass-roots approach to construction many new ideas 
weir, generated.
There was for example the question of the scale of 
projects, the emphasis on local initiative and what would
set BETTELHEIM C., et al. La Construction du Socialisme en 
Chine, Paris, Maspero, 1971
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be described in today’s terminology as 'appropriate'
technology. This relates to a certain developmental 
philosophy geared to the transformation of internal 
conditions in under-developed countries. Even the slogan 
of steel production, one-sided though it may have been, and 
even the "backyard furnace" movement, whatever its errors, 
show that the aim was not simply to produce more steel, but 
to spread the necessary technology beyond an elite. The 
field of water conservancy, important in terms of the
Chinese tradition, is one where there had been a
considerable level of Soviet aid, which was essentially 
concentrated upon large scale installations . The Loap 
Ffuw-ird developed a radically different approach, to the 
effect that "Concentrated on small and medium projects, the 
col'- îtive efforts of China's five hundred million peasants 
will give bigger results faster than if they are
concentrated on the building of a few large projects."
There was a mass campaign during this period to spread the 
understanding of technology as widely as possible and 
encourage the masses to invent new techniques. This
aj*' ' 3ach implied also a shift from the existing model of 
education, which was again strongly influenced by the 
Sovi-: t one, via Sino-Soviet co-operation,^^ and new, more 
radical lines were put forward. The type of stale 
rriJi h t ne implied by a network of small-scale projects is one 
where it might be possible to limit the problems of
CHI Wen-shun "Water Conservancy in Communist China", China 
Quarterly 1965 p. 23
LT Chiang, article in Peking Review 1958 15 p. 12
sec e.g. "The People Invent" in PR 1958 16 p 15
sec- e.g. ORLEANS L.A. Professional Manpower and Education in 
Communist China, 1962
FK'aSER S (ed) Chinese Communist Education Nashville (Vanderbilt 
U.P.) 1965
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bureaucracy associated with the top-down development models 
adop!ed by many developing countries, capitalist and 
socialist alike. This would seem to be a fairly far- 
reerhing implication in terms of the overall philosophy of 
economic development, whatever the opposite tendencies 
imp!ted in the policy of shifting to public ownership of 
the land in the most extreme phase of the Leap Forward, 
which would presumably have increased the problem of 
bureaucracy, had it been implemented.
One of the most original aspects of the Chinese model lay 
in its critical approach to the Soviet style of 
industrialisation which involved squeezing the peasantry to 
create a massive accumulation in order to permit the rapid 
growth of industrial centres. This, for the Chinese,
created an industry with feet of clay because there was no 
basis in terms of mass demand for the products of light 
industry, while at the same time, politically speaking, it 
served to weaken the worker-peasant alliance, which the CPC 
saw as the main foundation of socialism. The ideas set out 
particularly in Mao's article "On the Ten Major 
Relationships" have far-reaching implications with respect 
to ll*e debates around economic development in different 
par's of the world.
CO-OPERATION WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
These new elements in the Chinese model would potentially
const j tute important elements in the basis upon which
economic and other relations with other developing
countries could be built, and it would be interesting to 
consider how far this specifically Chinese line influenced 
CO-operation with developing countries, even in this very 
early period. This is an area which can be viewed not just 
as a very concrete form of the embodiment of united front
54 SCO AMIN S. L ’Avenir du Ilaoisme Paris (Eds du Minuit) 1981
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policies between the socialist and nationalist currents, 
bui also as a factor of considerable interest in the 
context of the view of socialism and capitalism as two 
competing socio-economic systems, and the likely impact of 
thal competition upon the world balance of forces overall.
Addressing the VIII Congress of the CPC in 1956, Politburo 
member Chen Yi stated that "To develop an independent 
national economy and raise the living standards of their 
people [the Asian African states] need not now go hat in 
hariîi to their former oppressors; they can look forward to 
assistance from the socialist states in both modern 
equipment and technical experience with no strings 
ai ) hed. "
It lias however been argued that in practice the CPC 
harboured some reservations regarding existing forms of 
socialist economic co-operation with the third world, 
pf 1 ps in terms of this approach being too business- 
oiisrited.^^ Clearly, this question could provide an 
insight into China's own philosophy of economic 
co-operation, particularly once China began it uwn 
pti-jramme of co-operation, which was just getting underway 
in ^he period under discussion.
At the time of the Bandung conference China's economy was 
severely weakened, particularly by natural disasters
CILHN Yi in China Supports... op. cit. p. 37
HINTON H. Communist China op. cit, esp p. 47 states that China 
obj ^ ted to some aspects of the Soviet switch from trade in goods to 
technical co-operation in 1955.
ses SCHATTEN F., "Africa: Nationalism and Communism" in LACQUEUP 
W. and LABEDZ L. Polycentrlsm New York (Praeger) 1962
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suffered the previous year^^. Hence there was not much to 
be dene but promote relations with the Soviet Union, as 
China did in the case of Egypt.
However soon afterwards China initiated its own aid 
programme, a precocious example of South-South co-operation 
whifdi was to lead in only a couple of decades to a net
disbursement of aid outstripping that of the USSR .
Seveial development projects were financed in 1956. 
Even though these were not yet of significance in absolute 
terms, it can still be interesting for our purposes to 
co}o. ! 1er the qualitative aspect of development philosophy 
ar. reflected in the Chinese approach to economic co­
operation with developing countries, itself an aspect of 
united front policy. There may indeed be differences in 
between Chinese and Soviet approaches at the period 
in question.
Iri Afghanistan, where the West, the Soviet Union and China 
were all involved in aid projects, it has been argued that 
Soviet projects covered very similar ground to Western 
ones, whereas China was more concerned with a smaller-scale 
and possibly more grass-roots approach to development.
It could be the case that this was simply a division of
Icili ur, in that China did not have the capacity to go in
SCO CHINA State Statistical Bureau, Report on National Economic 
Development.., Peking FLP 1956 p. 11
see BARTKE, W. The Economic Aid of the People's Republic of 
ChifM to Developing and Socialist Countries Revised ed. München (Saur) 
1989
The main instances in 1956 were loans granted to finance 
development projects: $22.9 million to Cambodia, $12.6 Million to Nepal 
aTi;1 $16.2 million to Indonesia. See GONZALO (RUBIO) J., Politica 
exterior de China popular Madrid (Edicion Nacional) 1973 p. 265
See FRANCK P.G. Afghanistan between East and West Washington 
(National Planning Association) 1960
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for the large-scale projects anyway, but we should see this 
in the context of what we know about China's own specific 
appiuach to economic construction, in contrast to the 
Soviet model. In the case of Burma, both the Soviet Union 
and China simultaneously negotiated aid agreements on 
January 1, 1958. It is reported that Soviet experts,
1onking at a plough designed by a Burmese college, pointed 
out that it was half a century out of date, and a Soviet 
one would do the job twice as well. There would seem to 
be a contrast here with what we know of the Chinese 
approach, with its stress on self-reliance and indigenous 
techniques.
It w:.«ild hardly be surprising if qualitative differences 
between Chinese and Soviet approaches to economic 
ciui truction were reflected in development philosophy with 
regard to the third world. We will return to this question 
below in discussing relations between China and the Arab 
world, notably Yemen. However, if it is true that two 
'lines' on economic construction may have existed, this 
d o r n o t  necessarily imply competition. At least at this 
stage, there was scope for a combination of large and 
small-scale projects, and for the combination of indigenous 
and modern technique.
7K/.7V/ TOWARDS SINO-SOVIET INTEGRATION AS A PARAMETER FOR 
CHINESE POLICIES
Thero was in fact a clear assumption of specialisation and 
even Integration within the socialist community's overall 
economic structure. Themes of economic integration - 
spf-'-ialisation, the division of labour etc. - , which had 
scarcely been broached in the Stalin era, began to be 
seriously considered from about 1955 onwards with regard to
The Nation (Rangoon) Jan 9 1958; Asian Recorder 1958 p 1845
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E\iTi,pe. In 1956 China participated in a meeting of the 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance with observer 
status, the only occasion on which she has done so. 
Subsequently, at least according to later revelations from 
the Chinese side, China was (together with North Korea) 
invited to join CMEA in 1958 and develop its economy with 
a primarily agrarian orientation.*5
Certain ideas of integration also influenced the Sino- 
Soviet relationship, and if Chinese decision-makers placed 
a high value or priority on building the socialist camp as 
an actor in world politics and the world economy, they 
might have to accept certain constraints which could run 
ccHit.^ ôr to an autocentric developmental model, so that a 
con p romise between an autocentric and an integrated model 
would have to be arrived at. The integrated model might 
imply a persistence of some of the features of the
prevailing division of labour between industrial and
d o l o p i n g  countries (e.g. export of raw materials and cash
crops) which would be at variance with a strictly
autocentric model. Such a view is implied in Zhou Enlai's 
rtp rt on the proposed Second Five Year Plan in September 
1956:
"As a member of the socialist camp, our country 
annumes its own share of the obligation; we must 
fulfill this share of obligations. We have the duty 
towards all the brother nations to supply them with 
quantities of agricultural products, animal products, 
mineral resources and certain machine equipment and 
industrial commodities required in building socialism.
see MEISSNER B. Das Ostpakt-System Frankfurt am Main (Alf. 
Ket^ iior Verlag) 1955
AiiUNSEN G Le Conseil d'Entr'aide économique Strasburg 
(Université des Sciences humaines) 1971 p 77
Interview with Geng Biao, Beijing November 25, 1978 quoted in 
ï'i'iiiDMAN, E. "On Maoist Conceptualisations of the Capitalist World 
System", China Quarterly 1979, p. 818.
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We must strive to increase production or adequately 
reduce domestic consumption to guarantee the supply of 
these commodities." °
Thei e was in fact a distinct geo-political implication in 
Sino-Soviet integration. Over the post-revolutionary 
period as a whole China has not, in its economic relations, 
broken with its primary orientation towards the Pacific 
region, which in turn is essentially part of the world 
ecu 1,0 my led by the OECD industrial powers. This assessment 
should not, however, obscure the fact that in the 'fifties 
art alternative orientation was in fact possible, and seemed 
evoji to be in the process of realisation. Early in that 
drr%:rle, one specialist described the Sino-Soviet economic 
relationship as implying
"a right-angled turn away from the coast, the seaports 
aiid international oceanic trade and towards Siberia, 
Central Asia, and eventual integration into an 
industrialised Eurasia."
bvc n in the later 1950s this same historic re-orientation 
seemed to be a distinct possibility, for instance if one 
sin lies lines of communications:
"Except for the incomplete Paochi-Chengtu line for 
linking North-West and South-West China, the general 
transportation system would become a line of drift 
ro- orienting the Chinese economy towards the Soviet 
Union and the satellites. Should the Paochi-Chengtu 
line be completed, Szechuan, the proverbial rice-bowl
CHOU En-lai, "Report on the Proposals forthe Second Five Year 
Plan", Remain Ribao Sept. 19 1956 quoted in CHIN C.S.K. A Study of 
Chinese Dependence upon the Soviet Union for Economic Development as a 
Factor in Communist China's Foreign Policy Eong Kong (Union Res. Inst) 
19.S9 p. 43
l.ATTIMORE, 0. "Inner Asia - Sino Soviet Bridge" The Nation Dec
6, 19[>2 .
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would also be effectively integrated into the Soviet 
Orbit." **
Fr3ftdman has drawn attention to an interesting discussion 
in the Chinese press in 1957 and early 1958 about whether 
a distinct socialist international market system could be 
considered to exist. There was lack of agreement on 
this, but it would at least appear as a possibility that a 
new regional subsystem could be in the making.
SJf^O-SOVIET MILITARY RELATIONS
Thf above issues in the economic sphere form a background 
to one of the most interesting parameters influencing 
Chinese policy in the period, namely the Sino-Soviet 
military relationship.
Certain ideas characteristic of the debate on economic 
dfv 1 jpment were carried through in a very similar form 
ini" the field of military organisation, as for example the 
stress on self-reliance and popular inventiveness in 
developing new techniques. As late as February 1958, 
Marshall Peng Dehuai delivered a speech praising the Soviet 
military model, but as the Leap Forward gathered momentum, 
a definite critique of this line began to appear. In the 
sniiir er of that year, we find an argument to the effect that 
"’KcVolutionization' is the substance of the armed forces 
wb<reas 'modernisation' is the characteristic", and a 
criticism made of "certain people" who overemphasise modern 
equipment; the problem is essentially political, it is
ChiN, op. cit., p. 92. The completion of this line was in fact 
announced on January 1st, 1958 {Xinhua January 3rd)
FKJEDMAN op. cit., p. 820 ff.
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argued, and the people can be relied upon to invent the 
necessary new techniques.
Hov,ever, the field of military relations also had its own 
specific character, and indeed the evidence in this area 
suggests that the problems in Sino-Soviet relations were 
already such that the Chinese were not merely stressing 
self-reliance as a balancing mechanism, but were tending to 
view the relationship itself as a threat.
The immediate background relevant to the situation in the 
seciMv.l half of the 1950s was the existence of a very close 
military relationship which had implications for the whole 
woiId alignment of forces. In 1955 for example, Mao had
sa 1 (1 ;
"li is plain for all to see that with the great 
CO operation between China and the Soviet Union, there 
aro no imperialist plans for aggression which cannot 
bo smashed. They will undoubtedly all be smashed. 
Should the imperialists start a war of aggression, we 
will, together with the people of the whole world, 
certainly wipe them off the face of the earth."
This statement was again given prominence in 1958, so the 
sold iment was apparently still considered to be topical.
Tho highest point of Sino-Soviet military co-operation was 
rest •hîîd in October 1957 with an agreement to share defence 
technology, which was presumably part of a package designed 
to oo.nent greater unity in the socialist grouping around 
the time of the Moscow Meeting. However, severe strains
Jiefangjun Bao editorial, "Against one-sided emphasis on 
modernisation", Aug. 17 1958, in JPRS 1357-N
MAu Zedong, Speech at a reception in the Soviet embassy marking 
the fifth anniversary of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, alliance 
and h d ual Assistance, February 14 1955, text in Comrade lîao Tse-tung 
on 7i\^ orialism.,. op. cit.
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began to develop very soon. The specific background to 
this shift, in terms of military relations, was a growing 
determination by the Soviet Union to use its military 
muscle to control its bloc more tightly. This was already 
apx’^ rent from Soviet positions during the 1957-8 period, 
and was later confirmed from the Chinese side in the
documents of the Sino-Soviet polemic, particularly a 
document concerning The Origins and Development of the 
Difference between the Leadership of the CPSU and 
Ourselves, in which the Soviet line is characterised as one 
of "'being friendly to enemies and tough with friends'
It has already been remarked that the Chinese view of 
socialist camp superiority in the world balance of forces 
war. not primarily military. Nevertheless, it was a point 
of key importance to the CPC throughout the period in 
question that, in order to deter imperialism, it was
ri( essary to show that one was not afraid of war, that the 
iriix' rialists must be brought to realise "that peaceful 
coeyistence is the only way out", otherwise 'they are
really inviting destruction'.^ And further.
"The Soviet Union is superior to the United States 
both in technology and military power. It has the 
power and confidence to retaliate with fatal blows 
against any aggressor. If Washington goes so far as to 
stir up a nuclear war, it will immediately invite 
destructive retaliation. Such a war will be the last 
war, the whole capitalist system will be wiped off the 
face of the earth."
see HSIEH A.L. The Significance of Chinese Communist Treatment 
of Khrushchev's January 14 Speech on Strategy, Santa Monica (RAND Corp 
for Ur: Air Force) 1960
The Polemic on the General Line of the International Communist 
Jlovt^ jhcnt Peking (FLP) 1965 p. 77
Da Gong Bao May 28, 1958 in SCMP 1782 p. 57
Da Gong Bao April 20 1958; Peking Review 1958, 9, p 19
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In these circumstances, the Soviet leadership probably came 
to the conclusion that if it didn't want to be precipitated 
into such a clash with the United States, it would have to 
be 'tough with friends'. This is the background to the 
developments later described from the Chinese side in the 
foilowing terms :
"In 1958 the leadership of the CPSU put forward 
unreasonable demands designed to bring China under 
Soviet military control. These unreasonable demands 
were rightly and firmly rejected by the Chinese 
government. Not long afterwards, in June 1959, the 
Soviet government unilaterally tore up the agreement 
on new technology for national defence concluded 
between China and the Soviet Union in October 1957, 
and refused to provide China with a sample of an 
atomic bomb and technical data concerning its 
nicj iiufacture. "
Clnii^  >e sources later amplified on these "demands"; the 
permanent stationing of Soviet forces in Luda a joint 
Par ;f;c fleet under Soviet command; the establishment of 
Sov > ' !. zones of influence for the development of resources 
in the north-east of China and in Xinjiang; the 
er;! iblishment of a long-wave radio station for naval 
communications under Soviet control; and a division of 
labrir with China exchanging agricultural products for 
Soviet industrial goods.
Ihf specifically nuclear dimension of Chinese policy during 
this period is interesting, because it constitutes a
The Polemic on the General Line op cit p. 77
Part of the Liaodong Peninsula, Luda includes the former 
concession of Port Arthur, occupied by Russia 1898-1905. The 
Sino-Soviet friendship treaty signed after 1949 gave the USSR a right 
to si a!ion troops there, but they were withdrawn in 1955.
Based on a talk by Geng Biao in Washington, May 29 1980, quoted 
in HSUEH Chun-tu (ed) China's Foreign Relations, New York (Praeger)
19%; IS 3
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stî iking example of double standards. In terms of united 
frcjiil work, it was a major goal to rally opinion against 
nuclear weapons. Publicly, the authorities expressed 
support for regional demilitarisation schemes in different 
pails of the world, and more specifically in Asia. They 
advocated the denuclearisation of Southeast Asia, and 
also argued for that of Asia as a whole. On the other 
hainl, even while they were putting forward such demands, 
tlifji e was an active scheme underway to develop China's own 
nuclear capability, both peacful and military; this 
programme, co-ordinated by vice-premier Nie Rongzhen is 
tlin ri ght to have been inaugurated as part of a "March on 
Scrinn :e" in 1955. In the same year, Mao Zedong said "If 
wc rjr e not to be bullied in the present-day world, we 
cannot do without the bomb." This statement was not made 
puTi] ic until much later, but in the course of 1958, 
foilrwing the nuclear sharing agreement with the Soviet 
Uiiî a concluded in October 1957, a number of public hints 
were dropped by Chinese leaders. In May 1958, General Liu 
Yalii, head of the Chinese air force, predicted that the 
Chi r: ie working class would soon produce atomic bombs, and
For example a plan for the demilitarisation of Europe put 
fori ; 1 by Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki in October 1957 was widely 
publicised in China.
see CHINA Government, "Statement on the forthcoming meeting of 
SFAli)' March 10 1958; ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 
Documents on International Affairs 1958 p. 482
Kuo Mo-jo (GUO Moruo) "Asia without Nuclear Weapons", Shijie 
Zhishi July 1958; PR 1958, 7, pp 8-9
see RYAN W.L. and SUMMERLIN S The China Cloud - A Study of 
Chithr’s Growth to Nuclear Power, London (Hutchinson) 1969.
MAO Zedong, Selected Works Vol V, op. cit, pp 288-9
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tbrti this would lead to a turning point. At the
beginning of June 1958 Foreign Minister Chen Yi reportedly 
singed that China would "soon" have nuclear capability.®^
On June 13 the opening of China's first civil nuclear 
reactor, supplied by the USSR, was announced. But
apparently the implementation of the sharing agreement ran 
ini o some difficulties from early o n . T h e s e  differences 
were reflected obliquely. A Renmin Ribao article at about 
the same time remarked scathingly upon how the United 
States was reneging on its commitment to share nuclear 
technology with Britain, ®® and this carries more than a 
hi Tt! of a veiled criticism directed at the USSR. In the 
same month the Soviet Union announced its unilateral 
cessation of nuclear testing, an overture towards the West 
which the Chinese did not particularly approve of.
Sect, afterwards, at the end of July 1958 Khrushchev 
visited Beijing for a hastily-arranged summit. The reason 
for 'his meeting was, according to Mao, that "From the 
SO! ‘id half of 1958 he wanted to blockade the Chinese 
CO-; ;d 1 ine. The military agenda of that meeting is
courirmed from other sources.*®
Survey of China Mainland Press 1900 pp 5-10, quoted in NORTH 
R.C. Hoscow and the Chinese Communists Stan ford 1963, p. 280
quoted in an article by ANDERSON G in Combat (Paris) Aug 4 1958; 
sec 0 T so his reference to a speech by GUO Maituo (President of the 
Chinese Academy of Sciences), May 16, 1958.
Asian Recorder 1958 p 2131
see CLEMENS, Arms Control and Sino-Soviet RelationsSoon 
Rf^ rmin Ribao June 30 1958; SCMP 1802 p. 42
MAO Zedong, "Speech at the Tenth Plenum of the Eighth Central 
Committe" (1962) in SHRAM (ed) Nao Tse-tung Unrehearsed op cit. p. 100
ShICHOR op cit p. 95
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If Sino-Soviet relations had rapidly degenerated to such a 
point in the crucial military field, it can be assumed that 
this would have been an important stimulus for the Chinese 
to develop a more self-reliant policy in all other policy 
fields, both domestic and foreign.
In conclusion we can say that the sense of being part of a 
communist movement which was asserting its supremacy over 
capitalism was an important parameter of Chinese foreign 
policy. This issue expressed itself at one level in the
Chinese domestic strategy of construction, which in the
pel i lid in question was more or less subsumed in the Great 
Leap Forward. It also expressed itself partially in the
coid ^ :t of membership of the Socialist Camp and in the
con*^ :t of the bilateral relationship with the Soviet
Union. The latter relationship was however coming under 
seve re strain in the course of the year 1958. The above 
points will all prove interesting as a background to a 
dfd : Iled study of the crisis in the Middle East where we 
will see how the Chinese media and decision-makers assessed 
thr influence of the rising national movement upon the 
socialist-capitalist equation. There was a crisis brewing 
ill no-Soviet relations, and this involved a web of 
di f ! ' rent issues all of which have a serious implication for 
t)i^  -7orld alignment of forces. Despite the overwhelmingly 
mi 1 i t nry orientation of the Mao-Khrushchev summit, 
differences were already considerable on a wide range of 
issvie.j relative to the analysis of the world system, as we 
will argue in the presentation which follows.
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OMAJPTER 3 : THE MIID3DEE EAST IN
INTERNATIONAL ROLITICS^
1 9 5 7 — S
The Middle East in the period in question was an important 
focus for the tide of nationalism which affected many areas 
of Asia and Africa. While most of the states in the region 
enjoyed formal independence, it was underdeveloped in the 
sense that the modern economy - where it existed - was 
subordinated to a world economy serving the interests of 
the industrial powers, while the traditional structures 
which survived only served to accentuate economic 
stagnation. There was a certain feeling that a more
effective national independence needed to be built as a 
precondition for a kind of economic development which could 
serve indigenous interests.
There was a widepread sense of a single Arab nation.
Historically, the region had, however, been disputed from 
very early times between rival centres of power, and the 
ending of Ottoman rule implicitly brought back to the
surface the issue of where the leading focus in the area 
would lie. Existing state boundaries basically reflected 
the comparatively short period of direct European control, 
but they nevertheless formed the immediate context of local 
politics.
Islam was potentially a unifying force, but here the 
picture was complicated by the existence of different
Islamic currents which had clashed in the past, as well as 
the problem of Islam's relations with other confessional 
groups, and in particular also the very complex issue of 
how the secular national movements related to it.
The Israeli/Palestinian issue was to be a major focal issue 
in its own right, but during the period in question world
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opinion scarcely perceived it as such. However, defeat for 
the Arabs in the 1947-8 conflict attendant on the ending of 
the Palestine mandate and the setting up of the state of 
Israel had made a major impact on local public opinion, and 
starkly exposed the weakness of the existing Arab regimes. 
This added impetus to the cause of forces aiming to 
supercede the old regimes, the most important landmark in 
this process being the Free Officers' coup in Egypt in 1952 
which heralded the emergence of Nasserism.
Always a pivotal area from the point of view of 
communications routes, the 'Middle East'^ came to acquire 
a geopolitical significance with the emergence of the 
modern great-power system. This was only accentuated with 
the construction of the Suez Canal and the emergence of 
petroleum as the main energy resource of industrial 
economies. A major object of contention in both World 
Wars, the Middle East took on a somewhat different, but no 
less important role in the context of the 'containment' 
policy which was pursued by the United States during the 
Cold War.
This policy, expressed in general terms in the Truman 
Doctrine of 1947, was concretised in relation to the Middle 
East in the form of a scheme for a Northern Tier of states 
surrounding the Soviet Union (1953). The setting up of a 
treaty organisation in the region was a major core interest 
of the USA in the mid 1950s. *
Despite American claims to combat Soviet expansionism, a 
more realistic analysis would probably show that prior to
 ^The origin or at least popularisation of the term is sometimes 
attributed to the American A.T. Mahan (see for example, LEWIS B. The 
Hiddle East and the West, London (Weidenfeld and Nicholson) 1964 p.9). 
See below for reference to the Chinese discussion.
 ^SCO FINER H. Dulles Over Suez Chicago (Quadrangle) 1964 Chapter
2.
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the mid 1950s the USSR did not pay the area much attention 
(apart from an early involvement in Iran), and it can be 
argued that the USA overplayed its hand in alleging a 
serious Soviet threat in 1955.  ^ Thus at least on this 
particular issue, Mao's assertion in his interview with 
Anna Louise Strong that a direct US-Soviet clash was not 
the main issue has some foundation in fact.
When eventually a treaty organisation was set up in the 
shape of the Baghdad Pact in October 1955, the USA did not 
itself participate as a full member, leaving Britain to 
handle the difficulties. Considerable pressure was placed 
upon the local states to become part of it, and the issue 
of whether or not to do so became a focal point not only of 
regional politics, but also of domestic politics within 
each state. In early 1955 the Arab states resolved that 
they had their own regional system, and that "This policy 
does not approve of concluding other alliances." Syria and 
Egypt also issued a joint communique saying that they would 
not join the Pact.* One of the first instances of Soviet 
interest in the area was an official warning issued by the 
USSR concerning the Pact.^ This marked an important point 
where Soviet foreign policy and the concerns of the Arab 
nationalist movements coicided.
At the same time, China's contacts with Egypt at the 
Bandung Conference were instrumental in the conclusion of 
economic and military agreements with the Eastern bloc.
 ^soc e.g. BECKER A.S. and HORELICK A.L Soviet Policy in the Midle 
East, Santa Monica (RAND Corp) 1970
* KHAi.IL, Mohammed, The Arab States and the Arab League, Beirut, 
(Khayats) 1962, Vol II, Documents 144, 145 (pp. 238-9)
5 royal institute of international affairs.
Documents on International Affairs 1955 p. 300
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including the financing of the major prestige project of 
the Aswan Dam.
Despite the beginnings of superpower involvement, the most 
obvious immediate goal of the national movement was to 
liquidate what remained of the informal dominance of 
Britain and France, and in the Suez War of 1956 the USA 
allowed these powers to experience the limits of what they 
could achieve as independent actors in the Post-World War 
II environment. In early 1957 the USA now announced its 
own direct stake in the area with the promulgation of the 
Eisenhower Doctrine which, unlike the Baghdad Pact, was now 
explicitly anti-communist. It provided for the employment 
of the armed forces of the United States to secure and 
protect the territorial integrity and political 
independence of countries "requesting such aid against 
overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by 
international communism". This again gave rise to 
considerable concern among nationalists:* It was widely 
perceived as an attempt to force the politics of the area 
into a cold-war mould. The USSR again responded, this time 
with the annoucement of a 'Shepilov Doctrine' calling for 
an end to military blocs and foreign armed forces in the 
region.
The issue of dependence on outside interests continued to 
manifest itself in political ferment within the different 
Arab states in the period after the Egyptian revolution, 
which itself exercised a widespread influence throughout 
the Arab world. Syria, which on many occasions played a 
pivotal role in regional power struggles, was the next 
focal point of conflict.
The Arab defeat of 1948 inaugurated a period of intense 
instability in Syria, punctuated by the military
* see COLOMBE, Marcel, Orient arabe et Non-engagement, Paris 
(Publications orientalistes de France) 1973, Tome II, pp. 65ff.
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dictatorship of Adib Shishakli which was itself overthrown 
in 1954. Thereafter, a ferment of debate concerning 
economic orientation gave rise to widepread criticism of 
the dependent economic structures created under the former 
regime. The concern with independent development as a 
cultural and not merely an economic question interestingly 
corresponds with some of the issues being raised in China 
during the late 1950s.^ During this period, the Ba'ahh 
Party, a socialist-orientated Arab nationalist party, 
emerged as a significant force. Shishakli, during his 
attempted comebacks in the period we are directly concerned 
with, was widely perceived as being manipulated by the 
West, in the role of an 'acceptable form' of Arab 
nationalism. ®
Key among the issues of domestic debate was the Baghdad 
Pact, and it is hard to escape the conclusion that Western 
policy helped create the very united fronts it feared most, 
namely on the one hand the coalescence of local leftist and 
nationalist forces, and on the other a situation where 
Soviet involvement was sol icited. In the course of 1956 
Syria and the USSR exchanged top-level visits and signed 
cultural and arms agreements and in July of that year Syria 
extended diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic of 
China. During the Suez War, the Syrian army blew up the 
pipeline of the Iraq Petroleum Co., thus raising the 
spectre of using oil as a weapon.
The greatest upheaval initially caused by the scheme for 
the Baghdad Pact occurred in Jordan. The announcement that 
the regime was going to join the Pact occasioned a popular 
uprising of practically insurrectionary proportions at the
 ^Sf ' HILAN Rizkallah, Culture et Développement en Syrie et dans 
les Pays retardés, Paris (Anthropos) 1969
® sec SEALE P. The Struggle for Syria London (OUP) 1965 especially
p.128
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end of 1955 and early 1956. The monarchy - realising that 
some concessions were needed if it was to remain in power - 
dismissed J.B. Glubb, British commander of the Arab 
legion. Around the time of the Suez War in October 1956, 
a left-wing government including communists held power in 
Jordan for a while and there was a brief upsurge of 
democratic political life. A visiting labour delegation 
from China received an enthusiastic popular welcome and was 
invited to a meeting with Prime Minister Nabulsi.*
In these circumstances, the announcement of the Eisenhower 
Doctrine in 1957 appeared to mark a further step in 
America's assimiliation of nationalism to communism, and, 
together with the Baghdad Pact, was widely interpreted as 
a tactic for smothering the rising nationalist trend 
through the ruse of depicting it as a communist threat. 
The danger of military intervention seemed real, and 
friendship with the eastern bloc a possible means of 
countering this.
The United States for its part was manoeuvring in such a 
way as to give the impression that intervention was likely. 
At the beginning of 1957 an American special envoy, James 
P. Richards, visited all the states in the area with the 
exception of Egypt, Syria and Jordan. Syria then issued a 
strong denunciation of the Eisenhower Doctrine and 
concluded an economic co-operation agreement with the USSR. 
The first move in what appeared to be a concerted 
counter-atack against the radical nationalist regimes came 
in April 1957 when King Hussein of Jordan dismissed the 
leftist government and called for American backing in the 
face of a wave of demonstrations against the Eisenhower 
Doctrine. Secretary of State Dulles responded by 
announcing that the integrity of Jordan was viewed as a 
vital interest of the USA. The US Sixth Fleet was sent from
K 1.ENCZ0WSKI G. The Hiddle East in World Affairs, Ithaca NY etc. 
(Cornell UP) 4th ed. 1980 p. 485
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Italy to the eastern Mediterranean in a show of strength, 
and the American government took over paying Hussein a 
subsidy which had originally been paid by the British and 
then temporarily (during the radical period) taken over 
jointly by Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia.
It soon became clear that this move was not just designed 
to shore up Jordan internally, but to bring pressure on 
Syria. Another US envoy, Loy W. Henderson, joined in talks 
with the leaders of Jordan, Iraq and Turkey. Turkey, a key 
member bridging NATO and the Baghdad Pact, massed its 
troops on Syria's borders and "a few land and air 
incursions into Syria and skirmishes followed."^® The 
international community did little to oppose this evident 
intimidation apart from some strong protest Notes from the 
Soviet Union. It is, however, worth remarking that Soviet 
policy was on the whole pro-Turkey during the period in 
question.^
Besides the external threat, a trial held in Damascus in 
December 1957 revealed the alleged existence of an 
internally-based plan to overthrow the Syrian nationalist 
regime, with the support of the US embassy and intelligence 
agencies. It appeared, then, that a thrust to smash Arab 
nationalism was underway, and this may well have been one 
of the motives for the Syrian regime deciding on an 
extraordinary course of action, namely to join with Egypt 
into a single state, the United Arab Republic (UAR), in 
February 1958. In practical terms this signified the
KARP AT, Kemal H et al, Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition 
1950-74 (Social Economic and Poltical Studies of the Middle East Vol. 
XVII) Leiden (E.J. Brill) 1975 p. 120.
In 1953 the USSR had renounced territorial claims and offered 
Turkey economic aid. Even the stationing of nuclear weapons in Turkey 
in 1958 did not alter the objective. In early 1960 an exchange of 
diplomatic visits between Khrushchev and Adnan Menderes was arranged 
(see KARPAT op. cit. p. 86) but the latter was overthrown a few weeks 
later.
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dissolution of Syria as an entity, since effective 
leadership in the new body was in the hands of Egypt.
However, besides the imminent threat of western 
intervention, there was another perhaps more important 
motive for the Syrian leadership to take such an extreme 
step as to dissolve their own state: the fear inspired by 
the growth of domestic communist forces against the 
background of increasing radicalism and anti-imperialism, 
aided as well by the USSR's espousal of the Syrian cause 
against Turkey. The Ba'athists thus saw salvation in union 
with the anti-communist and authoritarian Nasser regime. 
The UAR was therefore created in accordance with Nasser's 
stipulation that all political parties should be abolished, 
and the local Communists, who had always had problems 
deciding on their attitude to the nationalist current, paid 
the price by suffering a long period of repression. The 
lesson for the future was that the West did not have to 
rely upon puppets like Shishakli to suppress the left, 
because there was a domestic basis for this course of 
action among the nationalist forces themselves.
This episode undoubtedly carries important implications for 
the United Front policy of a state like China, bearing in 
mind that assessment of nationalist regimes had always been 
one of the most critical and difficult issues in the 
foreign policy of Communist states.
In response to the formation of the UAR, the pro-Western 
regimes, Iraq and Jordan, formed their own federation. 
Clearly the position at the beginning of the year 1958 was 
highly volatile. Pro-Western forces were seeking to co­
ordinate their efforts against the radical trend, but in 
doing so risked undermining their own stability.
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The focus now moved to Lebanon, where a constitutional 
crisis in the late spring and early summer of 1958 briefly 
crystallised the area's major conflicts.
Lebanon was characterised by a complex social composition, 
with the main Christian and Moslem communities being 
further divided into a number of subgroups, and these 
community divisions being cross-cut with class and clan 
affiliations. The problem was probably not so much with 
the social and cultural heterogeneity itself, as with the 
opportunities for manipulation from outside which this 
situation presented. When still part of the Ottoman empire 
it had been an area of special French influence well into 
the nineteenth century, the Christians being accorded 
special privileges as part of a classic divide and rule 
policy.
This helped to create a situation where to some extent 
Lebanese Moslems looked to the Arab world and Christians to 
the West. On the basis of community and clan divisions, 
the major political currents of the Middle East and the 
world in general asserted themselves, and it was difficult 
to engineer a consensus giving primacy to Lebanon's own 
interests. These characteristics also made Lebanon serve 
as a bridge-head of western economic influence in the Arab 
world, with a fairly wealthy indigenous class playing an 
intermediary role in this. One current in the Arab 
nationalist movement of the '50s considered Lebanon as part 
of Syria; this included the communists, because there was 
a single Communist Party for the two states. This issue 
became important in the conflict situation of early 1958.
According to the Lebanese National Pact the president had 
to be a Christian. The incumbent at the time, Camille 
Chamoun, was leader of one of the right-wing clans and 
strongly pro-Western, to the extent that Lebanon was the 
only Arab country explicitly to accept the Eisenhower
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Doctrine. Having taken this step, Chamoun then announced 
his intention of changing the constitution to prolong his 
tenure in office: concretely this was taken to mean using 
American support to disturb the delicate balance between 
the communities. The political crisis which ensued 
provides an example of how the general currents in Arab and 
world politics could manifest themselves in the affairs of 
a particular country at a particular time, turning it into 
a focus of wider conflicts.
The murder of an anti-Chamounist newspaper editor in early 
May 1958 sparked off a civil war, in which rebels seized 
and exercised political and military authority over much of 
the country. The movement grouped together several 
disparate forces: firstly those who considered it necessary 
to link up more closely with the nationalist current in the 
rest of the Arab world, as a defence against American
policy; secondly those who feared that Chamoun was
preparing to sacrifice the inter-communal balance - the 
guarantee of Lebanon's very existence - in order to further 
his followers' sectional interests; and thirdly Christian 
rivals of the clans which backed Chamoun. Confessionally, 
the rebels included Sunni and Shia Moslems and Druzes as 
well as Christians elements - notably the Franjieh clan -
and the patriarch of the Maronite Church. The official
armed forces refused to back Chamoun, so he relied for 
military power primarily upon the extreme right-wing 
Christian Falangists led by the Jumayel clan, arch-enemies 
of the Franjiehs.
US intervention was obviously a possibility in these 
circumstances. Even in the terms of Eisenhower's own 
Doctrine it would be hard to argue that the UAR was 
"controlled by international communism", but at least it 
might be argued that there was "overt armed aggression". 
To provide an argument for increased US backing, Chamoun 
therefore appealed to the UN Security Council, which set up
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an observation group, UNOGIL, to see if it was true that 
UAR troops were pouring in from Syria. Unfortunately for 
the USA the Group's first report, submitted early in July, 
found it impossible "to establish if any of the armed men 
observed had infiltrated from outside; there is little 
doubt, however, that the vast majority were, in any case, 
Lebanese.
But events were now moving very fast. The eye of the
storm, which had moved successively from Suez to Jordan to 
Syria and to Lebanon within the space of a year and a half, 
now shifted suddenly to Iraq, the capital of the Baghdad 
Pact. The Iraqi army was deployed as part of the concerted 
action of pro-Western forces against the radical Arabist 
trend, and on July 14 1958 the troops of Gen. Kassem, on 
their way to Jordan, launched a successful military coup. 
Nationalist and neutralist, the new regime promised a
foreign policy in conformity with the principles of the 
Bandung Conference; at the same time the local Communist 
Party, which had built a strong base through years of 
clandestine activity, played an extremely active role.
This was a serious blow to the West. Without waiting «ny
further, the USA immediately sent marines into Lebanon and
built these up to the strength of 10,000, while Britain, in 
a co-ordinated move, sent troops into Jordan.
The mighty confrontation between the West and nationalist 
forces, which appeared to be brewing, did not materialise. 
By and large the nationalist movement consolidated its 
gains, without making fresh ones (for instance the 
Jordanian monarchy did not topple, which seemed a 
possibility at one stage). American troops were not 
directly implicated in military action. Although it may be
see ZINZANI, Abdul Wahed Aziz, Arab Politics in the United 
NationSj Sana'a, Ydoeni Arab Republic (Sana'a University Publications) 
1977, p. 171.
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argued that their presence prevented a clear rebel victory, 
Lebanon did nevertheless find a 'Lebanese' solution 
'without victors or vanquished'. The army commander, Gen. 
Chehab, was elected President with one of the leading 
Moslem rebels as Prime Minister. The insurrectionary 
forces gained their two most significant demands with the 
destitution of Camille Chamoun and the repudiation of the 
Eisenhower Doctrine. The Iraqi revolution continued its 
course in a heady atmosphere of popular mobilisation; land 
reform was enacted and former political leaders were placed 
on trial for trying to subvert Syria in 1957. The various 
threats against Syria itself did not materialise.
Although there remained pro- and anti-Western forces, the 
polarisation was not altogether clear-cut. Indeed the Arab 
states were even able to salvage some show of unity when on 
August 20 Sudan presented a single resolution (albeit an 
anodyne one) to the UN General Assembly on behalf of all of 
them. Saudi Arabia had had a foot in both camps at 
different times; a country like the Kingdom of Yemen which 
was pursuing a strongly anti-Western line at the time and 
which joined with the UAR on a federal basis in the course 
of 1958, obviously represented something totally different 
from, say, the Ba'athist conception of Arab nationalism. 
More interesting, although this fact only surfaced towards 
the end of the year 1958, was the difference in orientation 
between Iraq and the UAR. Nasser moved close to the USSR 
internationally and the corollary was a highly 
authoritarian policy domestically in which communists were 
repressed and popular mass activity was tightly channelled 
and controlled. The Iraqi model was for a while more left- 
wing, with wider scope for grass-roots mobilisation.
Overall, then, the picture is quite a complex one. It 
could not be accomodated by simplistic schemas, and it will 
be one of our tasks to investigate how far Chinese sources 
of the period were able to construct sufficiently
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sophisticated models to enable them meaningfully to 
describe the different social forces in the area, and 
determine the possibilities of united front building with 
and among them.
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O H A T > T E R  -4 : C H I N A  ^ T H E  M I Ü Ü L E
EAST AND IMEERIADISM IN THE 
BXJILDHE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS , 
I ^ 5 Y
THE MIDDLE EAST AS FOCAL POINT OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
We have already remarked upon the key change in the CPC's 
analysis of the world system expressed in the view that the 
developing nations had emerged as a distinct force. As 
early as the spring of 1957, in returning from a major 
world tour, Zhou Enlai had stated that "We are now in an 
era which is marked, among others [sic], by the salient 
feature that the Asian and African peoples have taken their 
destiny into their own hands".
During the period under consideration this phenomenon was 
particularly concentrated in the Middle East. Zhou 
remarked that during the time of his tour, "The Near and 
Middle East was all along the focal point of the 
international situation."  ^ This focal role was only to 
increase in importance, in the Chinese perception, through 
the remainder of 1957 and into the summer of 1958.
The CPC used its published discussions of the situation in 
the Middle East to put forward important new formulations 
about processes in the world system in general. The most 
significant instance of this, prior to the Syrian crisis of 
October 1957, was the publication of an authoritative 
Renmin Ribao editorial on September 10 1957. The
programmatic tone of this text shows that it was intended 
as a systematic and comprehensive statement of offical 
line. It is argued in this article that
 ^CHoUEn-lai (ZHOU Enlai), "A Report on visits to eleven countries 
in Asia and Europe", March 5 1957, People's China Supplement April 1 
1957
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"The struggle between the United States, which is 
working for aggression in the Middle East, and the 
Middle Eastern people, who are fighting for and 
upholding their independence, is an important part of 
the struggle between the war forces and the peace 
forces. In its deliberate attempt to bring the Middle 
East under its control, the United States not only 
wants to turn the area into its colony, but also 
intends to make use of it to prepare for further 
aggression. Following the Second World War, there 
appeared in the world a number of nationalist 
countries, in addition to the socialist and 
imperialist countries. Most of the nationalist 
countries are following a policy of peace and 
neutrality. They have formed a tremendous power for 
peace and created great difficulties for the 
imperialist policy of expansion and aggression. To 
carry out its aggressive policy smooth ly, the United 
States wants, first and foremost, to suppress and 
eliminate in the Middle East the nationalist countries 
adhering to peace and neutrality and the national 
independence movements there. The Middle East is of 
gieat strategic significance in the American plan of 
aggression.
"If the people of the Middle East obtain independence, 
it will be impossible for the imperialists to maintain 
thoir remnant colonies not only in Asia but also in 
Africa. Under this influence, the national
independence movement of the Latin American people 
will also grow. It is therefore crystal clear that 
tht United States evaluates the Middle East as a key 
position for it to establish a world colonial empire."
There are a number of important ideas contained in this 
text to which we will return at different points in the 
course of our study. The following issues could briefly be 
noted here: the concept of neo-colonialism is anticipated, 
in the sense that the goal is seen as "independence" even 
though most of the area was legally independent already. 
The US drive for spheres of influence is repeatedly 
characterised as a trend leading to war, and thus 
nationalist struggles are seen as a force preventing war; 
this argumentation is implicitly counterposed to the Soviet 
tendency to dampen violent national movements, lest they
 ^Jtcnmin Ribao Editorial September 10 1958; Xinhua same date.
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touch off a conflagration which could lead to war. The 
focal significance of the area is seen as arising initial ly 
from its place in American strategy, but if this strategy 
can be made to fail, the area will become of central 
significance from the opposite point of view, that is a 
stimulus to the independence will irradiate outwards from 
it in the direction of geographically contiguous areas 
(Asia and Africa) and by force of moral example (Latin 
America). This was to be a very important theme in the 
Chinese treatment of the subject in the succeeding period. 
The reference to Latin America is particularly interesting, 
in that it anticipates a 'third-world' image of the 
national current reaching beyond the Asian-African 
dimension implied in the Bandung movement.
The issue of the conflict between the West and the national 
movements was to be the central theme throughout the period 
under discussion, so it is unnecessary to amplify on it 
further at this point. But this theme was by no means the 
only element which the CPC took into consideration in 
determining the centrality of this area at the time. In 
fact, they also perceived another very important dimension, 
namely the issue of relations among the Western powers.
INTER IMPERIALIST CONTENTION - THE BACKGROUND
The question of relations between capitalist powers was one 
on which traditional Communist theory had a considerable 
amount to say, in the form of the concept of ' inter­
imperial ist' contention which had been accorded great 
importance since the appearance of Lenin's Imperialism, the 
Highest Stage of Capital ism. This phenomenon was treated 
as an integral part of the systematic development of the 
basic image of the world system in the inter-war period, 
notably in Stalin's speech to the XVI Congress of the CPüU
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in 1930,3 and Stalin also devoted a lengthy section of his 
last systematic work dealing with the world situation to 
proving that this contradiction was still in force in the 
early '50s despite the strength of US hegemony.* His 
formulations were in turn to serve as a basis for the CPCs 
later presentation in the course of the Sino-Soviet 
polemic, to the effect that there were four basic 
'contradictions' in the world system, the contradiction 
between the socialist camp and the imperialist camp; 
between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the 
capitalist countries; between the oppressed nations and 
imperialism; and the contradiction among imperialist 
countries and among monopoly capitalist groups.^
This background could be something of a mixed blessing. It 
is at the very least clear that such traditional theories 
could not be applied unchanged to the far more complex 
conditions following World War II. The challenge facing 
the CPC was whether it would be able to bring about the 
radical adaptation necessary, to use the old analytical 
approach critically and not be imprisoned by it. It will 
be interesting to examine in the course of this study how 
successful they were. At this point we will briefly refer 
to the position in the early part of the period under 
consideration.
The question of how one understood the enemy camp and its 
internal dynamics was clearly a crucial one in united front 
policies. In fact the CPC's assessment of this question 
went through many changes in the late 1950s, and such
3 See Marxism, Nationality and War, London (Lawrence and Wishart) 
1940, Vol. I, pp. 62-3
* S3 ALIN, J.V. Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSP, Peking 
(FLP) 1972, p. 32 ff.
3 Thf' Polemic on the General Line of the International Communist 
Movement, op. cit., p. 7
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changes can be viewed as indicating a shift to a new 
overall image of the world system.
DIFFERENT FORnVLATIONS ON RELATIONS AMONG INDUSTRIAL POWERS
A consistent element in the Chinese approach was a strong 
conviction that the Western 'camp' was not a unified or 
homogeneous entity. Among reactionaries, it would seem, 
united-front type international relations of a non- 
antagonistic nature were not possible.
However, there are several different ways in which 
antagonistic relations among Western powers could be 
modelled, as different statements by the Chinese leadership 
show.
The first of these is one reasonably close to the classical 
Leninist standpoint, reflected, for example, in Mao 
Zedong's opinion after Suez, that
"the imperialist countries are now contending with 
câï h other for the control of different areas in the 
name of opposing communism....At present their 
contention converges on the Middle East, an area of 
great strategic significance."^
But several other ways of analysing this question can also 
be found in the immediately succeeding period. A second 
possible approach would be one which, while also emphasising 
antagonism, does so in a framework of increasing 
unevenness. Thus American expansion, notably in the Middle 
East, could be seen as serving the purpose of asserting its 
dominance not only of that area itself, but also of Europe. 
A third possible image was one whereby this process of 
differentiation could be seen as having advanced to a point 
where a qualitative difference could exist between the USA
 ^KAO Tse-tung, Selected Works Vol V, Peking, FLP, 1977 pp 361-2
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and the other powers, and the latter might learn from 
experience and perhaps make a break with their own imperial 
past, thus playing a positive role in opposing US schemes; 
could even they be potential members of the united front, 
in the broadest definition? A fourth possible position 
would, however, make an opposite deduction from the 
situation of US hegemony, and assume that the process of 
expansion into the spheres of influence of the former 
dominant powers was in essence a col laboratory process 
implying greater solidarity among the capitalist states.
In fact, elements of all these different images can be 
detected in various Chinese articles or statements. It 
must be said, of course, that they are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive, and in reality the policies of 
different European powers could indeed contain elements of 
conflicting responses to the problems posed by US global 
authority. However, Chinese policy during 1957-8 did tend 
to shift back and forth between the different paradigms, 
indicating that there was uncertainty as to which was the 
principal aspect.
The theme that the European powers were themselves 
oppressed by the USA dates back, as we saw earlier, to the 
interview with Anna Louise Strong.... perhaps surprisingly 
in that in 1946 the colonial empires were still basically 
intact, although from another angle it could be argued that 
economic subservience to the USA was far greater at that 
time than it was even by the late 1950s.
The view that the lesser-ranking capitalist states might be 
able to be won over as part of a broad array of forces 
directed against the main enemy was to resurface later 
around the time of the first enunciation of the "Three 
Worlds" theory in 1974. In retrospect. De Gaulle’s 
accession to power in France in May 1958 would probably 
have been seen by the Chinese as an example of this trend,
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although at the time it was depicted by them as a 
reactionary phenomenon.
Zhou Enlai seems to have been an advocate of the approach 
of winning or at least neutralising the European powers. 
In his major March 1957 speech he stressed the economic 
dimension of imperialism, supported by a quotation from a 
letter by Rockefeller to Eisenhower, and his argument 
implies that economic constraints were forcing the USA to 
embark on a more expansionist phase of policy, and that the 
impact of this would be felt by other countries, both 
industrial and developing:
"The 'Eisenhower Doctrine' which openly announces the 
indention of seizing the colonial interests of Britain 
and France is a useful lesson to countries 
participating in American military blocs ....If such 
major allies as Britain and France could be abandoned 
by the United States, what other so-called allies are 
there that the United States cannot abandon?"
He then went on to make a specific plea to Britain and 
France to abandon colonialism and assert their 
independence of the USA.
Zhou returned to this subject in another important speech 
nearly a year later, arguing that the deepening capitalist 
crisis around the middle of 1957 had caused the USA to 
attempt further to increase its grip over the various 
allied states using the idea of the "so-called 'Communist 
threat'" for this purpose.®
It is interesting that Zhou emphasised this point even 
though according to his own analysis many of the new 
developments in the independence movement over the past
 ^ZHOU Enlai, Report, March 5 1957 op. cit.
® ZHOU Enlai, "The Current international situation and China's 
foreign policy", February 2 1958, in Xinhua Banyuekan p. 37
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year - in Yemen, Algeria, Ifni* and Oman - were directed 
precisely against the traditional colonial powers. The 
logic would appear to be that these struggles might 
convince the European states that it was futile for them to 
dream of an independent power-political role in the old 
sense; which in turn might bring about an evolution in 
their policy. This could be seen as an illustration of how 
shifts in the balance of forces at one level could alter 
the possible scope of the united front at another.
Other sources were, however, apparently sceptical about 
whether the colonial powers would in fact learn such a 
lesson. An authoritative editorial published in the 
international affairs journal, Shijie Zhishi in the summer 
of the same year makes the point, specifically in relation 
to Oman, that the British colonialists "have obviously not 
absorbed a profitable lesson from the grievous defeat of 
their aggression against Egypt" and calls upon them to 
withdraw from the South Arabian area as soon as possible, 
while the Omani people are at the same time warned, in 
struggling against Britain, not to allow the USA in to fill 
the "vacuum".^*
It would appear that some specialists did not agree with 
the view that it was a politically realistic scenario that 
Britain and France would distance themselves from the 
practice of imperialism. One fairly extensive study 
written in the summer of 1957 devoted considerable 
attention to clashes between US and British strategy, but 
in this case more in terms of classic inter-imperialist 
contention. The author contrasts on the one hand Britain’s
* 1957 saw a significant independence movement in the Spanish 
colonial territory of Ifni, later absorbed by Morocco.
Shijie Zhishi Editorial^ "Aman renmin di wuzhuang qiyi", 1957, 
XV (August) pp 3-4
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attempt to control the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf and 
the Arabian peninsula via its bases in Kenya and on the 
other the US plans for an Indian Ocean joint command under 
its own leadership. American plans to expand the Baghdad 
Pact into an anti-communist league spanning North Africa 
and West Asia are here directly ascribed to a strategy of 
absorbing British and French spheres of influence.^ The 
article sees a dual nature to the importance of the area 
for the United States: to assert its control over western 
Europe, because of the letter's heavy dependency on oil 
imports, and as a base for expansion into North and East 
Africa. In carrying out the latter goal, according to the 
author, the USA faces two contradictions: against France, 
in its attempt to gain control over the oil interests in 
the Sahara and Morocco, and, more important, against 
Britain. The Middle East is described as Britain's 
"lifeline", not only because of oil, but also, more 
important, because its positions in that area
"are indispensible as the communications line 
protecting the dominions and colonies .... in Asia, as 
well as a cover for the advance into the colonies in 
East Africa".12
A meeting of the Council of the Baghdad Pact held in 
Karachi in June 1957 was seen as indicating an acceleration 
of inter-imperialist contention, with the USA mobilising 
its supporters to defeat Britain’s plan for a joint 
military command, and thus seizing effective control over
the organisation from B r i t a i n .  1^
11 JIANG Yuanchun, "Lun zui jin Zhong Dong xingshi", Shijie Zhishi 
1957, XII (June 6)
12 ibid.
1^ J^’rnmin Ribao June 8 1957; Xinhua same date
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Another interesting article from the same period argues 
that Britain feared that defeat in Oman would "lead to a 
chain reaction" threatening her other strategic interests, 
and sees Britain as attempting to intensify control over 
Aden, Cyprus and K e n y a . H o w e v e r  a new element also 
enters in. While referring to a persisting conflict of 
economic interests between Britain and the USA, expressed 
for example in the dispute over the Buraimi O a s i s , ^ from 
a political angle the author clearly tends towards the view 
that the expansion of US interests involved an element of 
collaboration or co-ordination with Britain, and was thus 
not purely a matter of contention. Surveying the British 
press of the period, he argues that British decision-making 
circles were on the whole hostile to the United States 
tendency to develop a behind-the-scenes role in Jordan, but 
that recently this hostility had been disappearing because 
they sensed an underlying support from America. This 
collaborationist interpretation was, as we will see later, 
to replace other perspectives as the predominant one in the 
Chinese analysis in the course of the year 1958.
In late 1957 however the predominant view was still one of 
an expansion of US control imposed by the USA. This i s 
clear from the manner in which the subject was treated in 
the important Renmin Ribao editorial of September 10. 1957;
"The conclusion of the Suez war was seen by the United 
States as a good opportunity for its expansion in the 
Middle East and Africa....[The United States] has 
tightened its control over the Baghdad Pact bloc and 
included Jordan and Lebanon into the aggressive system 
of the 'Eisenhower Doctrine'. United States forces
DU Song, "Meiguo dui Xuliya di qinlue yinmou", Shijie Zhishi 
1957, 19 October 1957)
an area claimed by both Muscat (backed by Britain) and Saudi 
Arabia (where the main petroleum concessions were in US hands)
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are infiltrating into the Persian Gulf and all 
Africa."
The article then asserts that "There are many signs that if 
the US were to gain ground in Syria and Egypt, its next 
step would be to seize British and French interests in the 
Middle East and North Africa", before going on to stress 
the crucial importance of the region not just in general 
strategic terms but also in terms of raw materials. If the 
USA successfully asserted its control over petroleum 
resources it would be able to use this "to manipulate 
[Britain and France] to force them to follow its example of 
arms expansion and war preparation." Britain and France 
for their part
e trying to put up a defence line along the Persian 
Gulf and North Africa to stop the advance of the 
'iisenhower Doctrine'. The conspiracies and
inter-imperialist 1ife-and-death struggle add to the 
acuteness and complexity of the Middle East 
situation."
This model clearly downplays the aspect of collaboration 
between the traditional colonial powers and America, while 
on the other hand, it does not lend its support to the view 
that there was a serious chance of the former coming to 
play a positive anti-American role. It is, thus, probably 
fair to say (given the authoritative tone of this 
editorial) that the dominant view in late 1957 was still a 
very orthodox interpretation of inter-imperialist 
contention.
However even here, the manner in which inter-imperialist 
rivalry is treated is such as to leave no doubt that the 
importance of this theme was secondary to that of the clash 
between imperialism and the peoples of the region. There 
is a clear impression that the expansion of the US into the 
spheres of influence of the old colonial powers was seen as 
clearing the decks for the main agenda, the battle against 
American imperialism.
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Given, then, that the area was considered to be of central 
significance in world politics at the time, it is necessary 
to examine what were the prospects for China herself to 
build direct links with the countries of the Middle East.
CHINA'S RELATIONS WITH THE MIDDLE EAST
At a popular level it may be true that there was mutual 
ignorance between China and the Middle East, as Nasser- 
Eddine, for example has argued concerning relations between 
China and E g y p t . B u t  this was certainly not true at the 
level of Chinese decision-makers. In fact the Middle East 
had long been an area of central concern for the CPC, 
dating back even to the pre-1949 period. Not only is there 
evidence that the CPC was well informed on world affairs in 
general during the Yenan period,^ but Shichor has proved 
that this was true in relation to the Middle East in 
particular. Even in 1941, when the German-Soviet pact was 
still in force, Chinese Communist publications were closely 
concerned with the strategic implications of German 
expansion in that a r e a . ^
After 1949, it was not easy for the new Chinese regime to 
build diplomatic and commercial relations with developing 
countries, but the Middle East played a fairly significant 
role in helping China make an initial breach in the cold- 
war blockade. In 1950 twenty-five countries recognised the 
PRC,1* but it was very hard in the immediately succeeding 
period for Beijing to add to that list; of those states 
which extended recognition to the PRC between that year and
NASSER-EDDINE, M., Rrab-Chinese Relations (With Special Emphasis 
on Egyptian-Chinese Relations) 1950-71, Beirut (Arab Institute for 
Research and Publishing) ND, p. 33
see YAHUDA, M. in WILSON (ed) op. cit, p. 46
SnICHOR op. cit., p. 10 
WANG Gungwu op. cit. p. 52
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1958, most were Arab/Islamic.^ In addition, it is also 
important that China was able to develop commercial links, 
notably with Lebanon, even in the absence of diplomatic 
relations.
The Bandung Conference was a significant turning point in 
this process, because of the development of close links 
with Egypt. Recognition of China was only a small part of 
the general challenge to the West which Nasser launched in 
1956, but it is probable that some of the more spectacular 
aspects of that challenge - the arms deal with the Eastern 
bloc and Soviet financing for the Aswan Dam project - were 
themselves a spinoff of relations with China. According to 
Salah Salim, a member of the Egyptian leadership at the 
time, both these arrangements were injliated through the 
Nasser-Zhou discussions at B a n d u n g . A  substantially
similar account is given by Mohammed Heikal.22
The expansion of relations with the Arab countries in 1955- 
6 was also influenced by the CPC's theoretical analysis of 
the world system and the alignment of forces within it. We 
have already referred to the fundamental concept that the 
developing countries, and the Middle East in particular, 
were the main initial targets of Western strategy, and thus 
served in a certain sense to shield the socialist camp. 
This view had obvious implications for practical policy. 
According to Mohammed Heikal, after meeting Abdel Nasser at 
Bandung, Zhou Enlai wrote a memorandum to Mao Zedong, the 
text of which was afterwards shown to the Egyptian
The states which did so were: Nepal (1955), Egypt, Syria and 
Yemen (1956), Iraq, Morocco and Cambodia (1958), as well as the 
Algerian FLN (1958)
Interview with Patrick Seale, April 13, 1960, text in SEALE P., 
The Struggle for Syria London (Oxford UP) 1965, pp. 235-6
HkiKAL M., The Sphinx and the Commissar - The Rise and Fall of 
Soviet Influence in the Middle East, New York (Harper Row) 1978, Ch. 3.
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leadership at the time of the Sino-Soviet split. Part of 
the text as reproduced by Heikal reads as follows:
"It is impossible for the socialist camp to adopt the 
role of a spectator in the inevitable battle in the 
Middle East. As I see it; our position obliges us to 
assist the nationalist forces in this battle for two 
reasons - because their victory would be in the 
interest of the socialist camp, and because it would 
thwart all attempts of the western imperialists to 
complete the encirclement of the eastern camp. My 
conclusion is that the logic of history points to the 
nationalist movement as the coming force in the Middle 
East; and that we should make our approach to it as 
friendly as we can. There is a great difference 
between approaching it early in the day, when we can 
help it to achieve its objectives ; and adopting a 
policy of wait and see; thus leaving its leaders to 
fiyht their battles alone and only approaching them 
after their victory has been won. The advantages 
likely to accrue to the socialist camp from an 
immediate approach should not be underestimated."
Thus the logic of imperialist policy described in the Anna 
Louise Strong interview (attacking the intermediate zone 
before the Socialist Camp) created its own counter-logic in 
terms of China's policy and its practical united front 
priorities. This was moreover; not simply seen as a 
Chinese policy but first and foremost a Socialist Camp 
policy; an approach which was still, as we have argued, 
very much in force in the late 1950s.
One specific area of policy which was quite important for 
China's relations with the Arabs was the Palestinian 
question. Unlike the Soviet Union, China had not 
recognised the state of Israel, but this did not prevent 
discreet contacts between China and Israel on a number of 
occasions. On the basis of Israeli sources, Shichor argues
Hi:iKAL M.; op cit., p. 59
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that it was mainly Israel which resisted a number of 
Chinese overtures in the period prior to about 1955.^^
At the Bandung Conference, Arab representatives made an 
effort to canvass their line on the Palestinian issue. The 
deputy head of the Syrian Delegation was Ahmad Shuqayri, 
who subsequently became Chairman of the FLO and negotiated 
China's recognition of the FLO in 1965 He held an
important discussion with Zhou Enlai at B a n d u n g , a n d  
Zhou's sympathetic attitude on the Palestinian question is 
thought to have favourably impressed the Arabs, who were 
disappointed by the lack of comprehension of other 
prominent statesmen like Nehru and U Nu.^ However it is 
fair to say that during the period under consideration, the 
Palestinian/Israeli issue was scarcely regarded by the 
Chinese as a central issue in its own right.
The importance of Egypt as a focal point in the growing 
nationalist current was reflected in the summoning of a new 
Asian-African conference in Cairo in December 1957, known 
as the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference. This was regarded 
in a somewhat ill-defined way as a sequel to Bandung. Both 
China and the Soviet Union worked to promote it, and it 
appixently developed from an initiative at an Asian Writers' 
conference held in Tashkent in December 1956, followed by 
a visit to Abdel Nasser paid by delegates from China, the 
USSR, India and Japan in February 1957
Si!ICHOR Y., The Hiddle East in China's Foreign Policy op. cit. 
pp. 21-7
BARON, X.: ies Palestiniens Paris (Sycomore) 1977 p. 136
SHICHOR Y., "The Palestinians and China's Foreign Policy" in 
HSUEH op. cit. p. 162
Bi:HBEHANI H.S.H. China's Foreign Policy in the Arab World - 
Three Case Studies, London (Kegan Paul International) 1981, pp. 21-2
Nj JHAUSER C. Third World Politics, Cambridge Mass (Harvard UP) 
1970 p. 11
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The Cairo Conference, unlike Bandung, was not a meeting of 
top leaders; rather it assembled delegations, many of them 
non-governmental, from radical movements, including for 
example African liberation movements. It resulted in the 
formation of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity 
Organisation, which later became the object of a fierce 
struggle at the time of the Sino-Soviet split and was 
virtually taken over by Moscow by the late 1960s. This was 
not yet the situation, however, at the time of the original 
conference. Its Chairman was Nasser's close associate and 
eventual successor, Anwar al-Sadat, and his influence was 
used to counteract that of the Soviet Union and to promote 
nationalist trends.
Despite this, the Chinese delegation, for its part, 
received a very warm welcome and was in turn favourably 
impressed. The Chinese media devoted extensive coverage to 
the conference. We will discuss their interpretation of 
its overall significance later but for now this event 
should be noted as a positive milestone in the CPC's 
campaign to build its united front relationships in the 
third world in general and the Middle East in particular. 
A measure of the credit China enjoyed at the time is that 
a Chinese was elected to sit on a seven-man, predominantly 
Moslem, subcommittee to prepare a draft resolution on the 
Palestine question.^
At the same time, trade relations with Egypt had developed 
to a point where China made a really significant 
contribution to the Nasser regime's ability to hold out 
following the blockade imposed by Western powers in July 
1956. The critical year was 1957 during which China was 
the main purchaser of Egypt's cotton, overwhelmingly that
Egyptian Gazette December 29 1957 quoted in BEHBEHANI op. cit. 
pp. 24-5
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country's most important export commodity.^ It is also 
interesting to note that the Suez Canal played a fairly 
significant role in China's overall foreign trade at the 
time.
These close economic ties coincided with the high point of 
political relations as well. Sources suggest real popular 
sympathy for China as a fellow developing nation, in 
contrast to the relationship with the USSR which was more 
seen as a matter of expediency. A pamphlet on the Chinese 
revolution published in Egypt sold out within a week, while 
a Chinese publication of Nasser's Philosophy of the 
Revolution was also much in demand.3% It should be 
stressed that as far as Egypt specifically was concerned 
1957 was a high point, and relations had definitely cooled 
by 1959. In this sense, the year 1958 was transitional, 
although meanwhile China's relations with other Arab states 
were improving.
THE EGYPTIAN 'PATH'
The relevance of the Middle East to Chinese united front 
considerations was not confined to the building of direct 
links with countries in the area, because CPC analysis of 
politics in that region was employed as a key context in 
which to propound major ideas about the world system and to 
examine, in the light of events, how successful these 
analyses were. It was a laboratory for the CPC's overall 
view of the alignment of forces.
In the intervening period of about a year between the Suez 
War and the Syrian crisis of October 1957, Chinese interest 
in the area did not slacken. It was continuously perceived
3^ NASSER-EDDINE op. cit. pp. 121-2, and sources cited on p. 139.
31 see SHICHOR, The Niddle East p. 64
33 NASSER-EDDINE op. cit. pp. 127, 130
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as the focus of international relations, and two high-level 
analytical articles were published in the form of Renmin 
Ribao editorials,^ as well as numerous lower-level 
commentaries. In these sources, the main issues, problems 
and targets of struggle were referred to, and also 
especially how the Western threat should be responded to. 
We have already mentioned how the clash with the West was 
presented in general terms, but even more interesting in 
the context of united front questions is the assessment of 
different policy trends of states within the region, 
particularly in terms of their relations with one another.
In approaching this question, the Chinese media employed a 
procedure much favoured by them, namely the propagation of 
positive and exemplary models. Initially, the most 
important of these was Egypt.
Nasserism stands out as unquestionably the most influential 
aspect of the new nationalist trend in the area, and it was 
a phenomenon which posed real problems of analysis not only 
to the socialist countries, but to the West as well.
Egypt could potentially serve as a pole of attraction 
around which other nationalist forces could cohere - this 
is certainly what Nasser himself, and his admirers in other 
parts of the Arab world, intended to happen. Egypt was 
thus potentially a dominant actor in regional terms. This 
is, however, not the aspect which the Chinese chose to 
emphasise. Instead, their emphasis fell mainly on the 
weakness of Egypt in relation to imperialism.
One of the most important themes in the CPC's dialectical 
world view was the possibility of converting weakness into 
strength via correct policies - including policies of 
international solidarity and ones which could provide a
July 26 and September 10, 1957
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focur for the unity of domestic social forces. An official 
telegram at the time of the Suez War thus stated that 
"Although Britain and France are militarily superior to 
Egypt for the time being, they are opposed by the peoples 
of the whole world and the overwhelming majority of the 
countries, and are thus utterly isolated and morally 
bankrupt", and called upon the Egyptians to "strengthen 
their solidarity" as a guarantee of victory.3*
The approval which Chinese leaders expressed for the 
Egyptian 'path' in this period pinpoints an interesting 
theme - the link between united front strategies in the 
domestic and international spheres. Thus we find a Rennn’n 
Ribao editorial from the summer of 1957 stating that "the 
anti-imperialist struggle of any small and weak nation is 
not isolated at all", and continuing with references to 
Egypt's policies of peace, independence and neutrality, to 
assert that
"Precisely because of this policy, Egypt has been able 
to unite all patriotic forces at home; has earned the 
international support of all peace-loving peoples; and 
has thus victoriously withstood the grave test 
presented by the struggle against imperialist
aggression.
In other words, neutralist strategies internationally are 
seen as a focus of domestic cohesion, which in turn 
provides a basis for strength in the international sphere.
The same editorical went on to predict that, as a result of 
this policy, "A rich and powerful new Egypt will rise and 
stand majestically on the African continent." It should be
ZHoU Enlai, Telegram addressed to President Nasser, November 10 
1956; Text in China Supports pp. 116-7
Rcumin J?ii?ao Editorial, July 26 1957; China Supports op. cit p.
127
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noted however that the logic of this analysis does not 
imply that Egypt would necessarily remain in the vanguard 
of the anti-imperialist struggle. The more "rich and 
powerful" it became, the more likely the USA would 
concentrate on attacking weaker links in the anti­
imperialist coalition, perhaps in a manner analogous to the 
way in which the USA was thought to be concentrating its 
strategy on the intermediate zone, rather than on the 
Socialist Camp directly. Thus in the subsequent period the 
spotlight moved first to Jordan, then to Syria and then to 
Lebanon.
None of this, however, alters the importance attached to 
the exemplary role of Egyptian and Syrian foreign policy in 
the concrete context of late 1957. This was spelt out 
again in the most systematic official statement of the 
period, the Renmin Ribao editorial of September 10 1957 
where it was argued that Egypt and Syria, by pursuing a 
policy of peace and non-participation in military blocks 
and opposition to imperialist aggression, "have grown in 
strength and in internal unity and also developed 
economically."^" Here the link between domestic and 
international united fronts is clearly spelled out. 
Assuming its most didactic tone, Renmin Ribao proceeded to 
argue that "This path that Egypt and Syria are following 
conforms to the interests of their people and peace for the 
Middle East and the rest of the world. This is the correct 
path." A positive example implied a negative one:
"The other path is one opposed to national interests 
an-l is inimical to peace. The ruling cliques of some 
Middle Eastern countries have followed the war policy 
of the imperialists and accepted the 'Eisenhower 
Doctrine'. They supply the United States with 
military bases and manpower. Politically,
economically and militarily they are now manipulated 
and controlled by foreign powers. This will not only
Renmin Ribao Editorial, September 10, 1957; Xinhua same date. 
Our emphasis.
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increase the burden on their people but also create 
suspicion and split among the Arab countries, giving 
the Western colonialists, the United States 
especially, an opportunity to attack Arab 
nationalism.
Thus politics in the area was seen in the form of a sort of 
'two-line' struggle. An important point in relation to 
united front issues is however that it was not implied that 
the two trends should fight it out between them. On the 
contrary, "suspicion and split" were considered a bad thing 
in themselves because they served the enemy.
We will return to this point subsequently. But the 
emphasis in late 1957 and the beginning of 1958 was upon 
unity in a very concrete form, one which unambiguously took 
Egypt and Syria as its point of reference. A study of 'he 
Arab nationalist movement published in early 1958 thus 
described these states as its "nucleus"^®, while according 
to Renmin Ribao "Egypt and Syria have become the core of 
Arab nationalism and the bulwark of the anti-colonial 
struggle in the Middle East."^ Those regimes which were 
criticised in the summer of 1957 were ones which 
"obstinately persist in remaining cut off from Egypt and 
Syria.
In analysing the strategy of imperialism which the united 
front strategy was intended to negate, it is argued that
"the United States is playing on the fear of the 
people harboured by the feudal rulers of certain Arab 
states and by a section of the bourgeois and feudal 
forces, using the myth of a so-called 'Communist
ibid.
Rii Zhi, "Alabo Minzu yu Alabo minzuzhuyi", Shijie Zhishi 1958,
4, 15
Rf <min Ribao September 10 1957, Xinhua September 12, p. 7
40 JIANG Yuanchun, article in Shijie Zhishi June 1957, p.11
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threat' to worsen the relations of those Arab states 
with Egypt and Syria, destroy Arab unity and isolate 
Egypt and Syria.
A point here which is well worth noting is that the anti­
communist slogan is seen not just as a general ideological 
justification for US deployment into the spheres of the 
former colonial powers (as in the model set out in the Anna 
Louise Strong interview), but also more specifically as a 
way of appealing to indigenous ruling strata.
It is now possible to have a clearer view of the logic 
whereby, according to the CPC, one particular part of the 
Arab world became the focal point in the overall conflict. 
Basically, Egypt and Syria were seen as the main positive 
forces, but Egypt was comparatively difficult to attack 
directly. Hence, the immediate goal in US strategy was to 
establish positions in other parts of the area by aiming at 
the weak links. The CPC's analysis was apparently that US 
policy entered into a new phase in the period immediately 
following the Suez war, characterised by a shift to t a c t i c s  
of undercover activity as opposed to open military 
intervention. Thus an official Chinese statement expressed 
support for the Soviet Union's diplomatic initiatives in 
February 1957, but where the USSR stressed joint actions of 
the great powers to prevent the outbreak of open conflict, 
the Chinese argued that "The United States is stepping up 
its machinations to undermine the unity of the Arab states 
and to subvert certain Arab countries from within.
But weakness could be transformed into strength through the 
implementation of domestic and external united front 
strategies. There was thus a possibility for those states
ibid
CHINA Government, "Statement Supporting the Proposal of the 
Government of the Soviet Union...", February 17 1957, text in China 
Supports p. 134
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which were selected as targets of US pressure themselves 
stepping into a vanguard role. It is important that the 
focal significance of Egypt was presented in such a way 
that solidarity with Egypt was depicted as a natural 
corollary of the fact that this country was the strategic 
target of the West; it does not imply acceptance of the 
assumption that Egypt would necessarily play a leading or 
dominant role in the alignment of local anti-imperialist 
forces.
JORDAN AS NEGATIVE EXAMPLE
Concretely, it was considered that the main focus of US 
policy was to undermine the weaker of the two main anti­
imperialist actors, Syria, and in order to do this it was 
necessary for the Americans to begin by concentrating their 
forces in politically more marginal areas so as to bring 
pressure to bear upon Syria. Hence the importance attached 
to Jordan, which in the early part of 1957 was seen as
"one of the major targets of the aggression carried 
out by the US imperialists in the Arab region"
The clearest touchstone in determining which 'path' a state 
was following would be key indicators such as acceptance of 
the Eisenhower Doctrine and membership of the Baghdad Pact. 
But only Iraq and to a lesser degree Chamoun in Lebanon 
would qualify under this criterion. So another way of 
looking at it was in terms of the actual lineup of forces 
in the area. Egypt and Syria, together with Saudi Arabia 
had stepped in to reinforce Jordan at the beginning of 1957 
in resistance to British pressure. This was viewed as a 
positive new lineup/** but by July of the same year Jordan 
was seen to be moving away from Egypt and Syria, and
QUN Li, "Cong lishishang kan Alabo dongfang ge guo renmin di 
jiefang douzheng", Lishi Yanjiu 1958, 7, p. viii
** QUÜ Li, article in Lishi Yanjiu 1958, op. cit.
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drawing closer instead to Iraq^^ - joined also by Saudi 
Arabia, which we find on both sides of the divide, a 
phenomenon which none of the Chinese sources seems to have 
been very comfortable with.
The ambiguous role played by Saudi Arabia is an interesting 
case. King Saud visited Lebanon at the beginning of 
September 1957, and the CPC apparently considered that he 
was acting as a US agent in promoting its policies, because 
Lebanon was immediately added to the list of hostile 
countries surrounding Syria. However, within the next few 
days the Chinese analysis changed. Without necessarily 
ceasing to regard Saudi Arabia as a basically pro-American 
actor, the Chinese seem to have concluded that in this case 
Saud was acting as an instrument in the development of 
regional solidarity. When Saud visited Syria itself later 
in the same month, Renmin Ribao welcomed this, saying that
'Solidarity among the Arab states was the most 
i in p o r t a n t  g u a r a n t e e  f o r  t h e i r  
independence....Consolidation of this solidarity would 
deal a fatal blow to imperialist aggression.
This complex role would obviously challenge some of the 
more simplistic assumptions of the two different 'paths', 
and this raises an important issue with regard to united 
front policies. As we have seen it was an extremely 
important element in the Chinese approach to identify 
progressive and reactionary state actors, and within 
definite limits they could be said to be supporting the 
former against the latter, insofar as the immediate task 
was to thwart US tactics for consolidating its forces in a 
positional sense. However the important point is that from 
a longer-term point of view, such division in itself was 
considered to be a bad thing, because it provided the
Ji^NG Yuanchun in Shijie Zhishi July 1957 op. cit.
Renmin Ribao Sept 29 1957; Xinhua Sept 30.
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context for outside intervention. Chinese policy was thus 
never alt ogether happy in a context of supporting one set 
of developing states against another, and the preferred 
goal was always to aim for the broadest unity. Thus in the 
concrete context united front policies could be considered 
to exist at two levels: the attempt of the radical actojs 
to maintain unity among themselves, and the broader process 
of working to surmount the limitations imposed by a 
regional two-camp division:
'The United States government want to force Arabs to 
fight Arabs for its own colonialist expansion....But 
the Arab people were increasingly aware that 
imperialism was their deadly enemy.'
Particularly interesting is the context in which, in the 
middle of October 1957, further official visits were paid 
to Syria not only by King Saud but also by Iraqi Premier 
Nuri es-Said, the latter being viewed in general by tlie 
Chinese as an archetype of an imperialist puppet. However, 
in the context the Chinese press interpreted even this 
action as an expression of Arab nationalism coming to terms 
with the fact that, whatever its differences, there was a 
mutual interest in Arabs running their own regional 
affairs. "All this shows that the relations among the Arab 
states are gradually being clarified" was the comment; and 
further,
'The United States should see from the growth of Arab 
nationalism that its efforts to set one section of + he 
At ribs to fight another and the schemes for Turkish and 
Iraqi invasions of Syria were bound to fail.'”
The interesting point is however that Jordan was seen as 
a negative example in terms of the process of surrounding 
and subduing nationalist actors, as a successful instance
Hcnmin Ribao Sept 6 1957; Xinhua same date 
Guangming Ribao Oct 15 1957; Xinhua Oct 16.
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of American action in opposition to the national- 
independent current and an example which the US wished to 
duplicate in the case of Syria.
The struggle in Jordan was seen in a broad historical 
context. One historical study points to a long-term 
continuity, both at the level of imperialist strategy of 
dominance (initially on the part of Britain) and at the 
level of popular struggle, dating back to the first Anglo- 
Jordanian treaty in 1928. This, it is argued, touched off 
a wave uT popular struggle which continued into the 1930s 
linked to resistance against British rule in
Palestine. The Anglo-Jordanian treaty of 1948, according 
to this article, "in substance made Jordan into a British 
colony." But this in turn produced a further wave of 
struggle, particularly from 1955 when Britain tried to 
pressure Jordan to join the Baghdad Pact. There followed 
the temporary shift to the left including the dismissal of 
General Glubb, at which point "the Jordanian people's 
victory was the victory of the Arab anti-colonialist 
movement".
However afterwards US policy was viewed as being at least 
for the time being successful, and in September-Novembor 
1957 the aim of the West was to "turn Syria into a second 
Jordan."
The above can be seen as an essentially historical level of 
analysis, whose basic image is of an unceasing dialectic of 
struggle between popular and interventionist forces.
However, there was also another level of analysis which 
interested the Chinese in relation to the case of Jordan: 
this is the spatial or geopolitical dimension, reflecting
ibid
QUN Li, op. cit.
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the fact that conflicts were won not just by understanding 
general historical trends, but by concrete strategies 
applied on the ground. Hence the importance of Jordan's 
physical location "between Egypt and Syria".^
This positional dimension is very important, because 
however much the revolutionary forces were thought to 
partake of a kind of superior historical logic - which 
might in the long term tend to overturn the rules of the 
system altogether - it was an essential principle of the 
Maoist approach that the left could only get to this point 
if they mastered the science of conflict sufficiently well 
to win trials of strength within the rules of the game. 
This distinction between the two levels can to some extent 
be seen as a reflection of Mao's view that "strategically 
we should slight all enemies, and tactically we should take 
full account of i vm.
Discussion of this spatial dimension in the Chinese press 
brings to mind a model drawn from the game of weiqi, in 
which a territory can be captured if it is completely 
surrounded. This model had been used illustratively by Mao 
concerning military strategy in the pre-1949 period, as for 
example in the section entitled "Forms in which We and the 
Enemy Encircle One Another" in his "Problems of Strategy in 
Guerrilla War Against Japan" (1938).^ At least one study 
of Communist military methods during this early period has 
used weiqi as the main explanatory model.
DU Song, in Shijie Zhishi 1957, op. cit. 
Peking Review Nov. 11, 1958, p. 9.
ff.
M^ iO Tse-tung Selected Works Vol. II, Peking (FLP) 1965, pp. 101
For discussion of the use of the weiqi model in the earlier 
period see BOORMAN S.A., The Protracted Game, New York (Oxford UP) 
1969, although in our opinion the author overestimates the importance 
of the spatial dimension, which was only one among several levels of 
analysis employed by the Chinese leadership.
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Applying this model 
to the case under 
consideration, if the 
West could move a 
piece into Jordan, 
Syria would be 
surrounded completely 
and would hence move 
into the other camp.
Iraq
SYRll
Moreover, as in the game of weiqi, what happens in a 
'sol gion' can be put into a wholly different perspective 
by developments over the board as a whole:
rufi
OFF SYRIA
w
’^Encircled** by.-.•■-.-.•.v. . . ...
Yu Yu-fan, 
from People's 
China, I 1957, 
23 (December)
Note that at 
this time, 
Jordan is 
a l r e a d y  
c o n s  i d e r e d  
pro-Western
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We will further argue in a moment, in discussing the Syrian 
crisis, that much of the Chinese treatment of Western 
'rapid deployment' calls to mind such a game model. But 
the essential point in seeking an all-round grasp of the 
models employed by the Chinese leadership is the 
interaction between different levels of analysis. The 
image - at least when the model is extended out of a purely 
military framework into terms of international relations - 
is not that you simply 'capture' territories by the act of 
surrounding them, but that the fact of surrounding them 
increases the pressure which can be applied in order to 
influence the development of internal forces. A link can 
be drawn here with Mao's view of internal contradictions as 
the basis of change and external contradictions as the 
condition for change.
If Chinese statements sometimes make it seem as though a 
particular country can change 'camp' overnight, this is 
because their perspective was one which attached very great 
significance to the role of the state as a political 
entity. There was a pronounced tendency to make 
unequivocal distinctions concerning which 'camp' a countiy 
was in, progressive or reactionary, at a particular time. 
Viewed as a process of change, this shift would reflect the 
dialectical view of quantity passing into quality. An 
article on the dialectics of the international situation 
published in the summer of 1958 when the CPC was heavily 
promoting the study of dialectics included King Hussein 
among a list of outstanding negative examples in recent 
history.^
This does not, however, deny that domestic social struggle, 
as the basis for change, was continuing. In certain 
circumstances, it could call into question the legitimacy 
of the existing state apparatus. This was certainly the
BIN Fu, "Guoji douzheng zhong di bianzhengfa", Shijie Zhishi 
1958, XXII.
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case with the Lebanon in 1958, as we will see, and some of 
this is foreshadowed in the case of Jordan. In fact the 
popular movement there was regarded as one of the most 
important manifestations of that anti-imperialist current 
in 1957 which gave rise to some fundamental political 
shifts in the Middle East, even though it failed to gain a 
lasting influence over state power in Jordan itself, and we 
find one author, writing just after the ending of the 
democratic episode in Jordan, of the opinion that the 
people have "sufficient strength" to reverse the trend, 
while he refers to the Hussein regime as "the 
authorities",a term which appears to question their 
legitimacy to some extent.
The historical model of a ceaseless dialectic of struggle 
was reinforced at the beginning of 1958 by that of the East 
Wind prevailing over the West Wind, an assessment which 
implies in its spatial aspect - although this was not the 
only dimension of the East Wind model - that conditions 
over the wider 'board' (the world system as a whole) were 
now unfavourable to the pro-imperialist forces. Together 
these two factors could be expected to create conditions 
propitious for a swing to the left in Jordan.
The underlying sense of the popular forces as the basis of 
legitimacy meant that people-based united front work could 
continue despite the reactionary nature of the regime in 
question ... or perhaps because of the reactionary 
character of the regime, in that the latter would provide 
a focus for the resistance of popular forces. It was 
certainly easier to support the popular forces openly in 
situations where the regime could unambiguously be 
considered reactionary. The CPC thus maintained a strong 
interest in the radical opposition in Jordan. The Cairo 
AAPSO Conference which ended in January 1958 was, unlike
dïANG Yuanchun, op. cit
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Bandung, a radical, non-governmental meeting. Jordan was 
represented by the left opposition, and the Chinese 
delegate Zhao Puchu, writing on his return, devoted a 
disproportionate amount of space to covering the 
contributions of these Jordanian delegates.
A clear causal link can be seen in terms of the Chinese 
analysis between the state as an actor playing a 
reactionary role, on the one hand, and the growth of the 
popular opposition movement on the other. This link is to 
be found in the idea that the more the regime pursues a 
sell-out policy, the stronger the popular resistance will 
become. This could be seen later in the Chinese analysis 
of developments in Lebanon, and even more obviously in Iraq 
who o the regime actually allowed itself to be overthrown 
by diverting its forces in support of Western policy 
objectives. An obvious possibility existed of the same 
thing happening in Jordan, and this was accentuated with 
tlK- revolutionary overthrow of the regime in Iraq in the 
summer of 1958. One article dealing mainly with economic 
fact ors described the Jordanian regime as "tottering as if 
about to fall" under the influence of events in I r a q , a n d  
twu Chinese correspondents were despatched to Syria to 
interview the exiled Jordanian radical leader Dr. Shuqair. 
He compared his country to a volcano, saying that "the 
victory of the Iraqi revolution is having a direct effect 
on Jordan, because Jordan and Iraq are linked in very many 
respects", and inviting the Chinese correspondents to visit 
him in Amman soon.^^
ZHAO Puchu, "Chuxi Ya Fei Renmin Tuanjie Dahui zaji" Sbijie 
Zhishi 1958, III, pp. 13-14
WU Cheng, "Mei Ying longduan ziben zai Zhong Dong di xiongtu 
molu", Jingji Yanjiu 1958, VIII, p. 53
LI Fanzhen and CHENG Lianping, "Yuedan, you yizuo kuai yao baofa 
di huoshan", Shijie Zhishi 1958, VIII
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The CPC's emphasis on the role of popular movements was a 
noteworthy characteristic of the Chinese world view at that 
time, and perhaps fills in an element which other ways of 
locking at the world system might neglect. It implies an 
approach to united front work taking as its point of 
reference the identity of interests of a broad popular 
mass. However, this approach carries with it a significant 
risk, that of seeing the negative trend, in the words of 
the major Renmin Ribao editorial of September 10, 1957,
simply in terms of "subversive activities" carried out by 
Western "agents and national traitors"
Suf;h an approach could serve as an excuse for neglecting a 
serious socio-economic analysis of these societies, and 
could thus provide a weak basis for evaluating either the 
pro- or anti-Western trends in policy in the long term. 
Tho subsequent unfolding of this study will indicate that 
there was indeed a significant tendency for Chinese authors 
of the period to fall into this trap. At this point, 
however, we must take up the discussion of events in Syria 
towards the end of 1957.
THE SYRIAN CRISIS
During the weeks of heightened tension from late August 
1957 the Chinese press described a projected Western move 
against Syria, based on the success of the same strategy in 
the case of Jordan, which could now itself be used as an 
enemy counter in the strategic game. The spatial logic of 
American strategy was depicted as one of seeking to 
"suppress and eliminate" key states adhering to the 
nationalist trend by bringing presure to bear upon them 
from other places in the area which were within the 
American orbit. This terminology calls to mind the
ZHAO Puchu op. cit.
Renmin Ribao Editorial Sept 10 1957 op cit.
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strategy of "encirclement and suppression" employed by the 
Nationalists against the CPC in the Chinese civil war and 
tends to confirm the validity of the weiqi model, at least 
within the limits of the spatial level of analysis. Egypt 
and Syria, according to a Renmin Ribao editorial of the 
period, 'had become the major obstacle to the "Eisenhower 
Doctrine"', so that the USA was putting all its energy into 
overthrowing them:
'If it succeeded, the United States could then 
concentrate all its energy on Egypt and attain its 
^mbition of enslaving the people of the Middle East'.
Thf>7 e is a clear 'domino' line of thought here. Again, 
according to Commentator,
"Obviously, the United States is attempting to 
utilise Turkey, Iraq and Jordan to encircle Syria and 
work in co-ordination with them in the event of 
aggression."
Two days later it was remarked that the US Sixth Fleet was 
heading towards the Eastern Meditteranean, thus bringing 
another element of pressure to bear. In early September 
Israel and Lebanon were mentioned as actors in the 
end element strategy.Considerable attention was given 
to the manoeuvres of the Sixth fleet off Latakia, as well 
as the airlift of arms to J o r d a n . S o m e  analyses referred 
to this rapid deployment of forces in Jordan as an instance 
of how, once imperialism had successfully established its 
position in a country, it could fairly quickly convert this
Reimin Ribao Editorial Sept 4 1957; Xinhua same date
Remain Ribao August 22 1957 op cit.
Remain Ribao August 24 1957; Xinhua same date
Guangming Ribao Sept 8 1957; Xinhua same date
Renmin Ribao Sept 11 1957; Xinhua same date
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into a pressure point serving its strategy against other 
countries. A coup by Syrian exiles based in Turkey was 
considered to be a likely immediate tactic.**
One of the major deductions which can be made for our 
purposes Is that this situation of the West seeking to 
combine or marshall its forces provided a context where 
united front policies were very important as a counter- 
factor. The weiqi model only goes so far, because the 
united front, in the Chinese conception, provided a 
mechanism for binding-together progressive forces at a 
level different from what could be encompassed in a simple 
gaming model.
Thus, while at one level it is true that pro-Western actors 
had to be met and defeated within the rules of the regional 
povj'CT-game as it existed, at another the united front could 
be envisaged as a mechanism to counter the very logic of 
the: divisions implied in this power-struggle. It is
probably valid to speak of two distinct levels of united 
front activity in a situation such as this. On the one 
hand, it was necessary to consolidate the grouping of 
'progressive' states which, as we have seen, took as its 
point of reference solidarity with Egypt and Syria. On the 
other, unity strategies could operate at a wider, more all- 
encompassing level, in order to assert the common interests 
of all countries in the region and oppose the logic which 
consisted in dividing actors into pro- or anti-Western.
There was thus a strong theme of stressing overall Arab 
unity. As we have seen, US strategy was viewed as one of 
first picking off one target, then using this as a pawn 
against the next, and so on. In these circumstances 
solidarity among the countries in the region, it is argued
I)U Song article in Shijie Zhishi op. cit 
** Hcnmin Xibao September 11 op. cit.
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•would help prevent attacks on the Arab states one by 
one.’^  ^ Overall Arab unity was an important theme, because
"The Arabs know from their own experience that the 
imperialists always take advantage of any weakening of 
Arab unity to undermine the independence and 
sovereignty of the Arab countries."
Unity of this kind, in the Chinese conception, implied as 
perhaps its main prerequisite a clear conception of what 
one needed to unite against. It is interesting that the 
CPC apparently did not consider that Western imperialism 
would be altogether adequate as a negative point of 
reference to cement unity at this particular, pan-Arab 
level: hence we find Turkey drafted into the picture as an 
important element. The sense of unity between the Arab 
peroples during the Syrian crisis was thus considered not 
only to have "dealt a powerful blow to the United States 
plot to 'use Arabs to fight Arabs'" but also to have 
"isolated Turkey which acts as a lackey of the United 
States aggressors."71
Wiihout using the term, the Chinese seem to have viewed 
Turkey as a kind of regional sub-imperialism, and the 
ChiT»f;r.e press did not shrink at hyperbole in describing the 
Turkish menace:
'Once the Turks unsheathed their swords, their 
objectives of attack would not be limited to Damascus 
or some other Syrian cities. The Turkish troops would 
very possibly push into Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan or even 
the whole of the Arab peninsula and North Africa. By 
that time..."the Arab people will encounter not only 
the rebirth of the tyrannical rule of the Ottoman
Guangming Ribao Sept 29 1957; Xinhua same date 
7® liagong Baa Oct 21 1957; Xinhua Oct 22 
71 Renmin Ribao Oct 22 1957; Xinhua same date.
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Empire, but the more dangerous and savage colonial 
rule of the American imperialists as well"'?*
THRbiAT OF ESCALATION AND THE ROLE OF THE SOCIALIST CAMP
It may appear strange that official media were prepared to 
exaggerate to such a degree and indeed to create anxiety in 
domestic public opinion about the seriousness of the 
situation. However, the important underlying theme behind 
both the progressive struggle of Syria and the reactionary 
policy of Turkey was considered to be the danger of a local 
conflict escalating into a global one, and in making this 
point what the CPC was really doing was to employ the 
regional conflict as an illustrative example in an oblique 
discussion of the issues involved in the strategic debate 
within the Socialist Camp.
Already at the beginning of September it was argued that 
•there was the danger of armed conflict started in this 
area by the United States spreading to other places...",?* 
arid as the situation deteriorated at the end that month, 
the Chinese press remarked that 'the United States was 
talking about surprise attacks with atomic weapons.'?^ A 
1 it11e later, it was warned that
"Action should be taken by all people in the world to 
check the outbreak of war. Both the two previous 
world wars started with local military action." *
The language about local conflicts escalating to a global 
or nuclear level is not different from that employed by the 
Soviet leadership at the time, but the deduction the
?* Vsgong Bao Oct 21 1957; Xinhua Oct 22 
?* Renmin Ribao Sept 4 op. cit.
?^ Renmin Ribao Sept 29 1957; Xinhua Sept 30 
?* Dagong Bao Oct 25 1957; Xinhua same date
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Chinese made from these premises was the opposite one - the 
necessity to take bold and decisive action in defeating 
local US policies. If it were true that the conflict was 
taking place in the intermediate zone before the USA could 
come to grips directly with the Socialist Camp, the 
implication would be that if the US were allowed to 
succeed, conflict with the Soviet Union would be a
possibility. This scenario envisages not just a 
'broadening* of conflict but its stepping-up to a different 
level. The issue of US pressure on Syria thus clearly 
served an illustrative or didactic purpose in terms of the 
big issues in the Communist movement.
One element in this was to stress that international 
tension was caused by imperialism. 'Since the Suez War, 
tension in the Middle East has never been relaxed,' noted 
the authoritative Renmin Ribao Commentator in August 1957, 
going on to say that during the past six months the
Eisenhower Doctrine had increasingly been used against 
Egypt and Syria. This was precisely the period which had 
elapsed since the Soviet diplomatic Note of February 1957. 
At the beginning of September the USSR issued another Note, 
which the Chinese press referred to as "a great 
contribution", but only to add:
'but the Western countries' rejection of this proposal
proved that what they wanted was tension, not peace.'
One level of response which the CPC seemed to be urging 
upon the socialist camp was that of agitating the spectre 
of nuclear deterrence in order to make US decision-makers 
properly appraise the risks, and indeed frightening US
allies in the region as well. One Renmin Ribao editorial
spelled out the consequences in the following way:
Jtermin Ribao August 22 1957; Xinhua same date
Dagong Bao Sept 8 1957; Xinhua same date
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"After the failure of its 'policy of strength', the 
United States is risking the danger of starting a war 
iri the Middle East in an attempt to hold its toppling 
position in that area and in the whole capitalist 
world. It is that which is responsible for the 
explosive situation in the Middle East and has created 
a grave menace to world peace.
"The Soviet warning should have made the United States 
understand that in the era of inter-continental 
ballistic missiles, should it dare instigate a war, it 
would not escape heavy blows as it did during the last 
two world wars.
"This is a question which must be seriously considgsd 
not only by the United States but by the participants 
in the United States-led NATO and BagdadÇ'Pact blocs 
because of possible involvement of these countries in 
war due to their membership of these blocs. As to 
Turkey, the country selected by Washington as the 
spearhead of aggression against Syria, it should take 
a particularly serious attitude toward the warnings 
from the Soviet Union and the Arab states and 
immediately halt its stupid action of pulling the 
chestnuts out of the fire for the US."
The unclear issue was thus considered to fulfill a 
potentially disaggregating role with respect to unity 
within the pro-Western front.
If Turkey's actions carried the threat of an escalation to
world war, Syrian defence equally carried the promise of
preventing this:
"The Syrian struggle against United States aggression 
involves the question not only of Syria's interests. 
This is a struggle between peace and war. If the 
United States adventurist plan becomes a reality, it 
will be difficult to confine the armed conflict to a 
limited scope."
C H I N A ’S DEMONSTRATION OF SOLIDARITY WITH SYRIA
One deduction which could be drawn from the above 
ar.r.c r>Gment was the need for solidarity with Syria. Chinese
Renmin Ribao Oct 18 1957; Xinhua same date
Renmin Ribao Oct 22 1957; Xinhua same date
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Preriiifîr Zhou Enlai thus sent a letter to his Syrian 
opposite number on September 15 1957; it was delivered by 
the Chinese Ambassador and talks were held. The ambassador 
also held talks with the Syrian foreign minister, who told 
him that Syria "valued China's support, both official and 
non-official." Xinhua News quoted many articles from
the Syrian press expressing satisfaction at this support.^
The talks at Damascus were said to concern "the situation 
in West Asia".*^ As we will argue subsequently, the term 
"West Asia" seems to have been used in preference to 
"Mi ddle East" when the Chinese leadership wanted to 
emphasise the interconnectedness of their own struggles 
wiili those of the Arabs, and to show that the two were 
simply separate fronts of the same broadly-defined 
bat I Infield. Zhou Enlai himself received a Syrian 
students' delegation, stating that the Syrian people stood 
"in the front line of the struggle against colonialism",®^ 
arr’  ^be connection was still more clearly made by a Chinese 
student leader addressing the same delegation, who
•compared the United States plots against Syria to 
United States aggression in Taiwan. "So we are 
fighting on a common front against imperialism."'"
Ther.e arguments anticipate in a very interesting way some 
of the ideas which were to emerge in the following year 
around the period immediately preceding the launching of 
the Taiwan Straits crisis.
Xitfhua Damascus Sept 15 1957; Xinhua London Sept 16 1957; The 
Times Sept 17.
81 e.g. Xinhua Damascus Sept 16-17 1957
Xinhua Damascus, September 15, 1957 
Le Ifonde Sept 8 1957
Xinhua Sept 27 1957
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Following the September 1957 discussions, in October of the 
sanif; year Mao Zedong sent a message to Syrian President 
Quwatli where he stressed the parallel development of 
Syria's struggle "against colonialism" and friendly 
relations with China. Once again, favourable comments 
in the Syrian press were quoted by the Chinese.
The policy of solidarity with Syria was not just seen as 
something for China itself, but even more as a policy urged 
upon the socialist camp as a whole. This is very clear in 
the context of Mao's interventions at the Moscow meeting. 
No sooner had he set foot upon the tarmac of Moscow airport 
than he remarked:
"The socialist camp headed by the great Soviet Union 
is a strong bulwark ensuring world peace and a 
faithful friend of all the peoples who refuse to 
suffer imperialist oppression and enslavement. At 
present, the US imperialist are directing their 
spearhead of aggression and war at the Arab nations 
[sic], at independent Syria."”
Mao followed this up with his speech to the Supreme Soviet 
of the USSR, where he referred to the intermediate zone 
thf ory in such a way as to emphasise that the spearhead of 
aggression and war was directed in the first instance 
agaiur.t the national-independent countries, and went on to 
say that
"The United States is still planning to invade 
independent Syria through Turkey or Israel, it is 
still conspiring to subvert the anti-colonialist 
Egyptian government. This maniac aggressive policy of 
the United States has not only precipitated a crisis 
in the Middle East but has also created the danger of
quot ed in Le Hondo Oct 19 1957
KAO Tse-tung, "Speech at Moscow Airport" Nov 2 1957; text in 
China Supports,., op. cit p 147.
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a new world war. All people in the world who love 
peace and freedom stand by Syria."®'
Although shortly after this the Syrian crisis abated 
somewhat, the Chinese leadership were at pains to emphasise 
that the threat of a step-by-step realisation of American 
geopolitical goals had in no way been removed. Writing 
towards the end of November, Commentator referred to recent 
troop manoeuvres by Israel in the following terms:
"The desperate efforts of the United States 
imperialists to overturn Syria is [sic] due to the 
fact that Syria and Egypt are the central force of the 
Arab movement of national independence. Moreover, 
Syria is in the most important strategic position in 
the Middle East. In the eyes of the American 
aggressive clique, once a break-through in Syria takes 
place, Egypt will be isolated. In that case, efforts 
will be made easily to step up the attacks on and 
finish off the national independence movement 
throughout the Arab world. This would carry out the 
entire colonial plan outlined in the Dulles-Eisenhower 
Doctrine." ®®
Our study so far thus suggests that there were several 
levels of analysis employed by Chinese official and semi­
official analyses: the regional spatial analysis, in which 
the weiqi model appears appropriate; the interaction with 
domestic socio-economic factors, including the popular 
struggle both within individual states and over the region 
as a whole (Arab unity); the perceived role of Turkey as a 
regional power; the link with international politics at a 
wider level, both in terms of the expansion of US aims 
outside the Middle East, and conversely in terms of the 
influence of encouragement to other anti-imperialist 
forces; and finally the question of escalation in the 
direction of possible superpower conflict. These elements
®^ MAO Tse-tung, "Speech at a Joint Meeting of the Supreme Soviet 
of the USSR", Nov 6 1957; People’s China Dec 1 1957 p. 7
Perunin Ribao Commentator Nov 27 1957; Xinhua same date
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were not separated from one another, and it is precisely 
their interconnection which determines the essence of the 
Chinese standpoint at that time.
It is against the background of this composite model that 
subséquent changes in the Chinese analysis can be assessed.
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OHTVr^ TER 5 : I IMPORTANT OKLAISTOES
IN THE CEO ■ S ASSESSMENT AT 
THE HEGINNING OE 1958
It will now be relevant to examine what were the new 
elements in the picture of the world system which the CPC 
drew out of the experience of the Syrian crisis, in order 
to see how this influenced the concrete strategies which 
they advocated and attempted to implement.
The overall balance of forces was not just conceived as an 
external factor influencing local situations, rather the 
image of the world system emerged from an analysis of local 
conflicts. The Syrian crisis was thus viewed as a trial of 
strength, whose outcome could reveal important facts about 
the functioning of the system. Understanding the CPC's 
approach in this way will give a more concrete perspective 
on the emergence of the East Wind theory.
One possible result of a shift to more favourable 
circumstances could be a reversal of trends, i.e. the 
spatial logic which we have just illustrated could begin to 
work for the progressive forces. The West's tactic of 
surrounding territories in order to 'capture' them could 
thus also work the other way round (not necessarily through 
invasions, but through influence on domestic social 
forces). An illustration of how this might operate is the 
following: at the time of the Syrian crisis it was stated
that
"The United States plans to use this provocation to 
distract the attention of the Syrian authorities, 
forcing Syrian troops to concentrate on the frontier 
to the advantage of conspiring elements within the 
country.
A similar description could apply very closely to the 
manner in which the coup in Iraq occurred in the following
 ^DU Song (1957) op. cit.
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year, in circumstances where the Iraqi authorities were 
preoccupied with military operations on the frontier 'to 
the advantage of conspiring elements within the country*.
Another possible result of a global shift to more 
favourable circumstances is implied in the way the original 
conflict was conceptualised, in the sense that even though 
the threat was considered serious in 1957, the obverse of 
this is that the West needed to win that particular 
confrontation:
"If the people of the Middle East obtain independence, 
it will be impossible for the imperialists to maintain 
their remnant colonies not only in Asia but also in 
Africa." *
Thus a new, more favourable set of circumstances for an 
enlargement of the geographical scope of the front of 
independence forces could come into existence. Eventually, 
in the summer of 1958, these different implications were 
indeed followed up by the CPC analysis, notably on the 
question of the spread of the nationalist current to 
Africa.
These were all possible deductions from the favourable 
outcome of the Syrian crisis, but they were not the issues 
which the CPC mainly focussed upon at the turn of the year 
1957-8. At that time, the single most important issue 
emphasised in assessing the new circumstances was probably 
the role of the Socialist Camp.
This emphasis should not necessarily be taken as an 
indicator of satisfaction, on the contrary, it could well 
have reflected a certain degree of anxiety about whether 
the Socialist Camp would in fact fulfill the historical 
role which was opening up for it. In practice, Beijing's
 ^Jienmin Ribao Sept 10 op. cit.
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increasing stress on the Asian-African peoples' movement 
later in the year 1958 was, when it occurred, not just a 
reflection of the intrinsic strength of that movement, but 
also a response to a feeling that these fears about the 
Socialist Camp were perhaps justified.
In fact, when the East Wind analysis was originally 
proposed, one of its most important functions was a 
didactic one with respect to the socialist countries. The 
main lesson was that the balance had shifted, so it was 
possible to be more bold in policy terms. This emerges 
quite clearly in the initial formulation of the concept in 
the January 1 editorial published by Renmin Ribao:
"The east wind prevails over the west wind, the forces 
of socialism are stronger than the forces of 
imperialism, and the peace forces are stronger than 
the forces of war. If there was still some dispute on 
this not so long ago, even among communists, now the 
fact is common knowlege even in the western world.
The image was that the socialist countries had surmounted 
a difficult period, leading to better prospects for unity 
within and between them, and that consolidation had 
occurred around definite political principles. When the 
Chinese leadership looked back at the negative experience 
of the immediate past, an interesting link developed 
between their perception of events in the Middle East and 
in the socialist countries. This was partly a link by 
analogy, but was also seen as a causal connection. Thus 
Zhou Enlai, in a major foreign policy report of February 
1958:
"In 1957 the imperialist aggressive clique, taking 
advantage of errors in the work of rectification in 
the socialist countries and relying on the opportunity 
created by difficulties we had in moving forward, 
stirred up a wild anti-Soviet, anti-Communist and 
anti-popular counter-current on a world scale."
 ^Remain Ribao, January 1st 1958; Xinhtia same date.
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This in turn, Zhou considered, exerted an influence upon 
internal developments, for example in China's own case:
"The anti-Soviet, anti-Communist, anti-popular 
counter-current stirred up by imperialism created 
among the bourgeois rightists in our country the false 
impression that there was an opportunity to be taken 
advantage of.
This image parallels the manner in which external pressure 
was considered to influence the alignment of domestic 
forces in the case of Syria and Jordan. Such a linkage is 
made quite explicit in one article written in June 1957 
which not only argues that the USA, losing confidence in 
armed force since the experience of Suez, was pursuing a 
general policy of subversion aimed at making bourgeois and 
feudal forces "raise their heads again", but also refers to 
US tactics of pressurising Syria, including a blockade on 
cotton exports, saying that these provide favourable 
circumstances for "bourgeois rightist elements" within 
Syria.5
This strikingly illustrates that there was a certain 
process of osmosis between domestic and international 
political concerns even before the inauguration of the 
Great Leap Forward.
The feeling was, then, that socialist and national forces 
had faced a common test in the negative circumstances of 
1957 - and had surmounted it respectively in the Moscow 
Meeting and the favourable outcome of the Syrian crisis. 
The different forces had come through it and united amongst 
themselves. In this respect the Cairo Conference
 ^ZHOU Enlai, "Muqian guoji xingshi he wo guo waijiao zhengce", 
Xinhua Banyue Kan, op. cit., p. 35
 ^JIANG Yuanchun, "Lun zui jin Zhong Dong xingshi", Shijie Zhishi 
XII (June 6)
152
duplicated the Moscow Meeting, its outstanding lesson being 
that
"What imperialism dreads most is the people's firm 
unity"®
It may be assumed that this would in turn create favourable 
circumstances for the two forces to unite with one another. 
In fact the crucial issue, and the most important single 
concern in united front terms was, for the Chinese, the 
correct approach for the socialist countries to adopt with 
respect to nationalist struggles in the intermediate zone.
It is thus important to understand the parameters in which 
socialist camp action was expected to be expressed. One of 
the most important themes in Chinese material from this 
period was in fact the notion that an incremental growth of 
US gains in local conflict situations would create a logic 
leading not just to an expansion of the area under US 
control but to a possible escalation of the level of 
conflict. Thus one of the major lessons of the Syrian 
crisis was seen as the need for action on the part of 
socialist countries in support of national struggles in 
order to prevent this escalation occurring.
The implication was that, so long as the conflict remained 
focussed in the intermediate zone, not only did this serve 
to shield the Socialist Camp (as mentioned in the Anna 
Louise Strong interview), but it also served to maintain 
the conflict at a level below that of direct superpower 
confrontation, with its attendant risk of nuclear war. 
Hence, to continue to tie the adversary down at this level 
was an important contribution to maintaining peace at the 
highest - global - level. Thus relations on a correct 
basis with the nationalist forces which were fulfilling
 ^ Jienmin Sibao editorial, marking the conclusion of the Cairo 
Conference, January 4th 1958; Xinhua same date.
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this function became a major task of united front policies 
from the socialist point of view.
This helps to explain why some of the formulations put 
forward at the time of that crisis sounded quite a dire or 
pessimistic note in terms of the possible outcomes 
envisaged. Such ideas implicitly contradict the Soviet view 
that the Socialist Camp should play a responsible role in 
alleviating tension; for the CPC on the contrary 
international tension was viewed as a necessary product of 
imperialist policy, and larger-scale wars were considered 
most likely to arise as a penalty for not giving 
whole-hearted support to anti-imperialist movements.
Realising the favourable potential implied in the East Wind 
assessment of the world balance of forces was by no means 
something which would come about automatically. The 
crucial condition, from the Chinese point of view, was the 
subjective one. A latent, objectively favourable shift in 
the world system could only be translated into real gains 
by means of correct policies, which in turn implied 
progressive actors uniting around correct principles or 
lines.
The condition for fulfilling this duty was thus placed at 
the level of policies adopted by socialist countries, in 
other words in the subjective sphere. Accordingly, a 
crucial area of the Chinese critique of socialist policy 
was the question of perception, an issue which can be 
understood concretely in terms of the interpretation of 
certain specific features of the system. None was more 
important, in the CPC's vocabulary, than the notion of 
positions of strength.
POSITIONS OF STRENGTH
The phrase "positions of strength" recurs with considerable 
frequency in the Chinese analysis of US strategy. It was
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seen as having two important aspects: firstly a physical 
process of concentrating forces regionally and secondly a 
psychological dimension, an attempt by the adversary to 
appear stronger than he really was, thus making gains 
partly by bluff.
From the point of view of the first of these aspects, that 
of the physical concentration of forces, a crucial issue 
would appear to be the relationship between distribution of 
power at a global level (reflected in the 'East Wind' idea) 
and within a regional subsystem.
The relative strength of forces would not necessarily be 
the same at these two levels. In a situation where 
imperialism was well entrenched globally it could still 
have local 'weak links'. However the interpretation which 
appears to have been espoused in the early part of 1958 was 
rather the opposite, i.e. one where imperialism was weak in 
terms of the global balance of forces, but could still 
prevail in a particular local conflict by concentrating its 
forces, provided that the progressive forces could not 
bring their latent overall superiority to bear. This is 
the concrete strategic context for united front policies - 
they would serve to allow anti-imperialist forces to 
express their global superiority in an effective local 
form.
As far as the psychological aspect is concerned, what 
matters in international relations is not just the 
objective distribution of forces - however this is defined 
- but how it is perceived by decision makers. There are a 
number of points of concordance between Chinese approaches 
and issues referred to in Western International Relations 
theory , not just on the role of perception in general, but 
in terms of the element of bluff involved in certain gaming 
models.
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Some of these ideas can be illustrated with reference to 
Chinese treatment of the Syrian crisis. In the period 
around October of 1957, the Chinese believed Syria to be 
actually weaker than the forces ranged against her locally. 
One article from this period gives figures showing the 
disparity between Syria and Turkey, in the letter's favour. 
At the same time the article effectively warns American 
decision-makers that in contemplating an aggressive course 
of action it is necessary to take into consideration not 
only the local but also the overall global balance: they 
should
"properly appraise the strength of the world's anti- 
aggressive forces."
An interesting illustration of the concentration of 
strength, or what later came to be known as 'rapid 
deployment', can be seen in the Chinese analysis of the 
role of Western naval forces. Anticipating the importance 
attached to the Mediterranean in the context of western 
reaction to the coup in Iraq in the summer of 1958,® the 
press referred in October 1957 to joint US, British and 
Turkish manoeuvres in the Mediterranean and Gulf areas as 
being intended by the western powers to "demonstrate their 
'enormous strength'"* During the crisis in Jordan it was 
remarked how, at short notice, the Sixth Fleet could be 
brought in to carry out threatening manoeuvres, in co­
ordination with pro-Western palace and feudal forces within 
that country.^* The Chinese considered that the West had 
had some success in the case of Jordan, thus being able to
 ^Dagong Baa, October 19 1957; Xinhua October 21.
®. for example, LI Jin, "Hei diguozhuyi bazhan Libanun di yinmou 
biran shibai", Shijie Zhishi, 1958, XV (August 1)
*. Kenmin JRibao Editorial October 18, 1957. China Supports p.
150.
10. JIANG Yuanchun, S h ijie  Zhishi 1957 op. cit.
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use that country, provisionally at least, as a basis for 
carrying out expansionist activities in other parts of the 
Middle East. Thus at the height of the 1957 crisis the 
Chinese press remarked upon the unloading - throughout the 
night, by floodlight - of western arms in Jordan, another 
example of a rapid concentration of forces facilitated by 
western presence in the Mediterranean.
However, this local power, it is argued, is not so terrible 
if it is seen in a global context, particularly if one 
makes a sober and accurate analysis. Thus:
"The United States Sixth Fleet may have the effect of 
fj ightening weak-nerved people, but it would be too 
fantastic for the United States to use it to challenge 
the whole world's anti-aggressive forces.
The element of perception, of understanding, comes in at 
this point: the crucial thing was to grasp the
potentialities for a convergence of popular forces at a
wider level, and not be misled by the apparent local
superiority of the other side.
A basic element in the Chinese leadership's view was in 
fact the notion that Western 'positions of strength' were 
also potentially a source of weakness. This was so because 
the political regimes in pro-Western state actors would by 
definition be anti-popular, and would thus themselves 
become targets of struggle. An example is provided by
British bases in Cyprus which were seen as another
significant element in rapid deployment of western forces. 
Plans to devise a constitutional settlement which could 
enable Britain to retain its forces in Cyprus were seen as 
a source of weakness, because they would stir up popular
DU Song, Shijie Zhishi 1957, op. cit.
Dagong Bao, October 19 1957; Xinhua October 21.
157
feeling against Britain. In Jordan, the "kind of
situation in which the government relies upon military 
terror to maintain itself cannot last l o n g . T h u s  even 
the 'positions of strength' themselves were viewed as 
stimuli to the formation of anti-Western united fronts of 
popular forces.
While arguing that Western strategy had to be defeated in 
positional terms, the CPC nevertheless resisted the view 
that its own camp was simply beating the other side at 
their own game. There was a different kind of logic at 
work. In the spring of 1958 Chinese leaders like Soong 
Ching-ling (Song Qingling) and and Guo Moruo conducted a 
campaign to mobilise public opinion against US 
positions-of-strength tactics, both conventional and 
nuclear. Simultaneously, another major ideological
campaign was being carried out against Yugoslavia, one of 
the key issues being criticism of the view that the 
socialist camp could be considered to be pursuing a policy 
of "'positions of strength and struggle for hegemony.
On this there was agreement with the Soviet leadership who 
also attacked Yugoslavia's position in that "they attribute 
to the USSR a position of strength policy.
At the same time, while the Socialist countries were not 
expected to practice hegemonic positions-of-strength 
policies, it was certainly felt that they had in some sense
6E Ping, "Saipulusi zen yang le?", Shijie Zhishi 1958, July 5,
p. 20
J]ANG Yuanchun, Shijie Zhishi 1957 op. cit.
see the interview with KUO Mo-jo in Peking Review May 20 1958 
and the article by SOONG Ching-ling in Peking Review April 8 1958.
Renmin Ribao editorial, May 5 1958; text in Peking Review May 13
see Pravda of May 9 1958 quoted in BASS and MARBURY eds The 
Soviet-Yugoslav Controversy - A Documentary Record New York 1959.
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a responsibility to puncture the appearance of strength 
cultivated by the USA, in the context of the power 
relationship between imperialism on the one hand and the 
two progressive groupings - the socialist camp and the 
Asian-African movement - on the other.
In terms of the key united front issue, that of building 
the relationship between the forces of socialism and of 
national independence, the issue of making a correct 
appraisal of the enemy was, from the Chinese point of view, 
crucial. The danger was perceived to be that the Soviet 
leadership would be discouraged from aiding the 
independence movements by the risk of nuclear escalation, 
and this would embolden the USA to a point where the local 
conflict might get out of hand and a global confrontation 
would in fact be more likely.
THE ROLE OF TREATY ORGANISATIONS
This issue can be studied in more detail in the context of 
what was seen as the most important mechanism for 
concentrating enemy forces, namely the use of military 
bases and pacts. On this question, the CPC continued to 
'take the enemy seriously tactically' even in the newly 
favourable circumstances defined by the East Wind analysis. 
Such an assessment of tactical risk was in no way excluded 
by the favourable assessment of the overall balance of 
forces.
We can distinguish different themes in the Chinese 
treatment of bases and blocs: (a) the use of these means to 
consolidate Western control over the specific countries in 
which they are implanted, (b) their use in concentrating 
forces with the aim of winning regional gains at the 
expense of national-independent regimes, (c) their function 
in subduing the intermediate area as part of a geo­
political strategy for surrounding the Socialist Camp, (d)
159
their actual military threat against the USSR. Within this 
multi-level analysis, the aspect on which the CPC placed 
the greatest emphasis was that the countries of the 
intermediate zone suffer more directly from imperialism, 
and it is their direct struggle - in which the fate of 
imperialism's wider strategy is bound up - which assumes 
the greatest immediate significance.
The most concentrated Chinese discussion of Western policy 
with regard to bases and treaty organisations within our 
period falls during the early part of 1958, and illustrates 
well the complicated relationship between the different 
themes which we have mentioned.
In the summer of 1957 the US goal had been described as one 
of turning the Baghdad Pact into "a North African and West 
Asian anti-communist league.*'^® The formation of the 
Baghdad Pact's military organisation at the same time was 
seen both in terms of its local role in facilitating 
Western dominance in the area in that it "once more exposes 
America's aggressive intentions in the Middle East," and in 
terms of a broader strategic role as part of plans to 
encircle the Soviet Union and eastern Europe and thus 
constitute a menace to world peace.1* The link with other 
treaty organisations was also considered important:
"The US-plotted Bagdad/bloc with Turkey on the West 
and Pakistan on the East, plus the NATO and SEATO 
blocs constitute an encirclement of the Socialist 
Camp.""
In January 1958 at the time when the shift to a more 
favourable analysis of the world situation was being made, 
a Baghdad Pact summit was held, to which the Chinese media
JIANG Yuanchun (June, 1957) op. cit, p. 10 
Guangming Ribao, June 8 1958; Xinhua same date 
Renmin Ribao September 10 1957; Xinhua same date.
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devoted considerable attention, arguing that the USA was 
using this occasion to increase its influence in the Pact 
generally, and to draw Lebanon (which had accepted the 
Eisenhower Doctrine) and Jordan into it; at the same time, 
it was argued that the USA was planning to establish 
nuclear bases not only in Pakistan, but also in Iraq and 
possibly in I r a n . I n  terms of the links between the 
Baÿi^ad Pact and NATO, attention was drawn to the key role 
of 'Washington's loyal flunkey', the Turkish leader Adnan 
Menderes. **
Besides its use in encircling the Socialist Camp, the Pact 
was seen as a means of breaking the unity of forces with 
the region. The January meeting was attended by Secretary 
of State Dulles, his purpose, according to the Chinese 
press, being to boost the '"morale"' of the Pact members 
and offer the sinister 'bait' of '"new economic aid"',^* 
while US goals were also said to include that of dividing 
regional states against each other in order to further its 
goal of penetrating the area economically; the main target 
of attack being the national-independent stance of Syria.
However the Chinese leadership came to the conclusion, 
expressed in a Renmin Ribao article of February 1, that 
Dulles had failed in his intrigues. In this, the 
interaction of local forces with Soviet initiatives was 
considered to have played a significant role. The failure 
was attributed not only to contradictions within the Pact 
and to the fact that 'The Moslem countries which
summary of the Chinese press on Jan 24 1958, in Xinhua News, 
same date.
Dagong Bao Jan. 28 1958; Xinhua same date, 
summary of Jan. 27; Xinhua, same date.
Dagong Bao, Jan. 28 1958. 
ibid.
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participated in the Bagdad/Pact suffered serious financial 
difficulties by following the United States policy of arms 
expansion and war preparations',^ but also to the issuing 
of a Tass warning by the M o s c o w . T h u s ,
'The struggle for peace and against imperialism waged 
by the people of the Asian and African countries had 
developed to unprecedented dimensions and the Soviet 
Union had made a timely exposure of the United States 
intrigues and a warning to the United States.' **
Among the different funtions of US bases referred to in the 
Chinese analysis at this time, the nuclear level received 
considerable attention:
'ihe United States wanted to turn Turkey into a base 
to launch rockets at Soviet territory ....But the 
mighty deterrent strength of the Soviet Union 
prevented war being unleashed against it by the United 
States. It was evident, too, that the building up of 
Turkish military strength by the United States was 
directed against the national independence movement in 
the Arab countries.'
But the argument that the Soviet Union was strong enough to 
neutralise the nuclear dimension did not prevent the CPC 
from continuing to make considerable play of the fact that 
if nuclear conflict did break out, the states which were 
part of the Western strategic structure would inevitably 
become embroiled in it, the clear implication being that US 
bases can only expect to become targets of pre-emptive 
Soviet strikes:
Renmin Ribao Feb. 1 1958; Xinhua Feb. 3.
Dagong Bao Jan. 23 1958; Xinhua same date. The Soviet warning 
was issued on Jan. 21.
Dagong Bao Feb.l 1958; Xinhua Feb. 3.
Renmin Ribao Dec 8 1957; Xinhua same date
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•The Bagdad/Pact countries would share the fate of the 
NATO powers to suffer the menace of rockets and 
nuclear weapons in the event of war.
In general, during the early part of 1958 the Chinese 
leadership was to launch a propaganda assault on Western 
bases and treaty organisations in different parts of the 
world, arguing that their formation conformed with the 
"strategic framework of atomic w a r " I n  the case of 
Southeast Asia, too, it was argued that
"The setting up of such bases in more countries not 
only will tighten US control over these countries and 
increase the danger of war, but will bring 
incalculable disaster upon these countries first of 
all should war be started by the United States.
NEW ANALYSIS OF INTER-IMPERIALIST RELATIONS
In fact in the early months of 1958, Chinese emphasis on 
the importance of the Soviet role only seems to have 
increased. A plausible explanation would link this to a 
very important change which occurred in another aspect of 
the CPC's analysis of the world balance of forces - the 
question of relations between the major Western powers.
Thus, over the space of a few months from the autumn of 
1957 to the spring of 1958 a major shift occurred in the 
Chinese analysis whereby the theme of inter-imperialist 
contention - previously a very important element - was 
strongly downgraded, at least in its political aspect.
At the time of Suez Mao had said "Did Britain direct its 
spearhead chiefly at Egypt? No. Britain's moves were
Guangmiingr Ribao, January 24, 1958; Xinhua same date 
Peking Review May 13 1958
ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, Documents on 
International Affairs, 1958, p. 484
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against the United States, much as the moves of the United 
States were against Britain" . Since then the CPC's 
image had already altered radically. Even by late 1957 
British military deployment in Jordan had been seen as 
complementary to, rather than a rival to, US deployment in 
Turkey. However at that time the theoretical framework 
still stressed the role of inter-imperialist rivalry. In 
the context of US political manoeuvrings over the Baghdad 
Pact at the beginning of 1958, the Chinese still saw things 
in terms of a process whereby America "will continue its 
efforts to seize power from Britain and bind every member 
of the bloc to the American war chariot", and Britain was 
even accused by the authoritative Renmin Ribao Observer of 
"challenging the United States for leadership of the 
western camp.
Very soon afterwards, however, a new model was developed 
reflecting the fact that, while there would be continuing 
struggle over economic interests, the Western powers could 
also realise their overriding interest in co-operation at 
a political level. Thus, in the case of Africa,
"In the economic field, US monopoly capital is trying 
gradually to oust British and French capital in South 
Africa, the Congo, Rhodesia and Morocco, so as to 
bring these regions under its exclusive control. In 
the political field, to hoodwink the African people, 
the US imperialists make a show of opposing the 
British and French ways of running their colonies but 
actually they give military and financial supp ort to 
the Anglo-French colonialists and openly take their 
side in the United Nations."^®
MAO Zedong Selected Works Vol V, Peking (FLP) 1977 p 361 
Guangming Ribao Feb 1 1958; Xinhua Feb 3
Renmin Ribao Observer , February 9, 1958; Xinhua February 10.
JIN Chunhua, article in Shijie Zhishi, quoted in Peking Review 
May 6 1958
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This implies a degree of co-ordinated logic in imperialist 
policy-making which would seem to clash with some earlier 
Chinese formulations.
In the context of the Lebanese crisis in May 1958 this 
implied shift was made quite explicit, the Chinese media 
referring to the USA, Britain and France "working in close 
collaboration to undermine peace in the Middle East".^^ 
And shortly afterwards Liu Shaoqi in his Political Report 
to the VIII CPC Congress gave an official and high-level 
appraisal of this change, arguing that for the moment 
contradictions between the capitalist powers had been 
patched up through NATO, the Baghdad Pact and SEATO; the 
treaty organisations are thus seen as a vehicle for inter­
imperialist co-operation, as opposed to rivalry as they had 
been seen before, such co-operation being "for the 
objective of opposing communism, the people and the 
national liberation movement."^®
This marked a very significant shift. While the CPC 
perceived opposite trends in the two camps, reflected in 
the concept of the East Wind prevailing over the West Wind, 
they apparently no longer considered that the growing unity 
of one camp was reflected in the disunity of the other, as 
had somewhat simplistically been assumed in the January 1 
Editorial, for e x a m p l e . W a s  there then a possibility 
that imperialist countries could respond to the less 
favourable circumstances by pulling together? Whatever the 
case, it is certain that the question of how united the 
opposition was would have an important bearing on the 
response of the progressive camp in united front terms.
Dagong Bao May 21 1958; Xinhua May 22
LIU Shaoqi, "Report..." op. cit, Peking Beviev June 3 1958 p. 7 
Benmin Ribao January 1, op. cit.
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HEIGHTENED EMPHASIS ON POLE OF SOCIALIST CAMP
The CPC clearly felt that the imperialists were pursuing a 
coherent strategy, and if it was true that they were to 
some extent successful in overcoming their divisions, this 
strategy might even become increasingly coherent. This
realisation was at least initially manifested in the 
sentiment that the role of the Socialist Camp would be 
increasingly important, presumably in terms of putting 
forward a coherent strategy counter to this. China's 
capacity to act as an individual state was strictly 
limited, but it would be a different matter if Chinese 
policy could successfully be urged upon the Socialist Camp 
as a whole. At least in the early part of 1958, while the 
Chinese press was paying considerable attention to Western 
diplomatic activity over the treaty organisations, the 
emphasis placed upon the Soviet role was also extremely 
strong. There was a feeling that a testing-time in 
international politics was approaching, with its storm
centre in the Middle East, and that the Socialist Camp,
together with other world-political forces, would be 
severely tried in this process. The Chinese certainly did 
not see the Socialist Camp's role as that of a proletarian 
leading core within the overall progressive movement, whose 
leadership other forces had to accept, but they may well 
have seen it as filling a necessary role as a kind of 
va.ngu.ard force. In conformity with the general mood in 
internal affairs during the Leap Forward, when a mass 
revolutionary upsurge existed it could be seen as a
dangerous and abnormal situation if the vanguard were to 
lag behind or get out of phase with it. For this reason 
the Chinese selectively praised what they saw as the 
positive trends in Soviet policy.
In terms of Soviet peace initiatives or proposals for 
negotiations with the West, the Chinese covered them from 
the point of view of implying that they were useful mainly
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in exposing imperialist aggressiveness. When the Soviet 
government on September 3 1957 proposed to the USA an
agreement on non-intervention in the Middle East, the 
Chinese argued that the Americans' real reply was a Baghdad 
Pact meeting in London on September 23 which discussed 
plans for a concerted attack against S y r i a . I n  his 
systematic treatment of the world situation put forward on 
February 10, 1958, Zhou Enlai drew together the threads of 
recent Soviet diplomacy in the two-month period since the 
close of the Moscow meeting, including firstly a plan for 
calling a summit conference of peaceful states which were 
not members of any bloc, such as India, Afghanistan, Egypt, 
Yugoslavia, Sweden and Austria, secondly, the proposal for 
ending nuclear tests, thirdly, the Rapacki Plan for a 
nuclear-free Europe, fourthly, a proposal for a non­
aggression pact to be signed by members of NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact, and fifthly, a proposal to guarantee the peace 
and neutrality of the states in the Middle East. Zhou 
contented himself with saying that this fully demonstrates 
the peaceful stance of the Soviet Union,without implying 
that there was any likelihood that such initiatives would 
modify the conduct of imperialism.
However, it was an entirely different matter when the 
Chinese were discussing Soviet warnings to the West or 
militant expressions of solidarity with the national 
movements. In this case great importance was attached to 
the Soviet role. The Soviet diplomatic warning of 
September 1957 had for example been described by Renmin 
Ribao as 'a great inspiration to Arab nationalism'^^, and 
in the early part of 1958 such solidarity was still 
considered a major condition for the national movements'
40 Renmin Ribao Sept 26 1957; Xinhua same date.
ZHOU Enlai, "Muqian guoji xingshi he wo guo waijiao zhengce" 
Xinhua Banyue Kan op. cit. p. 35.
Renmin Ribao Sept 6 1957; Xinhua same date
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success. In the speech just quoted, Zhou Enlai thus stated 
that :
"A strong socialist-camp presence and its powerful 
support for national independence movements has 
inspired all people striving for or safeguarding their 
freedom and independence and has formed an 
increasingly advantageous factor in their valiantly- 
progressing struggle against imperialism and 
colonialism.
It is particularly interesting that we find this same 
sentence quoted in full in another authoritative article, 
published in April under the signature Dong Feng (East 
Wind) The significant point is that the article in
question is on the topic of the ongoing character of the 
Bandung spririt. Bandung was the epitome of an authentic 
Asian-African initiative, yet the article goes out of its 
way to affirm the influence of the Socialist Camp upon that 
trend. Dong Feng thus argues that "The ties of friendly 
co-operation between the socialist countries and the Asian- 
African nationalist countries are getting constantly 
stronger", that "the Socialist Camp support all national 
independence movements," and that those who wish to commit 
aggression must be prepared to reckon with the "just 
indignation" of the socialist countries, which "strengthens 
the morale" of the national independence forces.
As usual during this period, events in the Middle East are 
used to illustrate general conclusions: imperialism had
planned, according to Dong Feng's argument, to subvert the 
Egyptian and Syrian governments and restore colonialism...
"but owing to the Soviet Union's severe warning, owing 
to the unanimous censure of the peaceloving nations 
and peoples, and also to the united resistance of the
ZHOU Enlai, speech of Feb 10, 1958, op. cit.
DONG Feng "Wanlong jingshen po lang qian jin" Shijie Zhishi, 
1958, VIII.
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Egyptian and Syrian peoples, the imperialists' plots 
could not come to fruition. It must be pointed out 
that the spirit of resolution exhibited by the USSR in 
restraining the aggressive adventurousness of the 
imperialists played an exceedingly important part in 
this.""
This was the assessment in the early part of 1958, and the 
strength of a statement like this will serve to measure the 
abruptness of the change which was to follow shortly.
ROLE OF THE NATIONALIST COUNTRIES
The importance of Socialist Camp solidarity in no way 
implied however that the Chinese were less interested in 
the strengths of the national movements at this point in 
time. In a climate in which enormous emphasis was placed 
upon the ability to stand up to imperialism and puncture 
its apparent strength, the Arab nationalist movement also 
came in for considerable praise.
As we have just argued, the experience of the 'counter- 
current' of 1957 was something where the nationalist 
countries of the Middle East and the socialist countries 
were considered by the Chinese to have faced similar 
threats, a similar interaction between external pressure 
and the activity of 'reactionary' social strata internally. 
By the early part of 1958 it was thought that this counter 
current had basically been reversed - hence the idea of the 
East Wind prevailing over the West. The parallels between 
the two situations were evident not only in the threats 
faced, but also in the methods used to overcome these, in 
other words building closer unity through a process of 
discussion aimed at arriving at a common position. This is 
illustrated in references to the Moscow and Cairo 
conferences in a similar context. Discussions like these 
were considered important in the process of building united
ib , p. 7.
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fronts in a principled way, and similar trends in the 
Socialist and nationalist movements would also tend to 
reinforce one another.
It would appear that an occasion such as this reveals the 
CPC - as in the case of the reference to 'bourgeois 
rightists' in Syria quoted above - scrutinising the Middle 
East through spectacles tinted by their own experience and 
policy demands, rather than the concrete reality of the 
region.
In the circumstances of late 1957, Egypt's action in 
hosting the Cairo Conference was an act of defiance, and 
this aspect was strongly emphasised in an account written 
by a member of China's delegation to that Conference, Zhao 
Puchu. He refers in detail to a speech made by Abdel 
Nasser at a mass rally, where Nasser symbolically handed 
over to the state a sum of money which had been intended as 
a bribe to buy certain people over into the service of the 
West, describing this as a form of nationalisation, similar 
to that employed over the Suez Canal. Referring to this 
unsuccessful Western strategy, Zhao Puchu says that
"this calculation has very obviously proved a losing 
bet, and has led to a great loss of face."
If handled in this way, he argues, the imperialists are 
helpless - they become a laughing stock. Even so, they 
will fail to draw the lessons from their defeat, but will 
continue to make similar attempts in the future, and thus 
prove the cause of their own undoing....
"until they end by being consumed in the fire which 
they themselves unleashed. The case with Nasser just
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mentioned only marks the end of an episode in the 
introductory chapter."
The above assessment is interesting in relation to the 
importance attached to defeating the psychological aspects 
of the adversary's local deployment of power. It does, 
however, also show that the Chinese were clearly selecting 
those aspects of the movement which happened to conform to 
their own overall picture of the tasks of the moment. It 
still needs to be asked how far their model was able to 
accomodate the intrinsic complexity of a phenomenon such as 
Arab nationalism, as a basis for a realistic assessment of 
united front possibilities.
The CPC did have some tools in its body of theory which 
could potentially be advantageous in making such a concrete 
analysis. In comparison to some other parts of the 
Communist movement China had the advantage of being a 
developing country itself, with direct experience of semi­
colonialism in the past. This is evident in the fact that 
there were interesting innovations in Chinese theory. The 
CPC broke with the image of stagnancy and other negative 
stereotypes in relation to China's own culture and 
traditions. What it had done in relation to its own 
society could potentially be done in analysing others. 
Thus for example, in the article by Zhao Puchu cited above, 
we find an interesting positive account of the early 
civilisations of Egypt.^
SPECIFICITIES OF THE ARAB REGION
Some of the strengths of the CPC's stance could be seen in 
looking at international links between developing 
countries. The Chinese took a long historical view on
^ ZHAO Puchu, "Chu Ya-Fei renmin tuanjie dahui zaji", Shijie 
Zhishi 1958 III (February) pp 12-15
ZHAO Puchu, op. cit.
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international relations, not seeing the European states- 
system as the point of reference but rather looking back to 
a pattern of relations which had existed in the pre­
colonial period. This in turn implies a very interesting 
dimension of united-front building, in that this process is 
seen in one sense as a reassertion of an earlier pattern of 
relations, though in a changed form. This dimension could 
easily be neglected if one were to interpret the role of 
the united front in Chinese policy purely in terms of 
political inputs deriving from modern political ideas.
One article presenting a historical study of the relations 
between China and the Arabs could serve as an illustration 
of this interpretation of the historical dynamic of Afro- 
Asian unity in a wider sense. It sets out an argument 
which can be summarized as follows: the exchange of
relations between different continents, cultures and 
peoples has played a vital role in the advance of 
civilisation; the importance of this factor has, however, 
been minimised by Western scholarship because of its class 
stand; this process of interchange was cut short owing to 
the action of imperialism; but it could not be suppressed 
for long, and is now reasserting itself through the current 
movement, in a changed form, since politically it now has 
an anti-imperialist character.^® Specifically, the authors 
argue that the past history of exchanges between China and 
the Arab nation
“not only enriched the cultures of the two nations 
concerned, but also furthered the progress of world 
civilisation."
Although these relations were interrupted by imperialism, 
nothing could prevent their being renewed; and after the
ZHU Changeai, UA Shuhua and ZHANG Peide, “Zhongguo shi Alabo ge 
guo renmin di zhencheng pengyou", Jiaoxue yu Yanjiu 1958, VIII (August) 
pp 9-11
172
Bandung conference, "they have developed speedily on a new 
basis. "4*
Noteworthy in the above is the view of the Arab nation as 
a single entity. The CPC did thus have a theoretical 
apparatus which could potentially be valuable in examining 
the historical dynamic of relations within the Arab world.
A certain specificity of politics in the Arab area was 
recognised, insofar as popular forces expressed themselves 
partly at a state-centric level, and partly at wider 
regional levels of solidarity. This duality is reflected 
in statements such as the following:
"Jordan's affairs should be managed by the people of 
Jordan themselves, and the affairs of the Arab 
countries should be managed by the Arab people 
thf.mselves, in which no foreign intervention is 
allowed."M
It is interesting to note that the point of reference at 
both levels is the people, thus confirming the impression 
that regimes were viewed mainly as intermediaries in united 
front building.
The problem of such formulations is however that they 
implicitly reflect a view of Arab nationalism essentially 
as a regional form taken by anti-imperialist solidarity. 
This is not inappropriate if it is taken as one aspect of 
a complex and multifaceted phenomenon. The CPC's tendency 
was however to reduce practically everything to this single 
dimension, and this posed problems in all departments of 
their analysis of the Middle East.
ibid.
“ CHJNS
July 18 1958 in China Supports,., op. cit p. 185
I A Government "Protest to the Government of Great Britain"
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While official Chinese policy statements tended to treat 
the Arab phenomenon mainly as an example of regional 
co-operation, specialists did in fact make some effort to 
grapple with the specificities of the situation. Important 
among these being the existence of several states within a 
single nation.
Thus a study of "The Arab Nation and Arab Nationalism" 
written by Mu Zhi takes the view that the different Arab 
states are entities "formed out of the Arab nation."^
ROLE OF ISLAM
But what of the role of Islam, which is undoubtedly the 
really the big issue? The USSR, having originally condemned 
Pan-Islamism as a trend, was moving painfully towards a 
reassessment of Arab Nationalism in this period.^ What 
would the CPC's attitude be? We have referred to certain 
aspects of the Chinese Communist tradition which could 
potentially prove helpful in making a creative analysis, 
but there were also other, more negative aspects of the 
CPC's specific brand of socialism. Particularly important 
in this was the homogenising approach which was manifested 
in relation to China's own minorities, the concrete 
expression of an attitude of mind in which cultural 
specificities - particularly religion - were viewed as mere 
historical relics whose contemporary significance was 
diminishing practically to zero. In practice, it was 
largely this aspect which was to predominate in Chinese 
approaches to Islam. Thus the overall conceptual approach 
which in China's internal situation was manifested in the
KU Zhi, "Alabo minzu yu Alabo minzuzhuyi", Shijie Zhishi 1958 IV 
pp. 15-16
See BOLTON A.R.C., Soviet Middle East Studies, Oxford (OUP for 
RIIA) 1959
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tendency to homogenisation, was expressed in terms of 
international analysis by a reductionist tendency to force 
the local reality into a mould dictated by the CPC's global 
analysis, rather than critically examining the latter in 
the light of concrete cases.
Thus, to pursue our examination of the Mu Zhi article, in 
substance Islam is seen merely as a historical factor 
contributing to the original process of nation-building. 
He argues that the decisive factor in the Arabs' becoming 
a mighty nation was Mohamed's leadership and success in 
producing a unifying religion. The author gives a clearly 
modernist interpretation of Islam, stressing its social 
conscience and concern for the poor. Also significant - in 
connection with united front issues in general, and with 
the specific line on promoting unity among Arab states as 
a major aim - is the stress placed on Mohamed's 
condemnation of inter-tribal strife.
The impression is of a historical framework in which an 
early impulse was provided by social ideas which expressed 
themselves in a religious form, while in the contemporary 
situation the local people are moving in the direction of 
a 'truer consciousness' ... their ideas are shedding the 
religious shell to become directly political, leaving the 
religious element as an obsolescent remnant.
Crucial in this process was considered to be the clash with 
imperialism, which provides a directly political focus to 
the unity of the Arab nation. Thus Mu Zhi quotes a 
memorandum sent from John Foster Dulles to Eisenhower in 
1956 to the effect that after the Suez War Arab nationalism 
constitutes "a major threat to the West", and explicitly 
depicts Arab national unity as the principal target of US 
strategy, arguing that
"the spearhead of American aggression is not directed 
against one or the other Arab state, it points toward
175
the entire Arab nation; and the purpose is to open up 
breaches in Arab nationalism, to smash it from a point 
internal to the Arab people themselves." ”
Quoting Abdel Nasser to the effect that "Arab nationalism 
will not fade away, because it is a belief and thus an 
indestructible object", the author argues that in trying to 
disintegrate Arab nationalism, Dulles simply "fails to 
understand history, and also fails to understand the 
present era." Events during the Syrian crisis only 
confirms the fact that
"....rather than being weakened [Arab nationalism] has
been increasingly consolidated..... This is because
Arab nationalism is the result of historical 
development; by now it embodies the common hopes and 
interests of the entire Arab people".
This approach which takes a single Arab nation as its basic 
point of reference presents some significant originality in 
comparison with the more conventional state-centric view of 
the official Party media. Despite this, even this author 
gives a strong impression of working within a fairly rigid 
framework where ideas derived from the CPC’s overall 
international, and even domestic, policies become the 
operative criteria for a blatantly selective approach to 
the experience of the area in question.
Recognition of the positive aspects of non-Western 
societies was important, but what of elements of conflict 
within them? Interestingly, there was a polemic in Chinese 
historiography at the time about the importance and nature 
of class conflict in the period before the advent of strong
MU Zhi op. cit. p. 15 
Ibid.
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Western influence.^^ The existence of this debate is 
important, but there is a strong impression that instead of 
attempting to establish the historical facts as the 
starting point, the debate was much more a question of 
contemporary line struggles being projected into the past. 
This was in fact a clear tendency of Chinese Communist 
historiography throughout the Maoist period.^®
SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION IN ARAB COUNTRIES
In the case of analysing other developing societies, the 
impression is that the needs of contemporary united front 
policy were the dominant consideration, leading to an 
interpretation which minimised social differentiation.
In historical terms this is perhaps understandable, but an 
understanding of social differentiation within contemporary 
Arab nationalism would be indispensible for the formulation 
of realistic policies, including ones geared to promoting 
unity. The overwhelming impression of the material in this 
particular period is that the Chinese used general 
references to 'the people' as a substitute for deeper
social analysis.
In the course of the year 1958, however much attention the 
Chinese devoted to developing diplomatic relations with the 
nationalist regimes, the most important aspect of
international contacts was definitely at the people-to-
people level, which was seen as the core of the
reVO1utionary movement.
See FEÜERWERKER A. History in Communist China, Cambridge Mass 
(MIT) 1968.
This tendency was later taken to a high point in the campaign to 
criticise Lin Biao and Confucius in the early 1970s.
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Chinese treatment of the Cairo Conference is extremely 
interesting in this context, because it illustrates a 
particular way of conceiving of people-based united fronts 
which some commentators seem to miss. The literature 
exhibits a certain tendency to contrast on the one hand a 
united front 'from above* between governments and on the 
other one 'from below' which is implicitly more 
revolutionary. This is not necessarily how the CPC itself 
viewed things, at least in this period. The people-based 
united front is people-based because it is conceived in a 
manner which downplays the state-centric dimension, not 
because it is necessarily more narrow or 'leftist' than one 
between governments.
As Zhou Enlai put it in a major speech shortly after the 
founding conference of the AAPSO,
"The representation at the Cairo Conference exhibited 
an extremely wide range of social strata, and shows 
that the movement to grasp national independence and 
safeguard world peace is already increasingly becoming 
a movement of the peoples of all the countries of Asia 
and Africa."57
Another interesting formulation was put forward at the 
Conference itself by delegation head Guo Moruo, himself a 
significant figure in united front work. He remarked that 
this meeting was better than Bandung because it was on a 
non-governmental basis and thus
"we can express our people's aspirations and demands 
more freely and work together to realise them."
ZHOU Enlai, "Muqian guoji xingshi he wo guo waijiao zhengce", 
Xinhua Ban Yue Kan February 1958
KUO Mo-jo. Address to the Cairo Conference, Xinhua (Cairo) Dec 
31 1957; Survey of China Kainland Press No 1685 p. 40
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Although the implication is thus clearly of a united front 
'from below', this does not necessarily mean a more narrow 
or 'revolutionary' orientation. Such a conclusion is 
suggested by the fact that the Chinese delegation was 
composed of non-Party members. They were Guo Moruo, then 
an unaffiliated 'democrat',Chu Tunan, a leading member of 
the China Democratic League and Zhao Puchu, a well-known 
Buddhist. All three were active in united front work at 
the broadest level, including international links with 
religious groups, and in particular peace and anti-nuclear 
campaigning.
The other side of this idea of the people as a very broad 
mass was the manner of treating 'reactionaries'. In 
practice, pro-imperialist strata were seen as 'cliques' and 
though they may at times have been labelled 'bourgeois' or 
'feudal' this seems to have signified a generally 
pejorative reference to their reactionary character, more 
than any attempt at a precise socio-economic 
categorisation. Even the key Renmin Ribao editorial of 
September 10, 1957, which marked the strongest official
attempt at categorising regimes in terms of their political 
stance, dealt with the 'reactionaries' in the following 
terms, which are typical of many other articles of the 
period:
"The ruling cliques of some Middle Eastern countries 
have followed the war policy of the imperialists 
....Politically, economically and militarily they are 
now manipulated and controlled by foreign powers." ®
This effectively denies the existence of any domestic 
social basis.
He had been a member of the CPC for a time in the 1920s, and 
rejoined later in the year 1958 under the influence of the line of 
increasing alignment with the Party during the Leap Forward.
Renmin Ribao Editorial, September 10 1957, op. cit.
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The fact is that the CPC was attempting to promote people- 
based united fronts, and to a large extent, the manner in
which they depicted social conditions in the developing
world was conditioned by this political option. This 
effectively deprived the united front of any meaning in 
terms of the coalescence of disparate forces.
There was, however, not a total absence of attempts at
categorisation of the Arab world in terms of more 
analytical socio-economic criteria. One article which 
makes such an attempt, seeks to establish a categorisation 
of the Arab states according to the degree of the 
development of capitalism there. Its author, Peng Shuzhi, 
refers to two groups. The first of these consists of 
countries with almost no native industry (save a little in 
the hands of foreign monopolies), almost no proletariat or 
national bourgeoisie: this group comprises Saudi Arabia,
Yemen, Jordan, Libya and the Gulf states. The remainder of 
the Arab countries fall into a second group which has some 
industrial development and some proletariat. This industry 
and proletariat may be small, but compared with the first 
group the economic level of the second group is fairly 
high, capitalist relations (including banking) have 
appeared, and the proletariat and its organisations are 
constantly growing.^
The implication of this is that the level of left-wing 
political activity is linked with the development of the 
productive forces and thus capitalist development is a good 
thing. And Peng Shuzhi actually explains the success of 
the 'Egyptian path' from this standpoint. Following the 
anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution of 1952, he 
says, Egypt began to take the road of national capitalist
PKNG Shuzhi , "Lue lun Alabo minzu douzheng di xin jieduan", 
Renwen Zazhi 1958, 4 (Aug 25) pp 23-31.
180
development, and underwent a striking change with respect 
to industry and agriculture.^^
Such a line of argument was apparently controversial, and 
this need not be surprising, bearing in mind the 
ideological climate in China in the summer of 1958, which 
stressed the 'leaping forward* of the backward, of the 
'poor and blank' to overtake the advanced. Another 
author, Guo Yingde, develop s an argument from the 
standpoint of the living conditions of the basic masses in 
the Arab countries.®^ Using statistical data from the UN 
Food and Agriculture Organisation to describe their 
poverty, he concentrates particularly upon those countries 
where capitalism was more advanced, including for example 
Lebanon. However the main focal point of his argument 
falls precisely upon Egypt. Far from discerning any 
"striking" economic development, he describes the working 
people existing on very low wages, drinking muddy water, 
never getting to eat any meat and only owning one set of 
clothes, a prey to joint exploitation by foreign companies, 
landlords and capitalists. This is clearly a 
counter-argument to the view which saw capitalist 
development as a factor for progress.
There is evidence here that certain critical questions were 
being asked, and even that a ' 1 ine-struggle' existed, at 
leant in specialist circles.
REACTION TO FORMATION OF THE U.A.R.
Overall, official sources paid practically no public 
attention to such issues. Decision-makers must however
ibid
GUO Yingde, "Diguozhuyi qinlue Zhong Jin Dong Alabo guojia 
xuexing shi", Beijing Daxue Xuebao (Social Sciences section) 1958, 3 
(August) pp. 5-12
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have had such considerations forced upon them by events, 
and none could have been more significant in this respect 
than the formation of the UAR. Viewed from the point of 
view of the Nasserist trend, this step was a rallying-call 
for a new stage in the Arab movement. But it was at the 
same time repressive in its domestic implications. There 
must have been some concern about the role of communists as 
an important element in anti-imperialist struggle. This 
rarely penetrates into official sources, but a historical 
study of the Egyptian national movement emphasises not only 
the impetus which it received from the Russian October 
Revolution but also the important role played by communists 
in the period 1922-3, and again in the course of World War 
13 The need for united fronts to be handled in such a
way that communists do not lose out was probably the 
central issue in the CPC's discussion of the issue, in 
relation to their domestic situation, in the pre-1949 
period. So the formation of the UAR raised a whole series 
of crucial issues.
In terms of their overall model for the unity of the anti­
imperialist forces, the CPC had already described Egypt and 
Syria as "the core of Arab nationalism"^^, and now this 
core had acquired an organisational form. But it was a 
form which raised definite problems for Chinese 
policy-makers, and eventually led them to place less 
emphasis upon the exemplary significance of the 
Egyptian-Syrian 'path', even in spite of the positive 
assessment of Egypt's role in the Cairo conference.
In practice Chinese sources depicted the formation of the 
UAR as a logical result of a history of co-operation 
against imperialist threats, from the defence treaty
QUN Li, "Cong lishi shang Alabo dongfang ge guo renmin di 
jiefang douzheng" in Lishi Yanjiu 1958, 7.
Hfirmin Ribao Sept 10 1957; Xinhua Sept 12, p 7
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between the two states signed in 1955, through spontaneous 
acts of sabotage by Syrians against the oil pipeline at the 
time of the Suez War, through economic union and mutual 
military assistance in 1957, and emphasised the aspect of 
mutual assistance and co-operation in economic construction 
via the pooling of resources and manpower.
In welcoming the formation of the UAR, Renmin Ribao thus 
betrayed some ambiguity. The event was assessed positively 
at both the people-to-people and state-to-state levels: 
from the former aspect, it "will fortify the unity of the 
Egyptian and Syrian people and aid in their common struggle 
against colonialism"; from the latter aspect it would also 
"promote the solidarity among Arab states and help to 
const)! idate peace in the Near and Middle East". The two- 
path analysis was also reaffirmed, in that
'Arab states now must choose whether to follow the 
path of peace and neutrality, of defending their 
national independence and sovereignty and of 
strengthening Arab unity and co-operation; or whether 
to join US military blocs to the detriment of their 
own sovereignty and national interests and causing 
discord among the Arab states,'®”
Thr: above does not however signify that the UAR was viewed 
as creating a totally new entity, a pole of attraction for 
a homogenisation of the Arab movement. The standpoint of 
united action between distinct entities still appears to be 
primary, and the same editorial tends in fact to view the 
UAR as a special form of co-operation between two 
entitities and not as the beginning of a reconstruction of 
the Arab nation under the auspices of a single political 
body, Thus
•Further mutual assistance and co-operation between
Egypt and Syria would tighten the economic contacts
Renmin Ribao Editorial, February 24, 1958; Xinhua same date.
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between the two countries and co-ordinated resources 
and manpower would favour economic construction.
The event was also a source of problems for Soviet foreign 
policy. However, after an initial coolness the Soviet Union 
decided to welcome Nasser in the most fraternal possible 
way when he paid an official visit shortly afterwards, in 
May 1958.^® Egypt was to be the major case study around 
which subsequent theories of the 'non-capitalist road' were 
«^ evelcped. Nasser's visit was favourably commented upon in 
the Chinese press at the time - including his statement 
there that the Soviet Union was the true friend of the 
Arabs®* - in the context of emphasising the Soviet Union's 
role in the area. But in China's case, it is noteworthy 
that from now on there was much less enthusiasm for the 
Egyptian-Syrian 'path', and instead more emphasis was 
placed on the small and weak nations like Yemen and 
Lebanon, who dared to take full advantage of the favourable 
world balance and defy imperialism.
Clearly the issues involved in assessing the nature of Arab 
political and social forces, as a basis for uniting with 
them, were very complex. It will be interesting to see how 
they arose in different forms regarding the analysis of the 
specific problems presented by events in different areas, 
in particular the Lebanese civil war, and the coup in Iraq. 
First, however, we will move to a case study of a very 
instructive instance in the context of what was in some 
respects China's most intense bilateral connection during 
1958, namely the link with Yemen.
ibid
®® see DAWISHA K. Soviet Foreign Policy towards Egypt pp. 19-20. 
Nasser paid a second visit to the USSR a few months later, following 
the coup in Iraq.
69 Tass quoted in Renmin Ribao Nay 6 1958 and Xinhua, same date.
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CH7VT>TER ô . O HINA 'S  REL AT IOISTS
WITH YEMEN — A CASE STUDY
During the period in question, the Chinese leadership 
viewed the Middle East as the focal point of world 
politics, yet China's direct contacts and influence in the 
area were limited. Such contacts, if they could be built, 
would serve what was identified as the crucial united front 
goal of linking the socialist countries and the developing 
world.
The? question of China's relations with Yemen thus stands 
out as an important case in its own right. It also carries 
special interest with respect to the long-standing 
communist problem of the appraisal of conservative regimes 
whi(h apparently adopt an anti-imperialist stance; finally, 
the Sino-Yemeni relationship constitutes an interesting 
early example of 'South-South' co-operation among 
developing countries.
Yemen was a legendarily rich and fertile area of the Arab 
world whose prosperous character was reflected in the Roman 
nail!': Arabia felix. The scene of successive great
civilisations reaching back at least to the thirteenth 
Cfc'iilury BC, the country had preserved its traditional 
social structure to a remarkable degree. Under Ottoman 
suxaiainty its boundaries were not demarcated. However, in 
1902-4 Britain negotiated with the Ottoman empire a 
delinuation of the frontier between Yemen and the British 
colony of Aden. The Yemeni monarchy did not recognise this 
and following the breakup of the Ottoman empire at the end 
of World War I, armed conflict broke out between Yemen and 
Britain. Eventually Yemen was obliged to sign a treaty 
recognising the status quo in 1934.  ^ The Yemeni entity as
 ^For more details of the dispute with Britain see MACRO E. Yemen 
and the Western World, London (C. Hurst and co.) 1968 pp 99 ff; ZABARAH 
M.A. Yemen New York (Praeger) 1982, p. 57.
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it. existed up to the period under examination, was thus the 
Kingdom of the Yemen, with its capital at Sana'a.*
Undoî the rule of Imam Yayha (1904-48), Yemen was one of 
the least Westernised countries in the world, and anything 
•modern* was eschewed practically as a matter of principle. 
Very interestingly, though, the country's enmity with 
Britain incited Yayha to make Yemen the first Arab state to 
enter into friendly relations with the Soviet Union, an 
early agreement in 1928 being followed by a friendship 
treaty in 1931.
In the mid 1950s Britain's activity in the region 
increased, with plans to consolidate British interests by 
federating the protectorates with Aden. Active hostilities 
with Yemen were renewed from 1956 onwards, and these led 
the country to attempt again to play the card of relations 
with the Socialist states. Though eclipsed by the Czech 
arm: deal with Egypt and the Suez War, the conflict in
South Arabia was not without international significance.
In Apri1 1956 a summit meeting was held between Egypt,
Saudi Arabia and Yemen, whereby Abdel Nasser arranged a 
Sanli credit to enable Yemen to buy arms from the USSR. 
Following this. Crown Prince Mohamed al-Badr, as foreign 
minister of the Yemen and effective head of government, 
established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic 
of China, toured the Soviet Union, and concluded various 
agreements with the Russians. From about 1956 the royal 
govuinment increasingly took Afro-Asian and anti-western 
positions in the UN and elsewhere. In March of that year, 
a trade agreement was signed with the Soviet Union, and
* TliA country became the Arab Republic of Yemen when a republican 
regime took power in the capital and was recognised by the UN in 1963, 
although a civil war with the royalists continued until 1970. It was 
often referred to as North Yemen in distinction to the People's 
Den: cm;Me Republic of South Yemen, which existed after the 
independence of Aden in 1967 through to the recent unification of the 
tw!i states.
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shortly afterwards an official visit was made to the USSR, 
Poland and East Germany. Soviet arms began to arrive in 
November of that year, and in January 1957 a Soviet mission 
was established.
After this, Yemen launched armed attacks upon certain 
border areas of Aden, and in June its government addressed 
the United Nations, laying claim to the whole of Aden.^ 
Chi Mr. supported the territorial claim with respect to 
Aden.* It is not difficult to see how positively China 
would have appraised the opening of a new front at a time 
when t he USA and Britain were considered to be trying hard 
to contain and smother the nationalist movement in a 
completely different corner of the Arab world (Jordan and 
Syria).
The royal regime in Yemen could thus perhaps be considered 
to form part of that broad united front including "even 
c€ 1 Iain kings, princes and aristocrats who are patriotic" 
to which the CPC was later to allude in the course of the 
Sino-Soviet polemic,^ and it was at the end of a further 
tour which took in Rumania, Poland and Yugoslavia* that 
CT ewe Prince Mohamed al-Badr, was officially invited to 
China. His visit, which lasted from December 1957 to 
January 1958, culminated in the signing of a trade and co­
operation agreement between the two countries.
. Certain parts of Saudi Arabia were also claimed.
*. More strongly, it has been argued, than the Soviet Union did 
(see WENNER op. cit. p. 184). During the same period, it should be 
noted, China was conducting a forceful campaign in favour of 
Indonesia’s claim to West Irian, which was probably perceived as a 
siniilar type of claim.
* A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International 
Conanunist Ilovement, Peking (FLP) 1963, p. 15
*. Xinhua News Belgrade, December 28 1957. Survey of China 
lîainland Press No. 1683 p. 41.
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It is an interesting point that the close relationship with 
China developed at a time when Soviet relations with Yemen 
were already cooling. That the Soviet arms were envisaged 
as some form of bargaining counter can be seen in the fact 
that they were not deployed and were appparently more or 
less left to rust away, sometimes not even unpacked; this 
experience caused the Soviet Union to terminate its 
military agreement with Yemen in August 1957.?
At a time when high-level visits by national leaders to 
China were rare, the official visit in question received 
considerable publicity in the Chinese press, coming as it 
did from the Arab world which the Chinese considered the 
focal point in international politics at the time. In 
saying that the type of foreign policy adopted by Yemen 
"has lecome increasingly important to peace and security in 
the Middle East and to world peace"®, the Chinese press 
used this case to emphasise some key concepts of wider 
significance.
It has already been remarked that the concern of the CPC 
was to study not just a particular country individually, 
bvH also the general significance of the "road" which it 
follows. We will thus consider both the general and the 
particular, bearing in mind that in stressing the exemplary 
significance of a particular event the Chinese tended to 
pre:‘:u>nt it in a somewhat idealised manner.
As we have seen earlier, Yemen was grouped among those 
states in the region with the least developed capitalist 
relations.* This is certainly accurate. Accordingly, 
descriptions of the country in the Chinese media placed
K O'BALANCE, E. The War in the Yemen, London (Faber and Faber) 
1971, pp. 54-6
® Gii-tngming Ribao Jan. 13 1958; Xinhua same date.
* according to the categorisation adopted by PENG Shuzhi, op. cit.
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considerable emphasis upon the degree to which the 
traditional way of life was preserved there. From the 
CPC's perspective this was not necessarily pejorative since 
they did not on the whole espouse the evolutionist aspects 
of the 'modernization’ theory of development, and hence did 
not equate 'traditional' with 'backward' per se - their own 
attempt to integrate traditional techniques into the 
development model testifies to this.
The country was depicted as a distinct entity within the 
Arab world, possessing its own particular character as a 
population group, and traits which supposedly characterised 
the local people included those of readiness to work hard 
and valiance in f i g h t i n g . Y e m e n  was also described as a 
politically and religiously united c o u n t r y . Y e t  it was 
at the same time seen as typical of a wider current 
existing throughout the Arab world, its foreign policy as 
reflecting the "awakening" of the Arabs as a whole,^ and 
its relations with China as something which "fully 
expressed" the friendship of all the Arab states towards 
China.
Uhc basis for the CPC's positive assessment of the foreign 
policy of Yemen, and hence its status as a good candidate 
for united front work, was undoubtedly the criterion of 
opposition to domination and imperialism. The Chinese 
pral^nd Yemen for a long history of resistance to foreign
PEI Min, "Fan dui zhimin qinlue di Yemen", Shijie Zhishi 1957, 
3 (February)
" ibid.
ZHOU Enlai, Speech at the banquet attented by Crown Prince Badr 
and the Syrian ambassador to China , Jan, 12 1958. Renmin Ribao Jan. 
13.
ZHOU Yiliang, "Zhongguo renmin he Alabo renmin di shen qing hou 
yi", Beijing Daxue Xue Baa, Humanities section, 1958, III; p.4.
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domination, dating back to the struggle against Turkey. 
Since the early nineteenth century, it is argued, Yemen had 
fallen within the British sphere of influence^^, only to 
become an area of co-operation and at the same time of 
contention with the USA after World War II. Chinese 
statements of support for Yemen were frequently linked with 
ones of opposition to the British occupation of Aden.
It is important that Yemen's opposition to imperialism was 
presented not just as the action of an individual country, 
but on the contrary emphasis was placed particularly upon 
the forms of interaction through which Yemen's anti­
imperialism was articulated. Such interaction was 
discussed at a number of levels of operation, which may 
also be viewed as different levels of analysis of the type 
of alignments which make up the raw material of united 
front policy. They could be viewed as mutually-reinforcing 
levels of united action which would help to cement the 
•foice' represented by the developing countries as an 
entity.
We can speak of five different levels (though these 
divisions are not of course rigid, and they shade off into 
one another in certain instances - we are proposing this 
scheme just as a rough guide to the framework employed by 
Chinas). First there is the immediate area in which a 
country is to be found, in this case the Arab world; 
secondly there is a wider region, in this case Asia, or 
more specifically West Asia, a term which was of 
considerable significance to the Chinese; thirdly, the 
aspect of Asian-African solidarity, to a certain extent a 
geographical notion (the Chinese sometimes referred to the 
Middle East as the junction-point between Asia and Africa),
PEI Min op, cit, p. 17
1.1» Ying, •'Yemen renmin weihu heping yu duli di lichang", Renmin 
Ribao, Jan. 13, 1958
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but at this time also increasingly coming to anticipate a 
more general concept of third-world solidarity; fourthly, 
the aspect of activity direction toward influencing the 
oveiall global system; and finally the question of 
relations with the Socialist Camp as a subsystem.
We will examine how the Chinese analysed Yemen's
international links at each of these levels, before 
applying this framework to a discussion of the specific 
bilateral relationship with China.
CHINA'S PERCEPTION OF YEMENI FOREIGN POLICY - LEVELS OF 
ANALYSIS
The first level may be considered to apply to the immediate 
locality, i.e. the Arab world. In this respect the Chinese
clf;ar ly downplayed the Islamic aspect, and in practice the
overwhelming emphasis was placed on the role of a common 
experience of imperialism;
"Owing to the long period during which they have 
suffered from colonialist oppression and plunder, 
Yemen and the great majority of Middle East states 
have an ingrained loathing for colonialism."
Molt specifically, this common experience of exploitation 
was linked, in the Chinese discourse, to a positive 
attitude on the key concrete international-political issues 
which the CPC considered to be the most important ones 
affecting the region, in other words opposition to the kind 
of Western tactics which have already been described. 
These elements were considered to provide a focus for the 
unity of positive forces.
Thus Yemeni foreign policy was favourably assessed for 
standing in opposition to attempts to divide and infiltrate
PKI Min op, c i t .
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the states in the region and to increase tension in the 
area.*^ It was pointed out that Yemen had persistently 
refused to join the Baghdad Pact since 1955,^® and that its 
government had, in September 1957, rebuffed an American 
delegation proferring aid in connection with the Eisenhower 
D o c t r i n e . W e  hear further that
"The Yemeni government is completely loyal to the 
policy of non-participation in aggressive blocs, and 
also exerts all efforts toward the security of the 
Arab League and the strengthening of the unity of all 
Arab states.
Apart from the Arab League, other forms of Arab unity 
mentioned include a number of agreements with particular 
Aral) countries such as the pact with Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia, "on the basis of" which mutual support at the time 
of the Suez war was organised, at which time it is also 
mentioned that Yemen had a large amount of volunteers ready 
to aid Egypt.
hc'\ ' 3 on from the regional level, a broader level of unity 
of forces can be found within the sphere of Asia as a 
whole. The following statement from one of Mohamed al- 
Badr' s main speeches in Beijing is interesting in this 
conI ext :
"Despite the fact that imperialism extended its 
domination to Asia and left us no corner without 
detrimental encroachment, we maintained our spiritual 
legacy and we fulfilled our mission regarding 
fraternity, co-operation and peaceful co-existence
Senmin Mibao editorial, "Zhong-Ye you hao hezuo di xin 
jieduan" January 12, 1958
PEI Min, Shijie Zhishi 1957, III, op. cit.
LU Ying, Reimin Ribao Jan 13 1958, op. cit.
PEI Min op.cit.
ibid.
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among individuals and peoples, regard less of racial, 
ideological, religious and other considerations."
He further argued that the way ahead consisted in a 
"resurrection of our old friendship and the strengthening 
of our economic, cultural and technical co-operation.
This shows that, even if al-Badr was an opportunist as 
later developments would tend to suggest, he was good at 
telling his hosts what they wanted to hear. The 
correspondence with China's views in certain respects is 
striking. We will return to this point in a moment.
A third level of analysis can be seen in references not 
just to Asia in a regional sense but to Asia and Africa, 
here implying a wider form of what would later be known as 
•third world' solidarity. It is thus argued that final 
victory in the Yemeni people's struggle against imperialism 
will come about through the support of the people of all 
countries, but especially those of Asia and Africa.^
A 111 !; between the Asian-African sphere of operation and 
the intermediate zone concept derived from the ideas set 
out in Mao's interview with Anna Louise Strong is clearly 
implied in some formulations, such as the following:
"The Yemeni people's struggle against British 
aggression has not only protected national 
independence, but has also produced a beneficial 
contribution toward Asian and world peace." [The 
Yemeni people] "know that their anti-colonialist 
struggle is inseparable from a movement to defend 
peace. The USA is carrying out aggressive plans in 
the whole world, especially in the Asian-African area.
Mohamed al-BADR, Speech delivered at Peking, Decmber 31 1957. 
Xinhua News report in Survey of Nainland China Press No. 1684 p. 47.
ibid p. 48.
24 PEI Min, S h ijie  Zhishi 1957, III, op. cit.
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endangering world peace and threatening the national 
independence of the Asian and African nations.
Throughout the discussion of these different levels of 
solidarity, it is important that they were understood first 
and foremost as a popular current. This was the point of 
reference, rather than any attempt to ’cultivate* a 
particular regime. The regime was appraised favourably 
insofar as it gave expression to the popular movement. So 
noticeable is this stress on the people that it would serve 
as a reminder against ascribing to the Chinese leadership 
too rigid a conception of a distinction betweens a 'united 
front from below’ and a 'united front from above.
A . Durable coincidence upon which the Chinese press 
remarked was the fact that the Crown Prince's visit 
coincided with the Cairo conference,** and the aspect of 
giowing solidarity among developing countries is reflected 
in the description of the government of Yemen as being 
entirely "loyal to the spirit and principles of Bandung".*^
A fourth level could be considered to encompass actions 
designed to influence the international milieu as a whole. 
At litis level, it is interesting that Yemen's dispute with 
Britain raised issues of international law which 
corresponded to a considerable degree with those which 
Chinese international lawyers put forward in the context of 
the Damascus conference, as we have already mentioned. 
Thus, we find al-Badr stating that
"This international law, following the profound 
development of the resurgence of vitality among the
LU Ying, Reimin Ribao Jan 13 1958, op. cit.
26 see an article in Renmin Ribao Jan 13 1958, p.4.
LÜ Ying, op. cit.
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people of all nations, especially of the Asian-African 
nations, is ready to be adjusted.”*®
Finally, at a level of relations with the Socialist Camp, 
it was argued that this relationship had a solid basis, 
being based on "knowledge derived from intimate experience" 
to the effect that the Socialist Camp was a reliable 
ally.^^ But the striking point is rather that the
relationship with the Soviet Union was downplayed in
Chinaae sources, even despite the intrinsic historical
interest of that relationship, stretching as it did over 
thr^x: decades and constituting one of the longest-standing 
alliances between communism and the national movements. 
Chinese emphasis in fact fell mainly on the common 
experience of Asian-African countries, and the Soviet Union 
tended to get left out of this picture.
YEMENIS RELATIONS SPECIFICALLY WITH CHINA - LEVELS OF
ANALYSAIS
We will now look in more detail at Sino-Yemeni relations, 
still using the five-fold division which we have just 
pjriji ;f.ed in a general way.
Taking the first of these levels, Arab nationalism, Yemen's 
relations with China were seen as one manifestation of a 
general pattern of increasing links with the area, as "a 
landmark in the improvement of the friendship between the 
people of China and the people of all Arab states"®® Once 
again, the emphasis on the people is to be noted.
®®. Mohamed al-BADR, Speech at a mass rally held in Beijing, 
January 12, 1958. Chinese translation in Renmin Ribao Jan. 13 p. 4.
LU Ying op. cit. The historical facts about Soviet-Yemeni 
relations are also cited in this article.
®®. Renmin Ribao Editorial, January 12 1958.
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However, apart from this aspect of China's relations with 
Arab nationalism, there is another side to the picture, in 
that while China could not participate directly in the Arab 
(regional) aspect, it could in the Moslem aspect of 
solidarity. In the period after the Bandung conference 
several visits and pilgrimages were conducted by groups of 
Chinese Moslems. By that time the Chinese had founded 
their own institute of Islamic Theology, and new premises 
for this institute were opened in Beijing to coincide with 
Mohamed al-Badr's v i s i t . L a t e r  in the year, to mark the 
Corban Festival (July 1), the Yemeni leader Imam Ahmed sent 
a letter to Burhan Shahidi, a leading Chinese Moslem, 
wishing that: "Allah will bestow blessings on the Arab and 
Islamic peoples each year."^
Ar. v;r: have argued, China's tendency at the time was to 
downplay the role of Islam, or if they accepted it at all, 
to view it as a cultural or social phenomenon rather than 
as a belief. They paid no attention to the issues posed by 
different historic currents within Islam, and on the issue 
of the differences between 'modernising' and traditional 
s+ïrti.îls within contemporary Islam, merely appear to have 
assumed that the trend which emphasised 'social' issues was 
axiomatically the one which would come to predominate.
On the whole the Moslem dimension was not given a big place 
in no-Yemeni relations. There are reports of various 
Chinese groups visiting that country including diplomats, 
doctors, technicians^, but not specifically of Moslems. 
As mentioned earlier, the Chinese leadership was at this 
time pressing for the social and economic transformation of
New York Times, January 13 1958; despatch from Hong Kong dated 
January 12.
Xinhua July 1 1958 (release published in the Xinhua bulletin 
dated July 2).
See for instance report of Xinhua News Agency Cairo, April 16 
1958 {Xinhua bulletin April 17).
196
the minority areas, and this fact is bound to have 
influenced the role played by Chinese Moslems in 
international affairs. It has been argued that statesmen 
from Moslem countries visiting China were usually kept in 
an atmosphere of meeting many Moslem personalities, 
attending Moslem activities etc/** However, a study of 
Mohamed al-Badr's visit does not show that such a policy 
was still being applied on that occasion.
We could perhaps say that the 'division of labour' within 
the Yemeni leadership at that time was such that Imam Ahmed 
viewed himself as a guardian of the fundamentals of Islam - 
he was even later to attempt to project himself in this 
rolf to a wider audience in the Arab world by the 
publication of a poem attacking Nasserism as contrary to 
3?-.lam;*^ his son, on the other hand, took on the role of 
making very radical political statements. Later in the 
yecn 1958 on the occasion of Yemen's National Day (November 
13), Mao Zedong sent a conventional diplomatic greeting to 
Ahmed, while Premier Zhou signed a much more political 
message addressed to Mohamed al-Badr.
At the level of links with fellow Asian countries, on the 
other hand, the Chinese were on firmer ground, and in terms 
of the image given to the bilateral relationship, it is 
overwhelmingly on this aspect that the emphasis was placed.
Tbf. Chinese side thus strongly responded to al-Badr's ideas 
about the historical basis of their collaboration, and 
China's emphasis upon the dimension of historical links 
between different parts of Asia in the pre-colonial period
See e.g. JOYAUX F., "Les Musulmans de Chine et la diplomatie 
de Pékin" in L'Afrique et l’Asie, No. 77, 1967, pp. 17-24.
The text can be found in El-ATTAR, Le Sous-developeiant du 
Yemen (1964).
Texts of these messages in Xinhua News November 14 1958.
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can in a way be viewed as constituting what was seen as an 
objective historical basis for the united front 
relationship. It was thus seen as having deep historical 
roots, rather than simply being a contingent reaction to a 
particular political context provided by US and British 
initiatives in the Middle East, however important the CPC 
considered these to be at a another level.
A fact of considerable significance is the existence of a 
pa4 tern of bilateral relations between China and Yemen 
reaching back several centuries. Chinese historical 
sturM -s mention the existence of relations from very early 
times, and these were particularly developed from the 
fifteenth century onwards. The existence of these
historic links is confirmed by other sources, and they can 
indeed be considered a significant aspect of early Yemeni 
international relations.^ It has been a long-standing 
teii T ncy of the CPC to stress the contemporary relevance of 
such a history of relations where it e x i s t s . T h i s  
historical relationship was interrupted, it is argued, at 
the time of colonial incursions.
"But today, when the people of our two countries have 
now embarked on the road of independence, when we have 
now established new friendly relations, there is no 
power on earth which can prevent the daily development 
of our friendship."^
ZHOU Yiliang, in Beijing Daxue Xuebao 1958, III op. cit.
see for instance the interesting discussion in M. W. WENNER, 
Kodern Yemen, Baltimore (Johns Hopkins Press) 1967.
See for instance the spate of Senmin Bibao editorials 
published in 1970-71 when a large number of countries concluded 
diplomatic relations with China.
Renmin Ribao Editorial January 12, op. cit.
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The agreements signed between the two countries on the 
occasion of this visit could thus be said to constitute a 
strengthening of "already existing" friendly ties.^
Apart from direct links betwen the two countries, reference 
is also made to similarity of experiences in terms of what 
is viewed as the positive aspect of traditional society. 
For example, both countries had traditonally been competent 
in the field of water-conservancy and terracing of 
agricultural land.^^
McivifiCf into the more recent period, common experience was 
again an important theme. For example, we find the Anglo- 
Yemeni treaty of 1934 interpreted as an unequal treaty of 
the kind which China too suffered from. The way in which 
the Aden protectorate is described suggests an obvious 
analogy with the problem of Taiwan. Reference is made to 
Yemen suffering from attempted subversion, from intrusion 
into national airspace, just at a time when the Chinese 
were protesting about similar problems in their own case.*3
Both parties attached considerable weight to the fact of 
their both being Asian countries as a context for their 
bilateral links. Mohamed al-Badr spoke of the area 
extending from China in the east to the Arab peninsula in 
the west (and including North Africa) as having constituted 
"a mighty and wonderful municipality" possessing a "natural 
u n i t y H i s  perspective could appear conservative, in 
that his prescription for the present was to "restore the
. Henmin ^ iJbao Editorial, January 12 1958 op. cit.
These aspects of Yemeni history, described in studies of the 
country (e.g. El-ATTAR op. cit.) are discussed from the point of view 
of their similarity to the Chinese experience in PEI Min op.cit.
These various points are made in the article by PEI Min
op.cit.
Mohamed al-BADE, Speech of January 12 1958, op. cit.
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original conditions" and "resume the legacy of their 
ancestors",but we can consider that this is probably no 
more than a partial contradiction with the Chinese view, in 
that the CPC considered that there were progressive aspects 
in the pre-colonial system of relations which could be 
built upon. And it is noteworthy that he explicitly 
employed the term 'united front’ in his image of the future 
pattern of relations among Asian states:
"We can bring forward the realisation of this 
aspiration: our method is to organise our united
front, to strengthen the co-operation between the 
peoples of all nations in all respects and in all 
areas; if we do not strengthen our co-operation in the 
fields of economics, culture, art and science, we 
surely cannot realise this goal of ours."^®
In response to this, it is also interesting, however, that 
the Chinese took up a distinctly geopolitical frame of 
re Terence in stressing the significance of China and the 
Middle East as different sides of the same Asian continent, 
in a particular strategic context. Thus Zhou Enlai took 
the opportunity of an official banquet to float some ideas, 
the full impact of which would be revealed only later:
"The Arab people are not only awakening, but at the 
same time they are stationed on the western outpost of 
the anti-colonialist struggle [zai fanzhiminzhuyi 
douzheng di xifang zui qianxian]. In this valiant 
anti-colonialist struggle, Yemen, Egypt and Syria show 
especial resolution. This valiant struggle calls
forth the deepest respect of the Chinese people and 
the people of all Asian countries."
And in reply to a speaker who praised China's support for 
the Arabs he continued: "I think that compared with the
responsibility borne by the people of the Arab countries on 
the western outpost of anti-colonialism, this is completely
ibid.
Mohamed al-BADR, Speech of January 12 op.cit.
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insignificant. We Chinese, and the anti-colonialist people 
of Asia, have extraordi*n^y admiration for your positive 
sux>port. Unfortunately our support is still not very 
great, from now on we further intend to support you still 
more and in this way return our thanks to you.
It will be important to bear in mind these themes of 
viewing the Middle East as West Asia, and the notion of 
Chinese support in the context of East Asia, to which we 
will return in discussing the Taiwan Straits crisis.
Moving up to the next level of analysis, that of the 
incipient third-world movement as a whole, Bandung was 
treated as a historical point of reference. It was pointed 
out that "at the time of the Bandung Conference, friendly 
contacts made by our delegation with the Yemeni delegation" 
led to a progressive development and consolidation of links 
between the two countries,^ and the negotiations between 
China and Yemen are described as a continuation of the 
Bandung and Cairo conferences.
This level of analysis links in with the level which 
identifies the 'milieu goals' of co-operation in relation 
to the mode of operation of the system at a world level. 
Thus bilateral relations were characterised as "a new 
contribution on the question of world peace through the 
cause of friendship of all the world's p e o p l e " , a n d  the 
two countries adopted an official position which took the 
Five Principles as a point of reference together with the 
UN Charter, arguing that these texts "must have universal 
acceptance, so that the people of all nations can enjoy the 
rights of independence and democracy, and have the
Zhou Enlai, Speech at Banquet attented by Crown Prince Badr 
and the Syrian ambassador, January 12 1958. Menmin Ribao January 13.
LU Ying, article in Renmin Ribao January 13, 1958.
Renmin Ribao Editorial, January 12, 1958.
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opportunity for peaceful co-existence and friendly co­
operation.
It seems likely that China was trying increasingly to 
formalise the Five Principles as a basis for its relations 
with other states, which would imply the interesting 
hypothesis that the consolidation of the United Fronts, 
with the new system of relations among states which it 
implied, would have a positive effect on the ground-rules 
of the international relations system in general.
Finally, it is striking that China's relations with Yemen 
were practically not discussed in the context of the fifth 
level analysis which we outlined, namely that of relations 
bfl' cen the developing world and the Socialist Camp, even 
though the visit occurred at a time when the CPC was in 
general still strongly emphasising the role of the 
Socialist Camp in the world system. Bandung and pre- 
colonial history were the points of reference, rather than 
the history of socialist foreign policy.
YEMEN’S INTERNAL STRUCTURE
The depiction of Yemen's internal structure by the Chinese 
media was strongly idealised, to a point where it would 
seem hard to make it serve as a basis for a serious 
understanding of the actual situation. The point is not 
that it was problematical in principle to stress the 
positive aspect of traditional society. One current in 
Marxism had always held that traditional structures could 
potentially serve as the basis for a new progressive 
development, and in the case of Yemen there was at the time 
a still-functioning communal structure in village life 
characterised by a concept of "solidarity" (al-ta'ouen) 
which created the idea of a collective responsibiIty for
CHINA People's Republic and YEMEN Kingdom, Joint Communique, 
January 12 1958. Renmin Ribao, January 13.
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taxes and misdemeanours. The point is however that the 
structure was at that point in time no longer the 
functioning and dynamic system which had made Yemen a 
prosperous part of the ancient world. The social system 
had instead become a condition for stagnancy. Indebtedness 
of tho peasantry to absentee landlords deprived the rural 
sector of dynamism. A specific parallel with China’s 
historical experience was the fact that a considerable 
proportion of the population was forced to emigrate in 
search of employment - about 20% at that time.^^ The 
significant fact, however, is that such parallels were not 
drawn by the Chinese media.
In such a context, recent rulers had put forward axioms 
such as Imam Yahya's to the effect that they "would rather 
live in poverty and eat grass" than see their riches in the 
hands of foreigners, and Ahmed’s "If it is a question of 
ch' - ing between liberty in poverty and dependence in 
abundance, I have chosen independence".^^ At one level 
thir> ideology seems anti-imperialist, but at another it can 
simply be viewed as a mechanism for perpetuating stagnancy.
It is not surprising then that there was a body of opinion 
which held that stagnancy should not necessarily be 
accepted as the price for independence. Hence an 
opposition movement had been formed which was to make Yemen 
one of the most turbulent parts of the Arab world in the 
'60s. In 1948 a coup attempt probably involving 
•modernising' elements including the subsequent republican
For this background see principally El ATTAR, Le Sous- 
developement du Yemen op. cit.; also STATISTISCHES BUNDESAMT, 
allgemeine Statistik des Auslandes: Jemen, SudjemeUj Stuttgart (W. 
Kolhammer) 1970.
quoted in El ATTAR, Le Sous-developement du Yemen op. cit. p.
36; p. 73
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leader, Abdullah as-Sallal, had succeeded in assassinating 
Iman; Yahya, but not in overturning the monarchy.
In the period under consideration a Free Yemen movement had 
already been constituted, and was also already enjoying the 
support of Nasser's regime in Egypt, for example via the 
provision of broadcasting facilities. At this point the 
situation was interesting, however, in that their political 
leadership refrained from personal criticism of the heir 
apparent, Mohamed al-Badr, hoping to capitalise on his 
apparently radical ideas.
But the economic situation in Yemen was in fact 
deteriorating rapidly. Food production was declining and 
had reached a disastrous level in 1957 (there was a further 
decrease in 1958), at a time when (despite poor health 
conditions and high infant mortality rate) population was 
on the increase. The country had been genuinely self- 
reliant over a very long period but during recent years 
this traditional independence had ended, and the country 
became dependent upon imports of food in 1957. In these 
circumstances the 'independence with poverty' rhetoric 
probably sounded increasingly hollow.
Nc^ it is noteworthy that none of this background was 
reflected in the Chinese media, and even the existence of 
opposition was not discussed. The most we find is that in 
a 'general knowlege' type of article about Yemen published 
in 1956, before China became directly interested in the 
country, the earlier disturbances of 1948 are briefly 
mentioned. They are, however, attributed to the 
machinations of Britain.^ And by the time of the royal
El ATTAR, Le sous-developpement. cit., pp. 162, 171; 
Statistisches Bundesamt, Jemen,. .op, cit. p. 7
KA Jian, "Yemen wangguo", S h ijie  zh ish i, 1956, XV, pp. 15-16.
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visit even this earlier incident had been 'written out' of 
history.
This neglect presumably reflects a view that to raise the 
question of domestic contradictions in a country would be 
harmful to united front work. But such an approach does 
point to the important issue of whether the particular case
had not been swallowed up in the idealised generality.
This in turn would create a difficult environment for
specialists, let alone public opinion, to appreciate future 
developments. As it happened, domestic conflicts came to 
a head quite rapidly. Although Yemen briefly federated 
with the UAR in 1958, soon afterwards Abdel Nasser threw in 
his lot with the republicans and a prolonged period of
instability resulted, especially following the accession of 
al-Badr to the throne in 1962.
It remains true, however, that the explicit Chinese 
orientation was to promote the independence of 'a people', 
however loosely defined, and it is in this context that it 
is ru oessary to examine the concrete facts of economic co­
operation negotiated in the course of the official visit.
CO-OPERATION AGREEMENTS BETWEEN CHINA AND YEMEN
Three distinct documents were signed on this occas ion: a 
Treaty of Friendship, an Agreement on Scientific, Technical 
and Cultural Co-operation, and a Treaty of Commerce. 
Whcil is interesting is that these agreements constitute an 
early attempt to formulate a new co-operation policy for 
China, which can probably be seen as intended to represent 
both a socialist 'aid' strategy - cementing this crucial 
united front relationship in a concrete form - and at the 
same time a blueprint for what later came to be termed
CHINA, People's Republic and YEMEN, Mutawakilyah Kingdom: 
Treaty of Friendship; Agreement on Scientific, Technical and Cultural 
Co-operation: Treaty of Commerce.
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soiith-south co-operation. The CPC was quite explicit that 
they were mapping out principles which would have a wider 
applicability:
"There is no doubt that the treaties and agreement 
concluded between China and the Yemen will stand as 
examples for the development of friendly and co­
operative relations between China and other Arab 
states."
By extension, it would seem that the same could apply to 
relations with other developing countries outside the Arab 
world.
Yei.' !t chose to play the socialist card at this time not 
only for political reasons implied in the dispute with 
Britain, but also because the deterioration of the domestic 
economy had reached a point where it undermined any 
realistic basis for the rhetoric of independence. This 
provided the context for the signature of a treaty of 
cc)Trii r ce with the USSR in 1955, and among other things 
Soviet economic co-operation provided for the construction 
of the port of Hodeida which served to reduce Yemen's 
dependence upon Aden.
Chinese aid thus arrived against the background of an 
already-existing pattern of co-operation with the USSR, but 
at the same time the Chinese immediately demarcated 
themselves from the Soviet approach in some significant 
respects. Thus Soviet loans were charged at an interest 
rate of 2.5%, whereas the Chinese loans were interest free. 
This agreement with Yemen inaugurated a policy of interest- 
free loans which was followed by China in the succeeding 
per i f i d . T h e  Soviet union was at the time presenting
Dagong Bao, January 13 1958; Xinhua, same date.
see BARTKE, Wolfgang, China's Economic Aid, Hamburg (Institut 
fur Asienkunde) 1975.
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itself as an unselfish ally of the emerging n a t i o n s , b u t  
China showed directly that it was possible to go further in 
this direction.
The Agreement on co-operation provided for Chinese aid in 
one project of considerable significance - the construction 
of a highway linking the Soviet-built port of Hodeida to 
the capital, Sana'a; the road also connected with another 
built with aid from the United States. Other projects were 
designed to permit Yemen to process some of its own raw 
materials and to diversify exports away from coffee. There 
were to be factories for cigarettes, glass, aluminium ware 
and canned fish, a sugar refinery, a textile mill and a 
tannery. The projects were to be financed by an interest- 
free loan of 70 million Swiss Francs. Specialist workers 
from Yemen were to be trained in China, each country was to 
give special facilities to students from the other country 
in educational institutions, and publications and documents 
were to be exchanged.
It is clear that the ideas embodied in this agreement 
constitute an early working-out of what were intended as a 
st.l of principles of far-reaching significance, and which 
were later to be summed up in a systematic manner by 
Pro nil er Zhou Enlai in a speech January 15 1964 setting out 
a series of principles: among these were the idea of
prtjjocts requiring little investment and thus allowing for 
quick accumulation, of projects aimed at building self- 
reliance, and the idea of enabling local people to master
see the discussion of the Cairo conference in NEUHAUSER C., 
Third World Politics- China and the A.A.P.5.0, Cambridge Mass. (Harvard 
Univtr; ity Press) 1968.
Such exchanges would certainly have been one-sided in this 
particular case since apparently the printing press was banned in Yemen 
at that time and no publications existed.
207
techniques.^ These can be viewed as a programme for an 
alternative approach to development, concretely embodied in 
south-south co-operation which could serve as a material 
basis for the more political aspect of south-south 
relations reflected in united fronts.
Policies embodied in the provisions of the treaties and 
agreement with Yemen include an undertaking that Chinese 
experts should not interfere in Yemen's internal affairs 
and rhould respect the laws and religious and social 
customs of the country. The Treaty of Commerce included a 
clciur.f stating that the value of imports and exports should 
be balanced as far as possible, and an exception to the 
provision of most-favoured nation treatment is that it 
should not affect any rights or privileges which "have been 
or iiiMy be granted to any neighbouring country", nor to any 
rights which Yemen might grant to any Arab country. These 
all T h: Fleet certain principles which could be considered of 
more general relevance, including in the case of the last 
of these, the notion of a regional basis for South-South 
co-operation.
The main project, the road from Sana'a to Hodeida, was 
something of a landmark in its own right. Construction 
be g a n in August 1958^^, and was completed in January 1960. 
227 km long, the road begins at sea level and climbs 3,500 
metres, crossing peaks and valleys on its way to the 
capital.** An extremely difficult proposition technically, 
the road made a considerable impact once completed. A 
comparison with China's later role in the Tanzam railway in 
Africa suggests itself, not least because in the case of
The text of these principles together with other relevant 
source material can be found in COPPER J. F., China's Foreign Aid, 
Lexington Mass. (D. C. Heath & Co.) 1976; p. 155
Le îîonde, August 24, 1958
**. These details are taken from El ATTAR, Le sous-developpement 
du Yemen, op. cit., p. 54.
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the Sana'a-Hodeida highway it appears that other foreign 
aid missions had pronounced this work impossible to 
undertake in the past. This was partly because of the 
working conditions, an issue to which the Chinese 
themselves were not insensitive, in that it was stipulated 
that the Yemeni government should "ensure so far as 
possible that they [the Chinese] have a decent living 
condition in the territory of the Yemen. But the main 
point is that the CPC was prepared to make the kind of 
commitment necessary to realise a project of this nature, 
becausf of the wider issues involved. As with other 
aspects of China's policy towards the Middle East during 
this period, so also in the field of economic co-operation, 
we find that the Chinese leadership was using specific 
casfs to work out general principles, and the significance 
of Sino-Yemeni economic co-operation cannot be measured in 
terms of its impact upon Yemen alone.
CHINA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH YEMEN IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The impact in question could be assessed at different 
levels of analysis. One level is expressed in the element 
of S'uth-south co-operation to which we have just referred. 
Another would, however, be the strategic dimension. 
Chiiif r.e sources remarked upon Yemen's "immensely important 
strategic position, dominating the mouth of the Red Sea"
Linked with this, there was the question of the country's 
economic potential. The Chinese press had already, in 
1956, remarked upon Yemen's "extremely rich" resources, 
hitherto undeveloped.®^ The country had supported a
thriving agriculture in the past, and was considered
CHINA and YEMEN, Agreement op. cit. Xinhua, January 13, 1958. 
PEI Min, op. cit.
MA Chien, op. cit.
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potentially to be one of the most fertile parts of the 
Middle East.GG Particularly significant is the official 
view that Yemen was rich in oil resources. This view was 
supported by the Chinese, both in 1957^^ and again during 
Mohamed al-Badr's visit
In April 1958 there were further co-operation negotiations 
held at Sanaa between Mohamed al-Badr and the influential 
figure in Chinese diplomacy, Chen Jiakang, ambassador to 
Egypt who was also accredited to Yemen. Further 
discussions took place in August of the same year^®, and a 
speedy announcement made that China was to begin work in 
constructing the highway immediately.^^ In announcing this 
co-operation a Yemeni source in Cairo specifically linked 
it with the news that oil had been struck at Hodeida.
Wcj► ! he Yemeni leaders hinting that they would develop oil
resources with Chinese or Soviet help, and did they do this 
with the thought of getting better terms out of the latter, 
or with the thought of scaring the West into making 
cull'.iisions? It is difficult to say. As the next few 
years were to show, al-Badr had his own aims and was 
prepared to ditch the Chinese when it suited him. No 
sooner was the road completed at the beginning of 1962 than 
the Chinese team was hurriedly ejected from the country, 
and the Yemen government refused to pay for the work.
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se El ATTAR op. cit., pp 46, 171 ff.
P’EI Min op. cit.
LU Ying op. cit.
Xinhua Taez April 27 1958; Xinhua Cairo April 15.
Egyptian Gazette August 1 1958.
Le Honde August 24 1958.
Egyptian Nail August 23, 1958.
LITTLE T. South Arabia, London (Pall Mall Press) 1968, p. 89
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Soviet experts were also expelled soon a f t e r w a r d s A l l  
this occurred around the time of al-Badr's succession to 
the throne and the outbreak of open hostilities with the 
Republicans.
Despite this setback, China's relations with Yemen turned 
out to be fairly long-lasting. The Chinese-built road 
proved of a much higher standard than the US-built one 
which soon began to deteriorate, and this made a favourable 
impact on public o p i n i o n . T h e  Chinese were instrumental 
in launching a project which had the effect of introducing 
wage-labour into the country almost for the first time - 
wHl- everything this could imply in sociological terms. El 
Attar is clear on the fact that this project heralded the 
first emergence of a proletariat in the c o u n t r y . D u r i n g  
the civil war from the early 1960s onwards, Chinese 
technicians were again present in the country and played a 
cerlain role in support of the republicans. Although Abdel 
Nasser succeeded in insisting that Soviet aid be channeled 
thruugh him, and in using it as an instrument of his 
influence in the area, China managed to a considerable 
ext tn( to prevent their own aid being manipulated by the 
UAR in this way.
Thus while it certainly appears that al-Badr thought he was 
'using' China, it was not necessarily he who had the last 
laugh. The CPC's understanding of the relationship in no 
way implied that they were 'cultivating' a particular 
regime or banking on its survival. They probably
0’BALLANCE E. The Var in the Yemen, London (Faber and Faber) 
1971, p. 57.
O'BALLANCE op. cit. p. 164.
According to El ATTAR (Le sous-developpement,., op. cit.), 
"nous assistons, la, a la creation d'un proletariat". (p. 118)
see O'BALLANCE op. cit. p. 175, where it is also argued that 
the Chinese gave crucial logistic support to the republicans in raising 
the: L.oige of Sanaa, by building roads and bridges at high speed.
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understood quite well that the monarchy was playing the 
communist 'card' for purely tactical reasons, and were 
ready to take up the opportunity which this presented. As 
we have shown, the CPC was fairly open about the fact that 
they were building relations via a particular regime, but 
with a popular current of struggle for national 
independence.
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O H A T > T E R  * 7 .  G 3 L . O S A X .  I S  S U E S  A S
EEEEEOTEU IN THE I.EEANES E 
C I V I L  W A R ^  1 9 5 8 .
An estimation of the balance of forces in the world system 
such as the statement that "The East Wind Prevails over the 
West Wind" signified for the Chinese leadership that the 
summation of strength on one side of the balance was 
greater than that on the other; but it also meant more than 
this, it implied something about the ability of forces to 
knit together, making the whole more than the sum of its
parts. This is where the qualitative importance of united
front building came in.
Moreover, there is an interesting link between united 
fronts as alignments between countries, and as alignments 
of social forces within each country. The latter would 
provide a condition for the former to exist, and both 
aspects were implied in the world-systems perspective which 
the Chinese leadership espoused in early 1956.
However, such an approach, placing as it does so much 
emphasis upon major themes such as 'eras' and 'forces', 
inevitably carried with it the risk of cutting the 
individual case to suit a Procrustean bed dictated by the 
overall assessment of the global trend. Events in Lebanon 
during this period provide a useful case permitting an 
assessment of how far this risk was in fact avoided.
A SMALL NATION DEFEATING A BIG
In the CPC's world view during the period of Mao's
leadership, there is one issue which constitutes a useful 
barometer of how the relative strength of forces in the 
world system was assessed. This was the question of how 
successful a small and weak country could be in waging a 
struggle of national independence.
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On this question the Chinese leadership's position evolved 
over time, and in this developmental process the period we 
are studying can be seen as something of a watershed.
Mao Zedong consistently viewed people's war as the main 
method whereby radical forces could reveal themselves in a 
position to win trials of strength with the adversary. In 
'Problems of Strategy in Guerilla war against Japan' (May 
1938) he asserted that the vastness of China's territory 
(together with enemy shortage of troops) was decisive: 
"This is an important, even a primary condition, as far as 
the possibility of waging guerilla warfare is concerned, 
and small countries like Belgium which lack this condition 
have few or no such possibilities."^ By 1970 on the other 
hand, his assessment had changed: "A weak nation can
defeat a strong, a small nation can defeat a big. The 
people of a small country can certainly defeat aggression 
by a big country, if only they dare to rise in struggle, 
dare to take up arms and grasp in their own hands the 
destiny of their country."*
The difference between these two statements concerning the 
prospects for struggle in a particular country lay 
essentially in the assess ment of the characteristics of 
the era, or to put it in another way, the global balance of 
forces (including the assess ment of the ideological 
motivation and coherence of the popular element, 
worldwide). There was thus considered to be an important 
relationship between the current of popular forces at a 
world level and the concrete case.
The world system which served as a background to the 
concrete case was itself seen as dynamic and constantly
p.99
* MAO Tse-tung Selected Works Vol. II Peking (FLP) 1965
*. P e k in g  R ev iew 1970 No. 22 p. 5
214
changing. In "On Protracted War" written in the same 
period as "Problems of Strategy...", Mao discussed the 
reasons for Abyssinia's (Ethiopia's) defeat by the 
Italians, among these being the fact that "she was not only 
weak but also small". This whole passage is relevant, but 
particularly striking is the statement that "there is still 
quite extensive guerrilla warfare in Abyssinia, which, if 
persisted in, will enable the Abyssinians to recover their 
country when the world situation changes," (our emphasis)^.
From what we know about Mao's way of thinking it can be 
assumed that the particular concrete struggle was not seen 
as passively dependent upon changes in the "world 
situation". An overall assess ment of the global (dynamic) 
balance was not an abstract statement but a generalisation 
itself based upon concrete cases. Its main expression was 
in the concrete, so the overall trend would also be 
revealed in the study of concrete cases. Moreover we can 
assume that each particular struggle, besides being 
symptomatic of the general trend would also be able to 
influence the overall system, to nudge its development in 
a certain direction. Hence the importance of winning local 
trials of strength.
The period which we are studying can be regarded as 
critical in the evolution from the model employed by Mao 
Zedong in 1938 to that employed in 1970. It is interesting 
that in the edition of his Selected Works published in 
1960, the text of "Problems of Strategy..." which we have 
just quoted was supplied with a footnote stating that "in 
the new historical circumstances .... guerilla warfare can 
be victoriously waged in a country which is not large in 
territory..."* It may be assumed that the struggles in the
\ MAO Tse-tung Selected Works Vol. II op. cit. p.
127.
* MAO Tse-tung, S e le c te d  Works Vol II op. cit. p 112
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Middle East in the late 'fifties were one of the examples 
which the Chinese had studied in arriving at this new 
assessment. It is certainly in the period under 
consideration that the idea of small and weak nations 
defeating imperialism begins to appear, hand in hand with 
the notion of a new overall balance of forces which makes 
this possible, expressed at that time in the notion of the 
east wind prevailing over the west wind.
A large-scale international trend like that represented in 
the concept of the 'East Wind' did not just 'exist* as a 
thing-in-itself in isolation from the human actors 
involved. Because it was seen more than anything as a 
movement of peoples, the element of consciousness was 
clearly implied in it. This consciousness required a 
focus, and the CPC identified certain key issues which were 
expected to provide this.
Among the most important of such issues was the defence of 
national sovereignty. The Lebanese case was considered so 
important because it encapsulated the sovereignty issue 
while at the same time also reflecting the struggle of a 
small entity against a major power.
The sovereignty issue was indeed one which played a 
significant role in that movement of developing countries, 
receiving its impetus from Bandung, a movement which could 
be viewed at one level as a form of joint action directed 
towards milieu goals, towards changes in the overall 
functioning of the international system.
Concretely, one aspect of the post-Bandung movement aimed 
at influencing the legal superstructure of the 
international system, and the Chinese gave considerable 
attention to this dimension during the period in question.
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PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
In addition to the AAPSO Conference held at Cairo, the 
other main anti-imperialist capital in the Arab world, 
Damascus, also hosted an important international gathering 
in late 1957, an Asian-African Lawyers' Conference which 
took place on November 7-11 of that year. It coincided 
with the Moscow Meeting, a point which was emphasised by 
the Chinese in stressing that the two elements in the 
progressive forces were mutually strengthening one another. 
It was the second such conference, the first having been 
held in Jakarta in 1955, so the link with Bandung was 
evident.
Demands for change in the legal superstructure were in
fact perceived at the time of the Damascus Conference as an
expression of the new assertiveness of the nationalist
forces, and also as a concrete orientation towards
translating this assertion into a degree of re-ordering of
the international system. Writing in connection with the
Damascus Conference, Chinese legal experts insisted that
the Bandung principles were becoming the legal basis for a
new code of international relations. The Five Principles
are described as "a charter of peace of the Asian and
African nations", as being in contradiction to "all kinds
of imperialist behaviour", as the "basis of peaceful
coexistence" and, it is argued, they
"already constitute publicly recognised new principles 
of International Law and are a very important weapon 
against any aggression."
The above statements are interesting because they reflect 
a conception of peaceful co-existence which contrasts with
 ^TAO Xijin, "Wei heping yu zhengyi er douzheng di Ya 
Fei falu gongzuo" (Jan 2 1958) in Zheng Fa. Yanjiu 1958 I pp 
4-9
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the Soviet view in two major respects: firstly its source 
is collective action of the Asian-African countries rather 
than the balance of forces between the Socialist Camp and 
the West; and secondly, peace is defined as a negation of 
imperialist aggression in the developing world. It is 
surely justifiable to view this definition of peaceful co­
existence as one important source for the type of relations 
China was seeking to promote via the united front, which 
thus appears not simply as a purely Chinese or purely 
communist phenomenon; it draws as its source upon an 
actually-existing trend in the conduct of Asian-African 
countries, and also appears as a macro-level, milieu- 
orientated sphere of activity, rather than a contingent 
policy dependent upon the tactical exigencies of particular 
conflict situation.
The following description of the significance of the 
Damascus Conference gives a good illustration of how the 
general world trend or 'situation' was seen as being 
realised through particular forms of organisation, which in 
turn exercise an influence upon the world system. The 
Conference, it is argued.
"is both a product of the new development in the 
international situation leading on from the basis of 
the Bandung Conference, and at the same time coincides 
with the present-day common aspirations of the 
Asian-African peoples, since it is also evidently the 
concrete carrying-through of the principles of the 
Bandung Conference, as well as being, from the legal 
point of view, a progressive clarification of these 
principles."*
Some of the positions adopted at Damascus can indeed be 
viewed as a radicalisation of the Bandung principles, in 
particular a gloss on the third of those principles to the 
effect that "It is legal for any state to give support to
‘ ibid
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a state which is the victim of aggression." This received 
considerable attention from the Chinese.
The Conference dealt with a number of contemporary issues 
of international law, including those relating to Yemen, 
Algeria, Oman, Cyprus and the Cameroons. However, the 
Chinese delegation concentrated on exposing their view of 
the Eisenhower Doctrine. This was necessary because 
"Certain people at the Conference did not yet perceive the 
aggressive substance of the 'Eisenhower Doctrine', 
mistaking it for a mere theory." By their own admission 
the Chinese helped swing the Conference to the position 
that this Doctrine
"is not only a threat to the Arab states and the 
national independence of all countries in the Near and 
Middle East, but is also a threat to the peace of the 
^ear and Middle East and to that of the whole world."
Til is point is extremely interesting, because it provides a 
glimpse of the actual mechanics of China's united front 
policies, the manner in which their representatives 
struggled for unity around definite principles. It may be 
assumed that similar struggles were conducted in other 
international arenas such as the Cairo conference, as well 
as in bilateral meetings.
Thus in a sense the Chinese identified a kind of 'line' 
struggle in the sphere of international law, and worked to 
unite the progressive forces around a correct line: on the 
one hand, according to this image, there was the Eisenhower 
Doctrine as the concentrated expression of the old power 
politics, with the USA for example trying to "create...a 
'legal' basis" for intervention in Lebanon;® and on the
 ^TAO Xijin op cit
® DU Song, "Libanun Renmin di nu huo", Shijie Zhishi 
1958, 11.
219
other the anti-aggressive demands of the Asian-African 
nations, expressed particularly in the Bandung Principles 
and their subsequent development.
This 'line' struggle was however viewed not merely as a 
clash in the realm of ideas, but as a debate which took its 
point of reference from concrete international conflicts. 
In a sense the CPC saw the Lebanese crisis as an embodiment 
of this clash of opposing principles. Articles by 
international lawyers published later in the summer of 1958 
drew connections between the different Middle Eastern 
conflicts in terms of "usual imperialist conduct of illegal 
aggression against small and weak states",  ^and this theme 
was used to link the Lebanese struggle with the revolution 
in Iraq. As a response, Chinese legal experts expressed 
support for struggles by peoples to protect their territory 
from foreign intervention.^^
Interesting parallels were drawn with China's own 
experience, both historical and contemporary, reflecting a 
common struggle to adopt new international norms designed 
to counter the interventionist norms of imperialism. One 
legal expert develops a parallel between the American 
argument about protecting US nationals in the Lebanon and 
a similar excuse put forward in relation to US intervention 
in Shanghai in 1927. Bringing the analogy up to date, the 
author refers to the Sino-US ambassadorial talks in Geneva 
where the USA brought up the demand for a right of
 ^ LI Haobei, "Zhichi Alabo renmin di zheng qu duli 
douzheng", Zheng Fa Yanjiu 1958 IV pp 4-5.
ZHOU Gengsheng, "Bu rongxu Mei Ying qinluezhe ganshe 
ta guo nei zheng", Zheng Fa Yanjiu 1958 IV
Zhengfa Yanjiu editorial, "Jianjue zhichi Alabo 
renmin zhengqu minzu duli di douzheng", 1958 IV pp 1-2 (Aug 
5)
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self-defence in relation to Taiwan, which is again seen as 
a parallel with the arguments used over Lebanon.^
When it occurred, the Lebanese confict was thus greeted as 
an example highlighting the issue of national sovereignty 
in its role as a focus for the rallying of popular forces:
"The Lebanese people’s courageous uprising 
proclaims the fundamental bankruptcy of the 
Eisenhower Doctrine in the Lebanon; and it has 
also shown again that in the circumstances of the 
East Wind prevailing over the West Wind, the 
unprecedented high tide of the Middle Eastern 
people cannot be stemmed by imperialism."^
The Revolution in Iraq was, in turn, seen as further 
confirmation, and writing in the summer of 1958, one of the 
participants in the Damascus Conference stated:
"At that time we recognised that the awakened Arab 
people were not likely to remain in slavery to 
imperialism; the setting-up of certain independent 
democratic Arab regimes, the fundamental failure of 
the Eisenhower Doctrine and the all-round collapse of 
the imperialist colonial system in the Middle East, 
these events would not be long in coming. Now, just 
as we predicted, the Lebanese people have begun to 
undertake struggle, the Iraqi Republic has been
founded.""
ASSERTION OF EFFECTIVE NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE
In the case of Yemen the Chinese supported what was 
considered an anti-imperialist action by a government, even 
a very conservative one. In Lebanon on the other hand they 
supported what was seen as a popular movement directed 
against the government in place. These differences reflect
SHAO Tianren, "Qianze qinluezhe di zuixing", Zhengfa. 
Yanjiu 1958, 4, p. 7
DU Song (1958) op cit.
LI Haobei op cit.
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something of the broadness of scope of the forces which the 
CPC was seeking to unite. But the common characteristic 
these phenomena were perceived as sharing was an 
orientation towards creating the basis for a real rather 
than a formal, national independence. This served as an 
important overarching criterion for the sort of forces 
China envisaged drawing into the united front. The support 
for a struggle against informal means of domination by 
outside powers is an interesting theme insofar as it 
anticipates to some extent the criticism of the Soviet 
leadership in the early '60s for neglecting the problem of 
"neo-colonialism"
The newly developing friendship and co-operation between 
the Asian-African countries (later to become organised into 
what was often seen as a distinct force in world politics - 
the Third World) had, according to the Chinese analysis, 
two aspects: on the one hand a resumption of ties
interrupted by the era of colonialism, on the other - the 
aspect which interests us here - a common experience 
acquired in the context of similar and linked struggles in 
the contemporary environment:
"The people of Asia and Africa, through their intimate 
experience, increasingly realise that the existence of 
imperialist powers and privileges is the most serious 
barrier to independent development; they must remove 
this barrier so that they can advance smooth ly on the 
road of independent economic development."^
China's view seems to have been that sovereignty did not 
simply 'exist* as some abstract, ideal entity, it came into 
being precisely in the course of struggle against the
There is also a link at one level with the theme of 
opposition to "hegemonism" in the mid-'70s, at least 
insofar as this was more than simply a tactic to isolate 
the USSR.
. DONG Feng, S h i j i e  Z h is h i op. cit.
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existing tendency to outside powers to intervene, 
particularly in the affairs of small and weak states. In 
this process, the Eisenhower Doctrine came to be seen as a 
concentrated symbol of what had to be combated, and Lebanon 
as a test case and focal point in the issue of real versus 
formal independence:
"Lebanon enjoyed territorial integrity until the U.S. 
forces invaded it. Lebanon was politically
independent, in form at any rate. The Lebanese people 
were struggling against the Chamoun government in 
order to change this formal independence into real 
independence. But the invasion of the U.S. forces has 
destroyed completely even that formal independence.^^
The fundamental issues later expressed in the concept of 
neo-colonialism in fact received a fairly 'programmatic' 
formulation at this time:
"iTi the case of those countries which have obtained 
legal independence, wherever this independence is 
still incomplete or not consolidated, the imperialists 
have tried hard to maintain a tight grip on them, 
economically, politically and militarily, or tried to 
force them back into their old subjection. The main 
tar^ k before the people of these countries is, 
therefore, to struggle to obtain national independence 
in the fullest sense of the term.
A major specific focal point of this question of form 
versus substance of national independence was considered by 
the Chinese to be the issue of military blocs (treaty 
organisations) and military bases, which pinpointed the 
character of American global strategy (building up spheres 
of influence under the smokescreen of containing 
communism.) This was perceived as an issue over which 
broad sections of the people of many countries and areas 
could be mobilised. The point to be noted in terms of
Renmin Ribao, Editorial, August 3, 1958; text in 
China Supports,, op. cit., p. 235.
Renmin Ri 
218 (our emphas is).
bao, Editorial, July 21 1958; ibid. p.
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links between local issues and a general trend is that all 
the particular local struggles against some aspect of US 
presence were considered objectively to be mutually 
supporting, while a subjective sense of solidarity would 
strengthen co-ordination further.
LINKS WITH ISSUES IN ASIA
Emphasis on the question of Western military bases and 
treaty organisations as a threat to sovereignty was not 
confined to the Middle East, but was rather part of a 
global approach which encompassed also Chinese efforts to 
unite with forces in other areas. Sovereignty was thus 
also a theme which the Chinese were exploring with regard 
to Asia in the same period as the conflict in Lebanon.
Referring to the Manila Pact, a statement issued in mid- 
March argued that the Bandung principles, as well as the 
policies of the USSR and China were opposed to the 
existence of blocs and military bases, but the United 
States "have tried hard to obstruct the development of this 
mainstream in the international situation.
The specific focus of Chinese articles on Asia during the 
period was Indonesia. The Chinese already supported 
Indonesia's claim to the territory of West Irian on anti­
colonial grounds, but events took a sharper turn at the 
beginning of 1958 when the American CIA^® backed an 
attempt, which turned out to be a somewhat embarassing
CHINA Government, Statement March 10, 1958. Text 
in ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, Documents on 
International Affairs, 1958, p. 482.
The action appears to have caused some 
recriminations among US decision-making circles which were 
not consulted. See IDE ANAK AGUNG GDE AGUNG Twenty Years 
of Indonesian Foreign Policy. The Hague (Mouton) 1973 pp. 
375-80
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failure, to overthrow President Sukarno. Rebellions were 
launched on the Islands of Sumatra and Sulawesi with 
American arms. A few days later John Foster Dulles 
provided effective political backing in a speech condemning 
Sukarno's Guided Democracy. Among other incidents an 
American pilot was captured by government forces.
The rebellion was soon crushed and America acted speedily 
to defuse the situation*^ - not quickly enough, however, to 
prevent disillusionment with the United States among 
Indonesian decision-making c i r c l e s . T h e  CPC took the 
opportunity to point a general moral regarding the 
significance of these events both in a regional and a world 
context :
"Taiwan has become an important stronghold for United 
States interference in Indonesia..in the past and 
today, both the Chinese and Indonesian peoples have 
had common interests in their struggle against 
colonialism. This is true not only for the two 
countries; but all Asian countries have had similar 
coiiimon interests. Therefore, the forcible occupation 
by the United States of China's territory of Taiwan 
not only encroaches on China's territorial sovereignty 
but also constitutes a menace to the Asian countries, 
particularly to the independent nations of Southeast 
Asia. Similarly the United States interference in 
Indonesia is also a provocation against peace in all 
Asia. The people of the Asian countries cannot stand 
idle under this provocation."^^
There are several levels of analysis employed in this 
passage. The actual use of Taiwan as a base for American 
intervention is a specifically local one. On the other 
hand the "common interests in their struggle against
LEIFER. M. Indonesia's Foreigrn Policy London
(George Allen & Unwin for RIIA) 1983 p. 51.
see WEINSTEIN F.B. Indonesian Foreign Policy - The 
Dilemma of Dependence Ithaca etc. (Cornell UP) 1976 pp.
71-2.
. Dagong Bao March 30 1958, text in Research
Backgrounder:Indonesia (no date or place of issue) p. 82
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colonialism" was something the Chinese extended not only to 
the whole of Asia but to Africa and subsequently Latin 
America as well. A few weeks later, as we will see, 
Chinese statements were to begin referring to the Middle 
East increasingly as West Asia thus emphasising a direct 
regional link with events in the immediate neighbourhhod. 
But even at this earlier stage it was possible to view 
events in Southeast Asia and the Middle East as part of the 
same process. In May renewed attention was paid to 
intervention in Indonesia just when the Lebanese crisis was 
building up,*4 and essential similarities were detected 
(despite the fact that in one case America was backing 
rebels against a government and in the other a government 
against rebels). On the one hand there was a parallel in 
terms of American strategy, both examples showing a 
readiness to launch limited wars; on the other, both were 
part of a wider common struggle: "Like the Indonesian
people, the Lebanese people are not alone in their 
struggle.
A critical issue was intervention by the West - its causes, 
the trials of strength to which it gave rise, and the 
possible outcome. These trials of strength in terms of 
actual force would determine the success of the global- 
level milieu-orientated action of the nationalist forces to 
restructure the world system. The issue at stake was 
whether the push generated by the anti-colonial movement 
and expressed at Bandung would succeed in bringing about a 
restructuring of international relations in such a way as 
to permit a context for ongoing independent development; or 
whether the USA would succeed in restructuring the system 
so as to generate new forms of dominance.
Dagong Bao May 10 1958 reported in Peking Review
1958 No. 11 
25 Renmin R ib a o May 20 1958; X in h u a same date.
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An important question was how far the US was able or 
resolute enough to intervene directly in this process. The 
Lebanese crisis of 1958 marked the first occasion in the 
post-war world when the USA had carried out a military 
operation outside its own traditional sphere of influence 
in Latin America - with the exception of Korea where the 
USA had not been fighting under its own flag. Shortly 
afterward Henry Kissinger in his book The Necessity for 
Choice, was to cite the Lebanese conflict as an example of 
how the USA had failed to demonstrate the ability to 
translate its power into a capacity to register success in 
concrete local situations. His assessment of the 
experience was not dissimilar to that of the Chinese, who 
viewed that conflict as a major test of the balance of 
forces in the world. First, the popular struggle in 
Lebanon had obliged the USA actually to implement the 
Doctrine and exposed America's inability to win victories 
by bluff, by a threat of force which did not need to be 
employed. Having achieved this initial success, the next 
and more difficult stage in the struggle was obviously to 
make sure that the American show of strength did not 
succeed.
For all these reasons, Chinese sources treated Lebanon as 
a vital test case for international trends - to the point 
of operating a certain reductionism in treating internal 
conflicts one-sidedly as a manifestation of wider 
international forces.
PERSPECTIVES ON THE 1958 CRISIS
The above are some of the predominant global issues which 
provided the background for the Chinese analysis of events 
in Lebanon. One of the key problems would necessarily be 
how far Chinese authors could harmonise their view of the 
big global issues with a realistic assessment of
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specificities of the particular situation of the country in 
question.
Indisputably, in the Lebanese context, the interaction 
between domestic and foreign policy issues was an important 
theme. The basis of Lebanon's existence was the National 
Pact concluded between the different communities in 1943. 
Among other provisions, the agreement between the 
communities stipulated that none was to call in outside 
support from another country. This was the provision which 
Chamoun was accused of breaking, and to which the 
opposition appealed. It can thus be said that a clear link 
existed between domestic co-existence and non-aligned 
external p o l i c y . A c c o r d i n g  to this analysis, the 
sitution in Lebanon presented at least formal points of 
convergence with the CPC's general view on the relationship 
between unity of domestic forces and the foreign policy of 
a state. It has also been argued that opposition to French 
imperialism was an original basis for willingness to co­
o p e r a t e , s o  it was not an illogical position to expect 
that internal intervention by the USA would have a similar 
effect in cementing national unity.
There were however countervailing tendencies. The growth 
of Nasserism and specifically the formation of the UAR 
could have been expected to constitute a disruptive 
element, in the sense of introducing a new pole of 
attraction for Lebanese Moslems, external to the Lebanese 
s t a t e . S o m e  Moslem forces, as well as the local
see KEWENIG M., Die Koexistenz der 
Rellgionsgemelnscbaften im Libanon, Berlin, (Walter de 
Gruyter - Rechtswissenschaftlicher Fakultat der Universitat 
zu Koln) 1965, esp pp 62-3
see AGWANI M. The Lebanese Crisis 1956, Bombay (Asia 
Publishing Co.) 1965, Ch. 1.
lONIDES M. , Divide and Lose - The Arab Revolt of 
1955-6, London (Geoffrey Bles) 1960, esp. p. 240
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Communist Party, did not fully accept Lebanon's existence 
as an entity independent from S y r i a . I n  practice, 
however, a fairly broad unity did emerge in 1958, and it 
appeared as though a new range of foreign policy issues 
might have been in the process of arising to supercede the 
old cleavages.^ It is at least clear that it could not be 
satisfactory to attempt an analysis of the Lebanese crisis 
essentially in terms of domestic social and cultural 
fragmentation^ - interaction with world forces was an 
essential dimension.
However it would be equally wrong to ignore the 
specificities created by domestic cleavages in Lebanese 
society, and in particular rapid shifts in the domestic 
economy against the background of a changing world economy 
must be seen as an important factor.^ The specificities 
of the case should not be lost sight of, particularly the 
problems posed by small size.^ The wealthiest country per 
capita in Asia or Africa at the time (excluding Israel and 
South Africa), Lebanon was also characterised by extreme 
divisions between rich and poor. Such concentration was 
expected, according to some development theories, to 
facilitate accumulation. There was, however, already 
widespread criticism that this was not happening. A large 
amount of investment capital was passing through Lebanon, 
which thus reflected in a concentrated way (all the most
see MEO L., Lebanon, Improbable Nation, Bloomington 
Indiana (Indiana U.P.), 1965, esp. p. 130
KEWENIG op. cit., p. 116
for example, HUDSON M.C., The Precarious Republic - 
Political Modernisation in Lebanon, New York (Random House) 
1968
see HACHEM N., Libanon: Sozio-okonomische
Grundlagen, Opladen (C.W. Leske) 1969.
KHALAF N.G., Economic Implications of the Size of 
Nations, with special reference to Lebanon, Leiden (E.J. 
Brill) 1971, pp 169 ff.
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concentrated perhaps because of its small size and 
diversity) many of the socio-economic changes of the region 
at that particular time.^^ There were important conflicts 
about how these could be harnessed to bring about lasting 
improvements in the country itself.
The above survey could lead to the following deductions: 
firstly, the image derived from China's overall world-view 
of nation-building and unity arising in the course of a 
struggle for effective sovereignty was not by any means 
prima facie inapplicable to the Lebanese case; secondly, 
however, it is equally clear that there would be a grave 
risk in neglecting the specificity of the case, and the 
complexity of socio-economic factors would argue against 
reductionist arguments or single-cause explanations. These 
points must be borne in mind in a critical examination of 
how CPC authors did approach this particular case. But 
before doing so we must first briefly consider the state of 
China's own relations with Lebanon.
CHINA’S RELATIONS WITH LEBANON
One interesting feature of the question of Lebanon in 
Chinese foreign policy at the time is that the regime of 
Camille Chamoun, which the Chinese condemned as a 
reactionary clique during the crisis, was one of the 
third-world regimes which had been most favourable to 
building links with the PRC during the 1950s.
Contacts between the two countries began in 1952 at the 
time when Chamoun came to office, and these were 
strengthened at Bandung, when the Lebanese government was 
favourably impressed by China's stance on the Palestinian 
issue. The Lebanese government thus rejected an invitation 
for an official visit to Taiwan, although a similar
see KISCHLI M., Kapitalismus und Linke im Libanon, 
Frankfurt am Main (Europaischer Verlagsanstalt) 1970
230
invitation was accepted by Iraq, for example. The USA was 
leaning heavily on its Middle Eastern allies not to have 
anything to do with the PRC; they succeeded at the time for 
instance with Saudi Arabia. But here too, Lebanon, while 
it stopped short of concluding full diplomatic relations, 
resisted this pressure to some extent. The historic 
importance of Lebanon's contribution to building links with 
the PRC is quite properly reflected in a systematic Chinese 
study of Sino-Arab relations published at the height of the 
conflict.
In late 1955 a trade agreement was concluded between the 
two countries, incorporating the principle of equality and 
iriiH ual benefit, and including a Most-favoured Nation 
clause. China established a trade office in Beirut, which 
also had the task of promoting friendship between the two 
countries.^ In early 1958 figures were available which 
illustrated the effect of the first full year of this 
trade. Out of about £L1 million exports to China, about 
£L5 were composed of manufactured goods, thus giving a 
certain stimulus to Lebanon's manufacturing industry.^ 
This is also an interesting point, because there was 
widespread debate in Lebanon at the time about one of the 
isstics which was later to emerge as a central theme of 
third-world development debate, namely the inability of
see MEDZINI op. cit p. 18
ZHOU Yiliang, article in Beijing Daxue Xuebao 
(Humanities Section) 1958 III p. 4
For the texts of the trade agreement and related 
correspondence see HERZER R and MOHR W. (eds) Vertrage der 
Vo]kyrepublik China mit anderen Staaten Teil 2 (Die Lander 
des vordern Orients und Afrikas), Frankfurt am Main (Alf. 
Metzner/Institut fur Asienkunde) 1963 pp 51-7; BENDALY V 
Accords commerciaux entre le Liban et les Pays socialistes, 
no place of issue, 1968 pp 129-34.
Le Commerce du Levant (Beirut) Jan 11, 1958
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some elites to invest productively in such a way as to 
stimulate the domestic economy. Apart from a generally 
unfavourable trade balance, Lebanon's exports were 
overwhelmingly composed of non-manufactured goods, mainly 
foodstuffs.^ This was particularly illogical in a country 
which did not suffer so much from the capital shortage 
which was considered to afflict other LDCs, and the 
inability of the regime to do anything to harness capital 
to productive uses was one of the main points made by its 
critics at the time. This particular case is thus
important in relation to the discussion of China's economic 
co-operation policy and its overall philosophy of the 
structural character of third-world development.
Anic ny the multiple levels of relations developing with the 
Lebanon, the Chinese press gave very clear pride of place 
to the aspect of people-to-people contacts. One article 
argued that the Lebanese people welcomed Chinese imports, 
but valued even more the supj^ ort given by the Chinese 
people. A Chinese art exhibition held in Beirut was viewed 
by 30,000 people, and many left friendly comments in the 
visitors' book. Thus when a conflict developed between, 
as they saw it, the regime and the people, the CPC chose 
the latter, even at the expense of distancing itself from 
the regime. This could be seen as 'disloyalty', but on the 
other hand it would also seem to show that at least in this 
case China did not see its own particular state-to-state 
relations as the determinant factor in making political
Foodstuffs made up over 70%of total exports in the 
period 1951-66; see KHALAF N.G. Economic Implications of 
the Size of Nations with special reference to Lebanon, 
Leiden (E.J. Brill) 1971 pp 182 ff.
see for example KISCHLI M. Kapitalismus und Linke im 
Libanon Frankfurt am Main (Europaischer Verlagsanstalt)
1970
ZHOU Yiliang, op cit
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judgements about which forces could be seen as 
•progressive* or 'reactionary'. The Chinese representative 
in Beirut, Wang Liewang, was recalled, "provisionally" but 
without explanation, at the beginning of 1958. The
President's 'reactionary' stance over the Eisenhower 
Doctrine thus presumably outweighed his positive role in 
relation to China herself. It is, however, also true that 
the Chinese leadership had hopes of building upon pro-PRC 
tendencies among anti-Chamounist forces on the question of 
spreading the PRC's state-to-state relations at the 
expense of Taiwan, and quoted anti-Chamounist leader Kamal 
Jumblatt as saying that "nationalist China no longer 
exists"
/^/.S7<WIC LOGIC OF THE LEBANESE CONFLICT
Reflecting the major overall issues which they perceived in 
initînational politics, one of the main questions which 
concerned Chinese commentators was that of how Lebanese 
iderH i ty as a country was asserted, or even created, in the 
process of anti-imperialist struggles. The term "national" 
was often applied in speaking of Lebanon, apparently 
reflecting a view that the importance of the national 
independence question outweighed any conceptual 
difficulties which could arise as part of the 'single Arab 
nation' issue.
Studies of the historical background are interesting in 
this context, because the national dimension was emphasised 
so strongly. One study examines the history of Arab 
popular movements from the sixteenth century onwards, and 
during the early stage of these struggles, peasant revolts
Le Commerce du Levant Jan 4 1958
Xinhua September 18 1958, despatch dated Cairo
September 17
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in today's Lebanon are accorded particular significance. 
However, the author argues,
"The point of the seventeenth and eighteenth century 
uprisings is clearly that uprisings which are not of 
a national character are generally turned by feudal 
rulers and foreign opportunists to their own 
advantage.
Another specialist concentrates upon a further series of 
revolts in the 1860s, implying that they were now more 
difficult to d e f e a t . H o w e v e r ,  here again foreign
interest in the shape of the French were able to divert the 
movement by accentuating its religious character. A 
further stage of the independence movement in Lebanon had, 
it is argued, acquired a national character in the period 
leading up to World War However this is where a new
elnrr.cut entered in: imperialist tactics for deflecting the 
struggle were also updated, and in the more recent period 
begin to take the form of using the 'communist threat' as 
a 'cloak' or 'smokescreen' to conceal imperialist
a g g r e s s i o n . T h i s  then was the situation at the outset 
of the post-World War II period.
The picture, then, was one of a continuing historical 
dialectic of popular struggle, increasingly tending to 
ditjc.over national forms, pitted against imperialist
attempts to deflect this process. It was against this 
background that the movement in 1958 was considered to mark 
a new, possibly qualitative, step in forming national 
unity.
PENG Shuzhih, article in Renwen Zazhi, 1958, 4
(August 25), p. 26
GUO Yingde, article in Beijing Daxue Xuebao, 1958, 
3 (August 1958), pp. 5-12
PENG Shuzhih, op. cit., p. 27
GUO Yingde, op. cit., pp. 6, 11
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In opposing Communism, the US was considered to be 
employing an extension of earlier tactics, those of "a 
thief calling 'Stop t h i e f ! P a r t i c u l a r l y  significant 
was considered to be the use of the notion of 'communist 
threat' to divide political forces within the country. 
This point, which mirrors one already noted earlier in 
relation to the conflicts in Jordan and Syria, fills in an 
interesting dimension which the global images set out in 
the Anna Louise Strong interview leave blank, namely the 
effect of the US anti-communist crusade upon domestic 
social alignments within countries of the intermediate 
zone. The tactic is seen here as serving to divide the 
forces of independence and deprive the movement of its 
national focus of unity. This has important implications 
for united front strategies. Issues had to be found to 
COL'lit -ract this, and focus the cohesion of popular forces.
What were the issues which could possibly crystallise a 
UTi H  f 1 opposition to imperialism? Despite the large amount 
of capital passing through the country, Chinese sources 
di ew attention to the lack of real development. Ninety 
percent of industrial and agricultural capital was in 
foit tgn hands, and the country was characterised by low 
waof, 3 and unemployment.^ This state of affairs was 
considered to have a political background, in that 
Lebanon's acceptance of Truman's Point Four aid in 1949 
gave the USA virtual control over the economy, at the same 
time as it acquired military b a s e s . T h e s e  bases were 
considered to be of particular importance to American
DU Song, "Libanun Renmin di nu huo", Shijie Zhishi 
1958, 11, 22-3 (May 28th 1958)
Guo Yingde, "Diguozhuyi qinlue zhong jin dong Alabo 
guojia xiexing shi", Beijing Daxue Xuebao, 1958, 3 (August)
pp. 7-8
QUN Li, "Cong lishi shang kan Alabo dong fang ge guo 
renmin di jiefang douzheng", Lishi Yanjiu, 1958, p. iv
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strategy,and given our earlier discussion of the issue, 
it is clear that they were viewed by the Chinese as a focal 
point for building domestic unity. So it would seem that 
there was an interlocking of economic and political factors 
involved in the crystallisation of opposition.
The development of the crisis was such that Chinese sources 
detected a further polarisation of the two 'lines', one 
selling out national independence and the other acting as 
a catalyst to national unity by upholding it. Refusing to 
heed popular feeling against the Eisenhower Doctrine, the 
Lebanese leadership was alleged to be bent on giving the 
USA various new military facilities:
"All this has not only deprived Lebanon of its 
independence and gone against its national interests, 
but has threatened the security of the other Arab 
states and isolated Lebanon from them."
SiKÎ. an image of ever-sharpening polarisation could lead 
logically to the type of view which Mao was to set out two 
years later in the following formulation:
"Those backed by imperialism are precisely those 
discarded by the broad masses of the people. Chiang 
Kai-shek, Syngman Rhee, Kishi, Batista, Said, Menderes 
and their ilk have either been overthrown or will be 
overthrown by the people. The risings of the people 
in these countries against the lackeys of US 
imperialism are also a fight against the reactionary 
rule of imperialism itself." 53
51 DENG Tuo, "Muqian zhong dong xingshi", Xuexi, July
1958.
5^ Guangrmingr Ribao, May 14 1958 in Survey of China 
Mainland Press 1773, p. 50
5^ MAO Zedong, Chairman Mao Tse’-tungr's Important Talks 
with Guests from Asia, Africa and Latin America Peking 
(PLK) 4th ed 1966 pp 4-5
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This was very much the perspective which Chinese 
decision-makers were moving towards during 1958, and the 
experience of the Lebanese conflict was important in this 
respect. A Renmin Ribao article carries a phrase which 
strikingly anticipates Mao's later statement:
"The Lebanese people's struggle against the Eisenhower 
doctrine and their struggle against the ruling circles 
in the service of the United States become one and the 
same. "
In order to depict Chamoun as an individual 'lackey' of 
imperialism, isolated from the people, Chinese sources 
stressed the amount of personal authority over home and 
foreign policy which the Lebanese consitution gives to the 
Tres 1 dent, so that Chamoun could personally be held to 
acr-Dunt, The implied view is a Rousseau-like one that
sovereignty inherently resides in the people, so it comes 
as no surprise to see Chamoun's regime described as a 
"tyranny" .
The corrolary was that, from the Chinese point of view, the 
armed uprising created its own legitimate political 
authority in Lebanon. Du Song's background article goes 
into some length describing the organisational forms which 
developed during the uprising: the formation of "people's 
armed forces", the way the rebels had taken over the 
adminstration of certain government organs, the creation in 
Tripoli of "public committees" and a people's court to try 
members of Pierre Jumayel's Falangist party who were
Renmin Ribao May 15 1958; Xinhua same date
Du Song, "Libanun renmin di nuhuo", Shijie Zhishi 
1958, XI pp 22-3
Guangrmingr R ibao May 14 1958; SCMP 1773, p. 50
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accused of committing murders. There is a flavour, 
pel haps deliberate, of Marx's The Civil War in France.
It is within this overall frame of reference that the most 
authoritative Renmin Ribao editorial on the subject 
emphasised the extent of the area of the country under 
effective rebel control - Tripoli, Halba, el Mina and 
Baalbeck, the north, and "vast areas" of the centre and 
s o u t h . I t  argues that whatever threats are made cannot 
deter the rebels because "they are fighting under the 
bautier of patriotism." The basic cause of the conflict, 
according to this article, is the fact that contradictions 
between the imperialists and their agents on the one hand 
and the Lebanese people on the other "have grown acute over 
a long period, and inevitably they developed into open 
conflict." Especially important was Chamoun*s acceptance 
of Ih»^  Eisenhower Doctrine:
"This is something that has not failed to embitter 
each and every Lebanese patriot, with the result that 
the pent-up public hatred burst with explosive force. 
It is precisely because of this that, in the current 
patriotic struggle, the chief opposition parties in 
Lebanon have come together, and that all sections of 
the population have closed their ranks to unleash a 
nation-wide, implacable strirggle against the 
imperialists and their agents." ”
This is a clear example of how the CPC would have liked 
domestic united fronts to develop, in the course of 
struggle over the focal issue of national sovereignty, and 
tending towards a resolution in which state power itself 
would change hands and hence the national entity in 
question would come to play a new role in the international
DU Song op. cit.
Renmin Ribao editorial May 30 1958; China Supports 
pp 194-5
Renmin R ib ao May 30, op. cit.
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United front. In conjunction with the historical view that 
class uprisings "which are not of a national character" are 
likely to be misdirected, and the view of the domestic 
enemy as a narrow clique with no apparent social basis, 
official Chinese statements created an amalgam between on 
the one hand a very strong stress on the primacy of the 
naiiiîrial contradiction, and on the other a populist view of 
the masses as the repository of national sovereignty.
This approach was a general one at the time, and was not 
exclusive to Lebanon. In the case of another pro-Western 
Turkey, a fairly similar line of reasoning was 
applied, to the effect that the whole people was demanding 
a sw'-ch to a neutral policy, and the government was trying 
to change the electoral law to prevent the opposition 
parties coalescing.^
DO?; n c  SOCIAL FORCES IN LEBANON
Official statements such as the above tended to play up the 
issf» of sovereignty to a point where there is almost the 
impression of 'the people' as an undifferentiated mass. At 
th«: r>ame time, it should be noted that background articles 
did display some recognition of the fact that 'the people' 
consti ' uted an alignment of different forces.
For example, the current affairs periodical Shijie Zhishi 
carried a reference article giving details of the 
different Lebanese political parties. Pride of place
was given to the Communist Party of Syria and Lebanon, with 
the remark that it enjoys "very high prestige", but with 
little description of any actual effective leadership role.
ZHUANG Chuping, "Diguozhuyi zai Zhong Dong di mao 
jiaozhao - Tuerqi", Shijie Zhishi 1958 15 p. 23
XIN Ping "Libanun di zheng dang" Shijie Zhishi 1958 
15 p. 30.
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leaving the reader perhaps to draw the inference that its 
practical influence was not that great. This is 
interesting because Chinese historiography tended to 
attribute a decisive role to communism in the early phase 
of the Arab movement. The historical study by Peng Shuzhi, 
to which we refer on a number of occasions, quoted a 
document from the Communist Party of Syria and Lebanon to 
back up this p o i n t . I n  the 1950s on the other hand China 
had to accept that except in Iraq the communist element 
within the popular forces was probably minor.
The Shijie Zhishi article recognises the key role of the 
National Front, founded in April 1957 and which took the 
leadership in a wave of strikes in May of the same year. 
Grouping together Sunni and Shi a Muslims as well as 
Maronites, the National Front "in the struggle against the 
Chamoun government ...is the major leading force." As far 
as mass base is concerned, the main emphasis is placed upon 
the: organisation led by Kamal Jumblatt, which is described 
as having great nationalist and anti-imperialist spirit. 
The article gives quite an interesting analysis of 
differences between pro- and anti-French sections of the 
bovjr oooisie, and between old and new nationalist groups.
The overall implication of the article is an understanding 
- perhaps already implicit in official statements about the 
opposition between the people on the one hand and a few 
imperialist lackeys on the other - that the nationalist 
cause is capable of mobilising most of the social strata in 
the country, even ones which one might at first sight 
expect to be characterised as reactionary. In discussing 
the Arab Liberation Party, for example, the author 
describes it as the representative of the landlords in the 
northern part of the country; in spite of this, he credits
PENG Shuzhi, "Lue lun Alabo minzu douzheng di xin 
jieduan", Renwen Zazhi 1958 4 p. 29
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it with being the main force in leading the popular anti- 
Chamounist uprising in Tripoli, and also praises its 
policies of closer co-operation with the UAR and developing 
trade relations with the socialist camp.®^
What still appears to be missing in this picture is a 
reference to the socio-economic basis of different social 
strata - for example sources cited earlier would lead one 
to a hypothesis that experience of poverty and under­
development would be an immediate step influencing popular 
forces to become conscious of the issue of sovereignty. 
Such a hypothesis would imply another important step in the 
argument, namely that such a coalescence of forces would be 
lilimited in nature and duration. This would seem to be an 
issue of crucial significance for united front strategies, 
air"! in particular to imply the need to guard against 
simplistic assumptions of a linear progression to great 
uni t y . Such an understanding was largely missing from 
Chinese discussion of the Lebanon. We will return to this 
imj) Î I ant question in relation to Iraq.
EFFECT OF U,S, INTERVENTION
The i: 'iner in which the Lebanese issue was handled was 
obviously influenced by the intervention of US troops in 
mid-July. Whereas the USA had wanted to control the 
situation from behind the scenes, the Chinese now argued, 
the popular struggle had forced it into the open, and this 
in turn only increased popular indignation.®^ Parallel 
with the line of the Leap Forward within China, there was 
an increasing stress on the massive material force 
represented by ideologically motivated masses. The image
XIN Ping, op. cit. 
DKNG Tuo, op. cit.
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of a volcano - also employed with respect to Jordan - 
served to represent the strength of the mass movement where 
a pro-Western 'clique' was perched in a position of 
auiljorityLebanon's small population of 1.4 million was 
emphasised, thus stressing the limitless power which could 
be generated by the people of even a small country.
However, the other aspect is that US intervention also 
broadened the scope of the issues involved in the conflict, 
and the Chinese thus began increasingly to look beyond the 
specifically Lebanese aspects of the case. Chinese sources 
in the period after the entry of US ground forces placed 
inerrasing emphasis on the country's strategic importance. 
This perspective can be seen in one of the articles 
iricdt'ded in a special supplement to Shijie Zhishi brought 
out a few days after the US landings, which depicts Lebanon 
as "llie gateway opening onto the Arab countries". Leaving 
aside the nuance which one might perhaps expect in relation 
to a state which had after all resisted the US policy of 
boycotting trade links with China, the author depicts 
l.el>Mi:)n as practically the primary channel of US influence 
in the area. He describes it as a point of access for 
dumping Western goods on the Arab market, the first country 
approached by the USA when the Eisenhower Doctrine was 
pr on : ? gated in an attempt to destroy Arab unity, a base for 
aggression against Syria both in 1957 and at the time of 
writing, and sees imperialism employing Lebanon "as a 
bridgehead for political and economic aggression against
see for example the article by LI Fanzhen and CHENG 
Liangping in Shijie Zhishi 1958, 17, pp 23-4
DENG Tuo, "Muqian Zhong Dong xingshi", Xuexi, July
1958.
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the Arab countries." Such an analysis clearly reflects 
an enlarged perspective upon the issues involved.
Despite the emphasis on the strength of the mass struggle, 
Chinese sources did not neglect the fact that it was still 
the: overall world configuration of forces which provided a 
condition for the successful waging of independence 
struggles in a small nation, and this in turn implied the 
involvement of other progressive forces in support of the 
Lebanese movement. At the time the civil war broke out in 
May it was already argued that US intervention in the 
internal affairs of Lebanon in its different forms
"seriously threatens the peace of the Middle East and 
of the world; for this reason it not only encounters 
the opposition of all the parties and the people of 
the Lebanon, but also all the peace-loving people of 
the world have uttered a solemn warning..."
Wiili i he widening of scope of the conflict in July, 
however, the international dimension became of even more 
cent ral concern to the Chinese, and the question of their 
responses to this will be the subject of the following
chapI-r.
YU Lisan, article in, Shijie Zhishi, Supplement I, 
(July 26 1958) p. 9
68 D U  Song (1958) op cit.
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The left-wing coup in Iraq on July 14th 1958, and the US 
military deployment in Lebanon which followed, marked an 
important change in the area, and introduced some elements 
which were to be of considerable significance for post-war 
international politics as a whole. Analysis of the CPC's 
perception of these events provides a context in which to 
sum up some key aspects of Chinese strategies for uniting 
anti-imperialist forces, particularly because certain 
questions now appear in new or sharper form.
ANALYSIS OF NATURE OF IRAQI COUP
Particularly important as an issue for the future was to be 
the question of the nature of the regime in Iraq.
Cases examined so far have shown that the united front was 
conceived functionally in terms of the definition of the 
target of struggle. Those who were defined as struggling 
against imperialism for whatever reasons were part of it. 
So far the spectrum was indeed broad, including, among its 
main examples, Nasserism with its combination of anti­
imperialism and anti-communism; a very conservative 
nationalism in Yemen; and a movement in Lebanon which 
itself spanned an extremely broad range of social forces. 
In Chinese presentations, these differences were 
downplayed, each movement being treated essentially as a 
particular manifestation of a general popular current.
To some extent the CPC seems to have reconciled itself to 
the fact that the role of explicitly left-wing forces was 
relatively minor. Yet in China's own experience, the role 
of the Communist Party had been a major factor In
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maintaining united fronts, for example against the 
Japanese, or subsequently the unity of a fairly wide range 
of forces against Chiang Kai-shek. The experience in the 
Middle East where the leading role was played by 
nationalist forces thus raised some difficult issues.
The implicit response to these difficult questions seems to 
have been that the masses were actually engaged in struggle 
and the regimes would either lead them in this or be swept 
out of the way. This may be a plausible assumption in 
theory, but it runs up against the problem of a particular 
evolution whereby nationalist forces could ride to power on 
the basis of the popular struggle and maintain themselves 
there by repression. With the benefit of hindsight this 
has indeed been a major characteristic of the area.
Iraq pinpoints the issue in an interesting way, 
representing as it did a movement which - at least in the 
period which concerns us - was explicitly left-wing, with 
the local Communist Party as an important actor, 
practically the mainstay of the regime for a certain 
period; CIA head Allen Dulles considered it on the verge of 
a "complete takeover" in early 1959.  ^ A secondary but also 
significant point is that the role of the Kurds calls into 
question the simplistic identification of the national 
movement with Arab nationalism.
In the mid- to late 1940s the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) 
had made considerable play of the Chinese model in their 
domestic propaganda,^ but following this had mainly 
concentrated upon working out a concrete model applicable 
to their own conditions. On balance it is probably fair to 
say that at the time of the coup China had little
 ^quoted in HAZELTON F., "Iraq to 1963" in CARDRI, Saddam's Iraq, 
London (Zed) Revised ed. 1989, 26
 ^GABBAY R. Communism and Agrarian Reform in Iraq, London (Croom 
Helm) 1978, p. 135
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involvement with the ICP or any of the other political 
forces there.* This did not, however, prevent China's name 
from being brought into the picture shortly after the 
period in question, Abdel Nasser was strongly promoting 
the enlargement of the UAR, and Iraq was the most obvious 
candidate. He was thus angered when Beijing entertained 
Khaled Baqdash, the head of the Communist Party of Syria 
and Lebanon in September 1958, who was strongly opposed to 
the existence of the UAR, let alone its enlargement. 
Meanwhile Iraqi politics became polarised over the issue of 
whether to join the UAR or not, and some elements who 
favoured joining Nasser in order to contain the influence 
of the Communists launched a coup attempt in the Iraqi city 
of Mosul in March 1959. Forces led by the ICP played the 
main role in defeating this and General Kassem, the 
military leader of the revolutionary regime, thus found 
himself temporarily more dependent on the ICP. He in fact 
also favoured containing the communists, although not at 
the price of losing Iraq's identity in the UAR. He thus 
sought an occasion to marginalise them, and this presented 
itself when some violent clashes occurred in Kirkuk on the 
first anniversary of the regime, July 14, 1959, Although 
these were probably mainly clashes between Kurds - who had 
strong reasons for distrusting the UAR - and local 
Turcomans,* the incident was presented by Kassem as a 
massacre carried out by the ICP. Although Kassem, as an 
Iraqi nationalist, was using the incident primarily against 
domestic communism, Nasser widened the issue by accusing 
China of involvement in both the events of Mosul and 
Kirkuk. Shichor is surely right in considering these 
accusations baseless.* We might hypothesise that Nasser
* sec for example CALABRESE J., China's Changing delations with the 
Iliddle East, London (Pinter) 1991
* see FAROUK-SLUGGETT M and SLUGGETT P. Iraq Since 1958, London
(I.B. Tauris) 1990
* SHICHOR op. cit. p. 87
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was looking for a way to attack communism without creating 
too many problems with his international ally, the Soviet 
Union.
Although a direct examination of these events falls outside 
the compass of our study, they undoubtedly arose on the 
basis of extremely acute latent contradictions which were 
already implicit in the formation of the UAR and the coup 
in Iraq. It is thus legitimate to enquire how far the 
Chinese analysis exhibited an understanding of the issues 
involved. Analysis of the Iraqi coup from the point of 
view of its social composition would thus constitute a 
critical test for how far the CPC was able to formulate a 
realistic model to elucidate the world system in the long 
term, linked as it is to the issue of the alliance of 
forces within a state, as well as the domestic basis of a 
state's international alignments.
The overall tendency in official Chinese statements was in 
fact once again to downplay the particularities and 
contradictions of the Iraqi situation, and to depict the 
movement as yet another example of the popular anti­
imperialist struggle, in other words to see the case as 
reinforcing their overall perception of the 'main trend'.
If we turn to more specialist publications we do however 
find at least some consciousness that there were issues 
requiring some kind of response.
Notably interesting is the question of a left-wing regime 
coming to power via a military coup, something which was to 
become an important issue in different parts of the third 
world in the future. The Iraqi revolution came like a bolt 
from the blue. At one level this could be an advantage in 
catching the enemy unawares. One article, using the
analogy with lightning, points out that the unexpected 
character of the revolution threw America into a panic.
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forcing it to intervene openly, which it had been hoping 
not to do.*
However at another level some explanation would seem to be 
required of how exactly a coup can be an expression of a 
popular mass movement. Most authors seem to have responded 
to this challenge by seeking to establish a distinction 
between form and substance - the military coup is seen as 
the form, but in essence the change of regime was a product 
of deeper social factors. However on the question of what 
this underlying nature really was, there was room for 
debate, as the literature reveals.
The exigencies of united front politics apparently dictated 
that public statements of an official nature did not enter 
into questions of the class nature of regimes considered 
part of the progressive camp. However, experts might be 
expected to express a view. An interesting question was 
thus whether they would take a clear stance on the key 
issue of whether the movement could be categorised as a 
bourgeois revolution?
One author who did, Peng Shuzhi, assessed the Iraqi 
revolution as a "continuation and development" of the 
Egyptian Free Officers' coup of 1952. Describing it as a 
"milestone" in the Arab independence movement and as a one- 
day "'lightning' revolution", he says that it was realised 
as a military coup, but
"its nature [xingzhi] is that of a bourgeois 
revolution whose purpose is to establish a national
* see CHI Liaozhou, "Qi man pa ying shi diguozhuyi di xingge", 
Xuexi 1958, 15 pp 7-8
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independent state in opposition to the rule of native 
and foreign reactionaries."
This analysis falls within the compass of the line 
emphasising the defence of effective national sovereignty 
which we have already examined in relation to Lebanon, but 
is a good deal more explicit in making an assessment of the 
predominant class character of the movement.
An alternative approach also existed, which we find in an 
interesting article representing the only occasion during 
the period on which a senior Party figure ventured to 
publish a serious theoretical analysis of the Middle East 
situation under his own name. The article in question was 
one in the theoretical journal Xuexi signed by Deng Tuo, 
head of Renmln Ribao and an important figure in Sino- 
Egyptian solidarity activities dating back to the time of 
the Suez War. Perhaps significantly, coming from a figure 
with a public profile, this article was less clear on the 
class question, tending instead to characterise the 
movement as a kind of populist trend without a definite 
(bourgeois) class identity. The article does, however, 
show evidence of an interest in the particularities of a 
more explicitly left-wing movement, although the approach 
is to assess the character of the movement as fluid, and in 
a sense unstable, - hence a 'wait and see* attitude is 
adopted. Thus Deng writes:
"This revolution was in practice realised in the form 
of a military coup; from now on it is still necessary 
to depend on the new government's continuing to take 
revolutionary measures of every kind...."
Among these, the author mentions fully mobilising the 
popular masses and strengthening democratic unity.® The
 ^PKKG Shuzhi, "Lue lun Alabo minzu douzheng di xin jieduan", 
Renwen Zazhi 1958, 4 (August) p. 31
® Tuo, "Muqian Zhong Dong xingshi", Xuexi, 1958, 15
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domestic united front is thus taken as a criterion of how 
the regime is assessed overall.
The reference to a deeper essence underlying the apparently 
sudden change of government would have received 
confirmation from an article by an Iraqi communist, Anwar 
Ali, commissioned by the Chinese press. In it, he 
emphasises very strongly that the movement was a result of 
thorough clandestine preparatory work by the local 
Communist Party and other forces. At the same time, in a 
historical context, Ali argues that the events were not a 
nine-days' wonder or the work of a small army group, but 
(quoting General Kassem) a continuation of a long struggle 
against imperialism and feudal monarchy by the Iraqi people 
and the Arab and Kurdish people as a whole.* It is worth 
remarking in this context that Chinese sources were 
practically silent on the Kurdish question, which is 
probably another example of the reductionism inherent in 
their tendency to explain all events in terms of what was 
perceived as the main issue.
In general Chinese authors also stressed the historical 
background of the movement as evidence for its deeper 
causes. Deng Tuo refers to the occurrence of uprisings on 
five separate occasions: 1936, 1948, 1952 and 1956, as well 
as the present one:
"Because this uprising in Iraq had accumulated 
experience over such a long period of time and its 
organisational preparation was comparatively tight, it 
therefore achieved victory so decisively."
In contrast to Peng Shuzhi's conception of the revolution 
as a bourgeois one challenging a feudal stratum dependant 
on imperialism, Deng Tuo - in accordance with his implicit 
assessment of the revolution as possessing a generally
* ANWAR ALI, "Yilake geming di tedian", Shijie Zhishi 1958, 24,
p. 14
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populist character rather than a definite class identity - 
states that most of the representatives of the old regime 
were military men and representatives of the bourgeoisie 
and petty bourgeoisie, whereas the new government (in 
contrast) is in line with progress and national 
independence. There are certain implications in this which 
would seem to anticipate the Soviet theory of 'socialist 
orientation'. Deng gives a catalogue of various 
progressive initiatives of the new regime using this to 
demonstrate that the new government
"is indeed certainly able to enjoy the support of the 
people and attain the victory of the revolution."^
What is particularly interesting in this analysis is that 
the author attaches considerable significance to the 
proletarian class character of the popular movement, and 
proposes an analysis of Iraqi society which stresses that 
the balance of class forces in this particular case 
strongly favoured the proletariat relative to the 
bourgeoisie :
"Imperialism took control of the petroleum there, and 
used the cheap local labour force for large-scale 
extraction. Under the impact of foreign capital, the 
Iraqi working class and national bourgeoisie appeared 
one after the other, but in comparison to the national 
bourgeoisie, the working class was very large. The 
Iraqi oil workers and other workers number nearly two 
hundred thousand, and with the addition of their 
dependents, one and a quarter million. Out of the 
country's total population, one-fifth are working 
class, which is very well worth attention."
Without pacifically comparing this case to that of other 
countries in the area, the implication is thus that the 
movement in Iraq was more radical because the proletariat 
was proportionally much larger, in relation to the national 
bourgeoisie, than in other countries.
DENG Tuo op cit
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THE COUP IN IRAQ AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL 
STRATEGIES
The Chinese leadership may have experienced some 
uncertainty in analysing the revolution in Iraq 
domestically but in terms of its international implications 
the analysis was comparatively unambiguous.
The overthrow of the old regime in Iraq was thus 
immediately greeted in China as important and positive, 
even as a turning-point: "The victory of the Iraqi
revolution has an extremely important, many-sided 
significance in modern history. At the same time,
however, it was seen as an opportunity which needed to be 
grasped. The events in Iraq were a 'turning point', 
leading to a * possible great change in the Middle Eastern 
situation.'1* [our emphasis]. As implied in the image of 
a turning point, there were different directions history 
could move in; hence the importance of 'seizing the hour'. 
Another element is thus the fact that the penalties for 
failure were enhanced. The danger was that the USA might 
mount a successful counter-attack; US leaders had signalled 
an intention of doing so by the direct involvement of their 
armed forces in Lebanon.
In describing this risk, the Chinese press rediscovered 
something of the apocalyptic tone which it had employed 
nine months earlier in the context of the assumed threat of
a Turkish invasion of Syria. Thus it was asserted that "if
the United States succeeds this time, its armed 
intervention will be extended to other Asian and African 
countries"^, and an important Renmln Ribao editorial gave
Renmin Ribao, Editorial, August 3 1958; text in China
Supports,,,, p. 235
Vagong Baa, July 15 1958; Xinhua, same date
Dagong Bao, July 17 1958; Xinhua, July 18.
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a dire warning of the risks at a global level which were 
likely to ensue, following the deployment of US troops in 
the area:
"The United States government is at present taking 
pains to confuse the world by claiming that these acts 
are but minor affairs. We must not believe these 
preposterous claims! The situation is very serious! If 
the people of the whole world and all governments in 
favour of peace act in unison, the US will have no 
alternative but to withdraw its troops, and the 
independence and freedom of the Middle East countries 
can be ensured and peace in the Middle East and the 
world saved. On the other hand, if the US aggressors 
are given a free hand, the people of the Middle East 
will be doomed to slavery, and what is more a new 
world war would be unavoidable.
The implications for united front strategies are clear - it 
was increasingly urgent to consolidate the progressive 
grouping both at people-to-people and government-to- 
government levels, so that at both levels there could be 
action "in unison".
IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA’S MOBILISATION
From the CPC's point of view, internationally as well as 
domestically, popular forces needed to be mobilised around 
some concrete goals or tasks. In examining what kind of 
action was envisaged in response to the new situation in 
the Middle East, an interesting perspective is supplied by 
looking at China's own domestic mobilisation on this 
international theme; an effort of mobilisation which was in 
turn seen as a component in an international united front 
effort.
The period in fact witnessed a kind of foreign-policy 
equivalent of the mass activity of the Great Leap Forward - 
so much so that when the CPC said that the 600 million
Rermin Ribao, Editorial, July 17, 1958.
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Chinese people were expressing their solidarity with the 
Arabs, one has the impression that they meant this to be 
taken literally. Thus, during a short period in the middle 
of July, 1958, a series of demonstrations were organised 
which anticipate the Cultural Revolution in scope, and it 
would be hard to find a historical parallel in any other 
country or period for such massive activity on an 
international issue not immediately affecting the state in 
question.
International relations theory recognises that popular 
commitment to a policy is - alongside more tangible indices 
such as wealth and military strength - an element in the 
power of a state, viewed as its capacity to act in the 
world arena. Generally this is quite a nebulous concept, 
but the CPC was attempting at this juncture an 
unprece dented experiment in concretising the dimension of 
mass commitment.
In this process, there was a definite dimension of 
interaction with the domestic sphere, in that it would seem 
that an attempt was being made to channel some of the mass 
fervour which already existed on domestic issues, in such 
a way as to reinforce China's international stance. 
Conversely the international issue was also probably 
employed as a focus of domestic cohesion. This all serves 
to throw light upon the interaction between domestic and 
international environments in the context of united front 
policies.
During this period, an official spokesman described the 
Middle East as the 'sole topic of conversation* in China.
A series of mass demonstrations were held, one of which, in 
Beijing, was described as one of the biggest
Times July 22 1958
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anti-imperialist demonstrations in history^* - foreign 
observers estimated there to be in the region of half a 
million persons present.
The CPC did undoubtedly wish the demonstrations to be 
'taken seriously' by the West, and one of the reasons for 
holding them must have been to influence the adversary's 
perception - an important factor in power politics. This 
concern probably lay at the root of a somewhat peculiar 
incident which occurred during the course of the campaign 
of mass demonstrations, when the CPC became embroiled in a 
public feud with Reuters News Agency, anticipating the more 
celebrated conflict which was to develop during the 
Cultural Revolution. The then Reuters' correspondent. Jack 
Gee, submitted reports to the effect that the 
demonstrations had been wildly exaggerated by the Chinese 
leadership, and Renmin Ribao responded by attacking him for
"vainly trying to play down the expression of the 
people's indignation with his cowardly and disgusting
pen."^®
But these activities in the capital were not the only, and 
perhaps not the most significant aspect of the movement. 
The campaign also possessed other dimensions which indicate 
that, in addition to being designed to make an impression 
abroad, it also had an important domestic focus. One of 
its main purposes may in fact have been an attempt to 
arouse all the different regions of China, thus serving as 
an exercise in the use of communications to further the 
cohesion of the country behind a centrally-determined line.
Xinhua July 17
Frankfurter Allgemelne Zeitung July 21 
Renmln Ribao July 24 1958; Xinhua same date
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Many reports came in of demonstrations in the most remote 
regions, for example in Heilongjiang
'a county-wide rural meeting was arranged to reached 
[sic] seven million peasants of Pin County, after the 
news of the United States and British aggression in 
Lebanon and Jordan came through. It was organised 
over the newly constructed wired broadcasting system, 
which covers the whole county.
Another mass demonstration was organised in Lhasa and 
addressed by the Dalai Lama, who called upon people 'while 
opposing imperialist aggression in the Middle East, to be 
alert and guard against subversive plots and splitting 
activities in Tibet.
One purpose of the demonstrations was apparently to cement 
the domestic United Front, not only between social strata, 
but also between nationalities. A number of reports 
mention the participation of Chinese Moslems. 
Demonstrations were reported to have assembled 'workers, 
peasants, students, Moslems, Buddhists, industrialists, 
businessmen and others in the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous 
Region and the Ningsia area.'^^
Besides bringing closer the different population groups and 
social strata, another purpose would seem to have been to 
assert effective national control, in a geographical 
dimension, over far-flung and sparsely populated (but 
strategically important) parts of the country. Even 
'Geological prospectors from the remote Changpai mountains 
in North East China, the Altai mountains in the North West 
and the Tsaidam basin in Chinghai province' were reported 
to have been mobilised to protest over the situation in the
Xinhua July 20 
Xinhua July 23 
Xinhua July 30
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Middle East. At one point during the campaign of
demonstrations it was stated that 21 million people had 
already taken part,*^ and a few days later, country-wide, 
a figure of 64 million was given.**
Undoubtedly the demonstrations were officially orchestrated 
and can thus be considered an emanation of leadership
policy. In some areas they may well have served as an
instrument for asserting control over the local population 
from the centre. Tibet would be a case in point. 
Particularly interesting in this respect is the case of two 
of the areas mentioned above, Xinjiang and Ningxia. In the 
former, there are reports of violent clashes with Uighur 
nationalists in the early part of 1958, and even more 
significant is the fact that Ningxia was implicated in a 
major leadership split which resulted in the purging of a 
number of leading Chinese Moslems in August 1958 - one of 
them, Abdullah Ma Chenwu was accused to attempting to 
create a Soviet-style autonomous republic in Ningxia.
It would seem, then, that the conflict in the Middle East 
coincided with a crisis in relations between the party
leadership and leading elements of the Moslem population in 
China, probably caused by some of the policies we referred 
to earlier which pushed the domestic united front in a
direction where it practically ceased to be a policy of 
united front at all, and became one of homogenisation. In 
these circumstances» the solidarity movement with the Arabs
** Xinhua July 30
** New York Times July 22
** Xinhua July 27
sec JOYAUX F., "Les Musulmans de Chine et la Diplomatie de 
Pékin", L'Afrique et l’Asie 1967, 77, p. 21, note; see also ADIE W. 
"The Middle East - Sino-Soviet Discords" in LAQUEUR W and LABEDZ L. 
(eds), Polycentrism - the New Factor in International Communism, New 
York (Praeger) 1962, p. 321 f
257
may have been used to channel the militancy of Chinese 
Moslems in such a way as to reassert central control over 
it.
However, taking China as a whole, the fact that this was a 
centrally-orchestrated campaign in no way denies the 
existence of real anti-imperialist sentiment in the 
country. The leadership could well have conceived of the 
demonstrations as an appropriate contemporary form of 
expression for the mass energies unleashed in movements 
ranging from the Boxer and May Fourth Movements through to 
the struggles against the Japanese and Chiang Kai-shek. 
Certain officially-chosen themes may have served to 
accentuate the link with past episodes in the Chinese 
national movement, particularly a strong anti-British 
government orientation. The Chinese government sent a 
strongly-worded diplomatic Note to Britain, which was 
singled out for attack while other Western nations were 
sometimes more favourably assessed for having 'expressed 
serious worry and apprehension over the United 
States-British aggression in the Middle E a s t ' I n  
actions which again anticipate the Cultural Revolution, the 
office of the British chargé d'affaires was plastered with 
slogans - the official news agency Xinhua actually 
reported this with approval - and there were also 
demonstrations on the Hong Kong border.^®
MILITARY INVOLVEMENT BY CHINA
We have already discussed two levels of analysis of 
leadership aims: firstly, there was the motive of trying to 
give a new dimension to the concept of 'a country' 'acting' 
in the international environment by actually mobilising the
Xinhua July 22
Xinhua July 17
Manchester Guardian July 22
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population as a whole; and secondly there was the aim of 
using the issue as a focus for national unity. A third 
dimension would also suggest itself in terms of using the 
mass movement in order to promote international solidarity 
between China and the Arabs, bearing in mind that in the 
CPC's view unity had to be built not just between 
governments but between peoples.
However, the mass mobilisation was by no means confined to 
an expression of anti-imperialist sentiment, it needed 
action to give it a focus. In this context, the most 
striking of the new elements introduced at the time of the 
change of regime in Iraq and the escalation of the conflict 
in Lebanon, was the idea of military involvement by China.
A suggestion of military participation in the Middle East 
had already been put forward at the time of Suez, when 
China had actually proposed the figure of 280,000 
v o l u n t e e r s . I n  1958, when the idea of military 
commitment returned, a parallel was also explicitly made 
with the sending of the Chinese Volunteers to Korea, and in 
the context of the mass demonstrations, many specific 
protest meetings of Korean War veterans were reported.^
The Chinese leadership did not publish the details of troop 
mobilisation, but it did leak details to western 
journalists, apparently to prove its seriousness. On 20th 
July, one reported, a Chinese official said that China’s 
army was ready to '"respond quickly" if called upon to act
see KERR M.H., "The Middle East and China - the Scope and Limits 
of Convergent Interests" in HALPERN A (ed) Policies Toward China New 
York (McGraw Hill for Council for Foreign Relations) 1965 p. 439; ROYAL 
INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, Survey of International Affairs 
1955-6 p. 306
sec e.g. Xinhua July 28
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in the Middle East situation. The operative word would 
seem to be 'act', which fulfills the terms of the passage 
quoted earlier to the effect that the people should "act in 
unison". This is a strong statement of the kind of people- 
based united front of which the Chinese mobilisation was 
designed as an example. Another major Renmin Ribao 
Editorial, entitled "We Will Not Look on with Folded Arms", 
stated that
"The peace- and freedom-loving countries and peoples
of the world have begun to act.
The following day an even more explicit reference appeared 
in a remarkable passage in a Renmin Ribao Editorial, which 
draws parallels between the American War of Independence 
and Lebanon's own modern equivalent. It reads as follows:
"The French and many other peoples of Europe organised 
and sent volunteers to America to help fight in the 
war . On the other hand, today both the Lebanese people 
in their struggle and the Iraqi people in their 
victory have depended almost exclusively on their own 
efforts. We may well ask at this point why should 
they not be entitled to the same international 
assistance as was given in the American War of 
Independence?
It is worth recalling in this context the Chinese position 
on international law, to the effect that it was "legal for 
any state to give support to a state which is the victim of 
aggression"
Details of preparations emerged from leaks to journalists 
or monitored radio broadcasts. Many army meetings were
Nev York Times July 22
Renmin Ribao ed. July 20; China Supports... p. 212
33 Renmin Ril>ao July 21; Xinhua same date
TAD Xijin, "Wei heping yu zhengyi er douzheng di Ya Fei falu 
gongzuo zhe huiyi". Zhengfa Yanjiu 1958, 1
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reported to have been held, where servicemen expressed a 
resolve not to 'keep their hands o f f  if the imperialists 
failed to withdraw. The Beijing garrison was reported to be 
under alert, and PLA units stationed there expressed a wish 
to be sent as volunteers to the Middle East.
MOTIVES OF THE CPC LEADERSHIP IN IMPLYING ARMED 
INTERVENTION
We can be reasonably sure that the actual capacity of the 
Chinese to mobilise their forces in a theatre like the 
Middle East was too weak to make military deployment a 
serious option. If one were to speak of a full-scale 
deployment of troops similar to the Korean operation, the 
logistics alone (in the absence of massive Soviet 
assistance), let alone political complications, would 
surely have been insurmountable. True, in foreign policy 
it can often be effective to give the enemy the impression 
one is going to act in a certain way, even if one does not 
intend to carry it through. However, it is hard to think 
that this particular threat could have been taken seriously 
by the Americans.
Should it be concluded, then, that the official hints of an 
actual military mobilisation functioned purely at an 
ideological level? The importance of the ideological 
dimension in the approach of the Chinese leadership should 
certainly not be underestimated. At one level, the linkage 
may be seen as reflecting a desire to educate the 
population in anti-imperialist consciousness using a direct 
analogy with China’s own experience. In fact in one sense 
the international situation was being used around this time 
as an element in a broader campaign to propagate Marxist 
philosophy. One article dealing with "Dialectics in the 
International Struggle" used the parallel between US
sec Manchester Guardian Jnly 26; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
July 21
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actions in Taiwan and Lebanon to stress the importance of 
consciousness as a material force. It is argued that US 
activity, as illustrated by these two cases.
"is everywhere prompting formerly backward people to 
accelerate the raising of their consciousness, and is 
everywhere prompting those who waver in the middle to 
rise up and struggle against US aggression."^®
This argument is interesting in the context of the debate 
about whether the united front is conceived in a broader or 
narrower way when the 'heat is on'. The implication would 
seem to be that when the heat was on it would actually be 
possible increasingly to win over the middle strata.
The notion that imperialism creates its opposite by 
accentuating popular consciousness was an important one in 
the overall Marxist education campaign at the time. A 
common illustration was Mao's metaphor of a fool lifting a 
rock only to drop it on his own feet, a concept upon 
which he had expanded when speaking in Moscow in 1957. 
From this perspective, there follows the assessment that US 
'positions of strength' could be turned into positions of 
weakness.
Bearing in mind the view that history was at a turning- 
point and that the opportunity was there to be grasped, in 
other words, that the subjective element in grasping 
favourable circumstances was critical, we can say that 
there was probably an important element of ideology in 
united front building.
BIN Fu, "Guoji douzheng zhong di bianzhengfa", Shijie Zhishi 
1958, 22, p. 11
This term was originally used by Mao in his article "On 
New-democratic Constitutional Government" (1940)
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INTERLINKING STRUGGLES IN DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE WORLD
However, such an analysis does not exhaust the issue of 
China's military involvement. It remains true that it was 
a basic methodological principle of the CPC leadership to 
demarcate themselves from the attitude that "problems can 
be solved merely by influence"^; the USA and Britain were 
involved at a military level, and it would still appear 
logical for China to respond at a similar level if at all 
possible.
In order to take this line of enquiry further, it will be 
necessary to turn back to some of the geopolitical themes 
discussed earlier, and see what changes had been brought in 
by the events of summer 1958.
We have already discussed the campaign against US military 
bases in late 1957, in the course of which it was stressed 
that it was the people in areas where such bases are 
implanted who suffer the direct consequences. This theme 
remained in force in the summer of 1958:
"Wherever an American military base is established, 
the people in that area are bound to suffer disasters, 
they bear the brunt head-on, and directly experience 
enslavement and persecution. If the people of the 
Middle Eastern countries do not start to free 
themselves from the fetters of imperialism, not only 
will they sink into an abyss of suffering, but they 
will face the added peril of becoming war-victims at 
the hands of imperialism."”
However, in accordance with the new stress on dialectics, 
we find increasing emphasis on the contrary opposite of 
this process, i.e. on the fact that
Selected Works of Nao Tse-tung, Volume IV, Peking (FLP) 1969, p.
19
DENG Tuo "Muqian Zhong Dong xingshi", Xuexi 1958, XV
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"If only the Middle Eastern people resolutely stand up 
and carry the national liberation struggle through to 
the end, they can escape from their hardships and turn 
the Middle East region into a battle position for 
peace.
The importance accorded to this type of evolution in the 
world system by the Chinese was considerable. Thus the 
connection between the Middle East - particularly Lebanon 
- and Taiwan came to be seen increasingly not just in 
terms of historical analogy, or of two peoples with similar 
experiences learning from one another, but as a direct 
strategic link, cementing a united front of peoples not 
just at a level of mutual sympathy, but at one of practical 
co-ordination.
US strategy was itself presented in such a way as to point 
up this linkage:
"Not long ago, American imperialism moved a heavy 
concentration of military forces into the Taiwan 
Straits to distract the attention of the world from 
its aggressive actions in the Middle East.
Conversely, the mass movements could co-ordinate their 
activities in such a way as to cause the maximum difficulty 
for the USA, and in particular hinder it from the 
concentration of forces which, as we saw in the context of 
the Syrian crisis in 1957, was conceived of as such an 
important aspect of the mode of operation of imperialism. 
This type of co-operation, in response to US strategy, can 
be viewed as the concrétisation of the united front.
® ibid.
TU Wei, "American imperialism will soon be buried in its own 
grave", Shijie Zhishi 1958 XXII (Nov 20) in Joint Publications Research 
Service 611-D pp 5-6.
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It is in this context that we should reconsider the 
question of the links between events in Lebanon and Iraq on 
the one hand, and the bombardment of the offshore islands 
on the other.
As we have already argued, the weight of evidence seems to 
suggest that the offshore bombardment was not a response to 
an immediate threat against China, despite the possible 
existence of a latent one. Thus it would be appropriate to 
regard the bombardment as an initiative from Beijing.
One hypothesis would be, as a a commentator observed at the 
time, that "real trouble in the Middle East would give 
Peking the opportunity, with the West otherwise occupied, 
to attempt the 'liberation' of Formosa".** However, the 
possibility of actually taking Taiwan in the face of strong 
US commitment was probably remote, and a more plausible 
hypothesis would thus be that the CPC seized upon the 
Taiwan issue in order to open a second front against the 
USA, thus giving encouragement to those struggling against 
the same enemy in the Middle East and cementing unity with 
them on a more practical basis.
Mao did indeed float the idea of such an interpretation: at 
least according to one source, he is reported to have told 
the visiting delegation from the Palestine Liberation 
Organisation in 1965 that
"Our artillery shelled Quemoy to engage the 
imperialists during the revolution in Iraq and the 
American landing in the Lebanon....The enemy should be 
engaged on all fronts."**
This statement could be viewed as a rationalisation, ex 
post; but there is ample contemporary evidence of linkage
** ZOKZA V. in Hanchester Guardian July 26 1958 
** quoted in SHICHOR Y. op. cit. p. 73
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between the Taiwan issue and the situation in the Middle 
East.
Later Mao Zedong was to use the image of a man trying to 
catch ten fleas with ten fingers in order to describe the 
United States predicament.^^ This line of reasoning was 
anticipated during the period in question. Thus Mao's 
speech to the Supreme State Conference on September 8 1958 
contains the following important passage:
"The general trend is that the East wind is prevailing 
over the West wind. US imperialism invaded China's 
territory of Taiwan and has occupied it for the past 
nine years. A short while ago it sent its armed forces 
to invade and occupy the Lebanon. The United States 
has set up hundreds of military bases in many 
countries all over the world. China's territory of 
Taiwan, the Lebanon, and all the other military bases 
of the United States on foreign territory are so many 
nooses around the neck of US imperialism. The nooses 
have been fashioned by the Americans themselves, and 
by nobody else, and it is they themselves who put 
these nooses round their own necks, handing the ends 
of the ropes to the Chinese people, the peoples of the 
Arab countries and all the peoples of the world who 
love peace and oppose aggression.
Hence it may well be that, while there was not in fact a 
serious attempt to move against the Chiang regime in 
Taiwan, the aim was to create such an impression, thus 
taking the pressure off the Arabs. A threat of this nature 
would presumably be more plausible to the adversary than 
would the idea of China actually intervening militarily in 
the Middle East.
It is perhaps from this perspective that during July 
important official statements, including speeches by senior
^ HAO Zedong, talk given in October 1975, quoted in Chairman ttao*s 
Theory of the Differentiation of the Three Worlds,,. Peking (FLP) 1977
Comrade ttao-Tse-tung on ''Imperialism and All Reactionaries ..." 
op cit pp 29-30
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leaders such as Zhou Enlai and Peng Zhen increasingly 
employed the term "West Asia" in place of "Middle East", 
which had generally been applied to the region before.^ 
This usage can be seen as implying a direct link whereby 
the adversary is engaged simultaneously on both flanks.
HOLE OF THE SOCIALIST CAMP IN THE UNITED FRONT
While the United States did undertake a serious commitment 
of naval forces in answer to Beijing's initiative over the 
offshore islands, it is however by no means clear that this 
significantly weakened the Americans' ability to operate 
simulataneously in the Middle East, or even that the CPC 
leadership actually expected this to be the case. But 
there is another possible function of the action over the 
offshore islands, namely to provide an example of how a 
socialist country should act at such a critical juncture in 
directly engaging imperialism.
At the time of the Syrian crisis of 1957 the Chinese had 
made great play of the role of the Socialist Camp and the 
Soviet Union in warning off imperialism. It is interesting 
that the individual among the Soviet leadership who was 
most active in threatening the USA at that time was Marshal 
Zhukov, who had become a key figure following the overthrow 
of the 'Anti-Party Group' in June, 1957. A few days after 
his role in the Syrian crisis, however, he was purged (in 
October 1957), one of the charges against him being that of 
adventurism in foreign policy.
sec PENG Zhen, speech at a Mass Rally on July 17 1958; ZHOU 
Enlai, Speech at a Reception at the Cambodian Mission, July 31 1958; 
both texts were reproduced in the important source China Supports,.. 
op. cit.
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This makes it appropriate for us at this point to make a 
brief re-examination of how the CPC perceived the role of 
the socialist camp within the international alignment of 
forces. This was an issue on which there was particularly 
rapid change during the period in question leading up to 
the Mao-Khrushchev summit in Beijing. In fact, as we will 
now argue, some evidence does exist for Chinese 
dissatisfaction with the role of the Socialist Camp around 
this period, and this in turn raises questions about 
whether the Chinese leadership were having second thoughts 
about how effective the Socialist Camp could be in 
fulfilling a pivotal role within the united front of 
progressive forces at this time.
China's doubts, if they existed, would relate to such 
questions as the issues of whether Moscow's acceptance of 
the Western summit proposal was indicative of a generally 
conciliatory approach towards 'imperialism', whether, as 
J.R. Thomas has asserted,^ there was criticism from the 
Chinese side of the Soviet handling of both the Lebanon 
and Taiwan issues by attempting to defuse them via the 
United Nations. Some more actively threatening posture by 
the Soviet Union would seem to have been desired by 
Beijing, and in fact the theme of Soviet support came 
increasingly to be used not as a way of praising the USSR, 
but rather as a way of commenting obliquely on the need for 
socialist countries to participate in the global trial of 
strength with imperialism. One article from this period 
even went back to Stalin's time to refer approvingly to 
Soviet backing for Lebanon's attempts to exclude British 
and French troops in 1946,^® before explicitly making the
THOMAS J.R. "The Limits of Alliance: the Quemoy Crisis of 1958" 
in GARTHOFF R.L. (ed) Sino-Soviet Hilitary Halations, New York 
(Praeger) 1966, esp. p. 125.
YU Lisan, "Meiguo jundui cong Libanun gun chuqu", in Shijie 
Zhishi Supplement I (July 26, 1958), p. 9.
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point that once US intervention occurred, it turned the 
Lebanese affair into an international issue.
To clarify the basic parameters of a possible Chinese 
critique of the Soviet position, it would be useful to 
return briefly to some important theoretical issues in the 
assessment of the world balance of forces, because on 
certain of these issues changes in the Chinese leadership's 
position would have a bearing on how the Soviet role was 
assessed.
As we have already argued, a key question was considered to 
be the correct response to the adversary's 'positions of 
strength'. This relates not just to the practical, 
logistic question of concentrating forces in a particular 
spot, but also to the cultivation of an appearance of 
strength, which could be practically equivalent to real 
strength if the United States' bluff was not called. This 
idea occurs more graphically in the image of the paper 
tiger - outwardly strong but inwardly weak.
Overall, the CPC tended to follow the method of taking up 
the issues which were put forward by the Soviet leadership, 
and turning round the argument so that it proved the 
opposite of what the CPSU was trying to prove. An example 
of this is the theme of local wars flaring up into 
something more dangerous. The CPC first took this argument 
at face value and then extended the logic one step further 
- to argue that therefore it was all the more essential to 
combat imperialism in local conflict situations. However, 
we will focus here on another issue of considerable 
importance throughout the debate and polemic between the 
Chinese and Soviet leaderships: that of the relaxation of 
international tension - détente as it came to be known - 
and its link with the balance of world forces.
ibid.
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Both sides agreed that progressive forces were getting 
stronger in relation to imperialism, but here the 
interpretations diverged. The CPSU argued that at least a 
section of US decision-makers could rationally appraise 
this fact. They could thus be restrained from military 
adventure, and meanwhile the growing preponderance of the 
progressive camp in the distribution of forces would push 
the world system in an ever more favourable direction. 
Hence it was necessary to moderate conflict situations 
which could threaten to disrupt this peaceful evolution.
The Chinese, on the other hand thought that the more the 
West sensed things slipping away, the more desperate it 
would be to reverse this trend.
Around the time of the Soviet 20th Party Congress in 1956, 
Chinese official statements accepted the view that 
"....within the ruling circles of the United States, there 
is a section of more sober-minded people..."^. But this 
soon changed. In the spring of 1957, the CPC put forward 
an authoritative analysis which, while it still employed 
the vocabulary of "circles", now fundamentally differed 
from the Soviet interpretation:
"When international tension has reached a certain 
pitch and when strong pressure has been brought to 
bear from all sides, the US government is sometimes 
compelled to accept certain measures for the
relaxation of tension. However the US aggressive 
circles are afraid of a substantial relaxation in the 
international situation, because they would lose their 
leading position in the so-called free world, their 
military blocs would become ever more loose, while the 
Asian and African peoples would take ever more 
resolutely to the road of independent development. 
Therefore, every time there is a substantial
relaxation in the international situation, the US 
aggressive circles will hastily create new tensions in 
a desperate effort to prevent a further relaxation. 
This is the root cause why the United States
Government wants the international situation to be
Text in Chixia Supports,,., p. 42
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tense but cannot make it too tense; it is forced to 
accept a certain relaxation but dare not accept a 
prolonged relaxation, thus wavering constantly between 
the two alternatives of relaxation and tension."
This can be seen as a fairly thought-out response to the 
Soviet position, and has quite interesting implications for 
the united front question. It is argued that the 
maintenance of the US bloc was conditional upon 
international tension, otherwise a military grouping could 
not be maintained. By extension we could draw the 
inference that a harmonious pattern of relations was only 
possible within the united front of progressive forces, and 
then only as a function of struggle against imperialism. 
It was thus, in the Chinese view, wishful thinking to 
assume that a 'great harmony' in the present international 
system could come about to encompass all the actors. The 
rule of imperialism in the process of change to a more 
peaceful world order could only be negative, i.e. it would 
bring this change about by focussing against it a broad 
movement of forces which, in their relations with one 
another, would gradually introduce new approaches for 
working out differences in a non-antagonistic way, as in 
the Bandung principles.
Thf; CPC saw themselves as having an educational role to 
play on this question, as when, at the Damascus Conference 
they explained to participants the true nature of the 
Eisenhower Doctrine.^
However in the crisis situation of 1958 they were 
reasonably confident that the developing countries, because 
of their daily experience in the reality of the struggle, 
would perceive the true nature of imperialism:
Text in China Supports,,, op cit pp 16-17
cn
see above
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"It will not be difficult for people now fighting for 
or defending national independence, particularly for 
the people in Asian and African countries, to see from 
history and the present reality that the US is the 
centre of the most reactionary forces of aggression 
and the most ferocious colonialist in the world 
today."
Bearing in mind the framework of analysis set out in the 
A.L. Strong interview, it could be deduced that this 
confidence in the accurate perception of the Asian-African 
peoples was derived from an assessment that they were 
involved in the main world struggles directly. The same 
logic might make the CPC less sure in relation to the 
perceptivity of some elements in the socialist world, 
precisely because they lacked the direct experience from 
which the struggles in the intermediate zone shielded them.
The reference to US "aggressive circles" oscillating 
between tension and relaxation implies, in effect, that 
what is important in understanding imperialism is its 
objective logic and not the rationale of particular groups 
of decision-makers, since such groups could simply be seen 
as reflecting the different sides of the same contradictory 
logic.
However, further new ingredients were introduced into the 
Chinese position in response to the increasingly acute 
conflict of 1958 in the Middle East.
The passage we have just quoted depicts imperialism as 
somewhat manipulative and scheming. Within the terms of 
its own logic it is presented as rational. This was still 
the predominant approach in the early part of 1958 when, 
for example, we find the the Lebanese conflict treated as
Ferimin Ribao July 17 1958; Xinhua same date
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a case where certain circles were trying to stir up wars ; 
and more generally, it was argued at this time that
"There are groups in the United States, which, in 
addition to their opposition to the relaxation of 
world tension, are on the look-out for chances to 
break the peace and launch 'limited wars' in some 
areas".”
An interesting article compared the American leadership to 
Hitler, who used propaganda to build up a position of 
strength which deceived even him.^® It can be noted in 
this context that, as A.L. Hsieh has observed, the Soviet 
leadership tended to avoid comparing US leadership to 
Hitler.^
However, around July 1958 there was a change in the way in 
which imperialism was presented in the Chinese press, and 
this was probably linked with certain problems raised by 
another area of Soviet argumentation which needed to be 
taken up, namely the assumption of rationality.
RATIONALITY OR IRRATIONALITY OF IMPERIALISM
Internally at least, if the material in Mao Zedong Sixiang 
Wansui can be relied upon, the Chinese leadership may well 
have retained throughout this period an assessment that the 
US leadership was aware enough of the risks not to push 
conflict too far. A problem would arise, however, if the 
socialist camp signalled too noticeably that it perceived 
this fact, and felt it had to reciprocate by being
Sermin Ribao May 30 1958; Peking Review June 3.
Renmin Ribao May 20 1958; Xinhua same date 
Peking Review Editorial, April 1 1958
HSIEH A.L. The Significance of the Chinese Communist Treatment 
of Khrushchev's January 14 Speech... Santa Monica (RAND for US Air 
Force) 1960.
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reasonable in return. Then US decision-makers might take 
advantage by pushing their luck further. Mao would appear 
to have believed that it was necessary to step up the 
struggle and profit from any weakness of imperialism while 
circumstances were favourable.
What this comes down to is an assessment that the adversary 
was more likely to understand hard knocks than he was to 
act rationally upon a sober assessment of the world balance 
of forces. In fact following Mao's idea of the logic of 
imperialism as "make trouble, fail, make trouble again, 
fail again", it can be assumed that such knocks would have 
to be administered repeatedly. The most important thing 
the Chinese leadership wanted to avoid was a situation 
where the progressive forces renounced revolutionary 
boldness for fear of undermining a certain reasonable group 
of US leaders and allowing hawks to take over.
This is probably the main explanation for an increasing 
tendency on the part of the Chinese to stress the 
irrationality of the Western leadership at this time, and 
in practice a view began to be propagated in the period 
leading up to the most acute phase in the Middle East, to 
the effect that imperialist involvement was an act of 
desperation, a reflection of the rising struggle against 
it.
to
The fact that the US leaders could not rationally hope/win 
a war did not, it was argued, in any way prevent them from 
launching one. The expression "rabid", frequently used by 
Mao and others, was thus more than just an indiscriminate 
term of abuse. US armed intervention in the Lebanon was 
said, in an official Chinese statement, to have been 
carried out "in a sudden rage and panic",^ and a Renmin
CHINA Government Statement July 16 1958; China Supports,., pp
181-2
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Ribao editorial published immediately after this Statement, 
returns to this theme:
"According to a western proverb: whom God would
destroy He first sends mad. The combined US-British 
aggression is an example of these death throes; .they 
are collaborating in digging their own grave..."5*
Another major Renmin Ribao article published immediately 
afterwards, in aEfirming that the historical trend was one 
of victory of the popular forces over imperialism, referred 
to Eisenhower's "complete ignorance, like an idiot, of such 
inevitable development",^® while the key Renmin Ribao 
editorial of July 21 1958 argued that
"Eisenhower and his like are completely ignorant of 
the present age. History for them is packed with 
unexpected events which they are incapable of 
understanding." ^
One premise of the above arguments is that the nuclear 
balance could not in itself be relied upon to deter the 
USA from launching local wars. This is shown in an article 
in the theoretical journal Xuexi which pulls out all the 
stops in describing the irrationality of American leaders. 
Referring to their "war mania", "nuclear madness" and 
"hysteria", the author argues that the combined effect of 
all these conditions "might lead to a nervous breakdown and 
suicide", or alternatively to the Americans playing with 
fire and consequent self-destruction. However, should this 
happen and the United States initiate a third world war, 
the author argues.
"The Socialist Camp headed by the Soviet Union and the 
world's peace-loving nations and peoples have a
Renmin Ribao Editorial July 18 1958; China Supports,., p. 210 
Renmin Ribao Editorial, July 18, 1958; China Supports... p 210 
Renmin Ribao July 21 1958; Xinhua same date
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sufficiently powerful extinguishing force and striking
force".M
The point at issue was that of how the grouping of anti-
imperialist forces could be considered to influence the
world environment. The Chinese were arguing that the
actions of the progressive camp could never render the
adversary peaceful, and its influence could only be 
exercised via repeated trials of strength. Despite later 
Soviet accusations, it is probably hardly fair to say that 
the Chinese leadership cheerfully contemplated a nuclear 
war: they did not believe one was inevitable, but were 
simply arguing that the best way of preventing it was to be 
bold and punish the USA in local conflicts, so as to break 
the momentum which might lead to a larger-scale war.
TOWARDS A NEW FORMULATION OF THE ALIGNMENT OF PROGRESSIVE 
FORCES
In practice the Soviet leadership was increasingly sensed 
as being ineffectual in this respect. This is the apparent 
explanation of a very important shift whereby Chinese 
statements moved towards a subtly different formulation of 
the united grouping of progressive forces, one which tended 
to marginalise the Socialist Camp as an organised entity 
and which took as its point of reference a very warlike 
definition of the peace struggle. This perhaps served to 
pre-empt the Soviet Union's identification of its policy 
with the cause of peace.
The term "peace forces" thus came to be used extensively as 
a term of reference for the progressive united front. But 
this in no way signified a 'non-militant' phase in front- 
building, because the term was used precisely to refer to
SONG Zhen, "Bei yapo minzu biran zhansheng diguozhuyi", Xuexi 
1958, 15
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those who were resolutely fighting for national 
independence. In mid-June Renmin Ribao stated that
"Peace is indivisible. Any threat to people in 
Lebanon and the Middle East is a threat to world 
peace. In that case, the world peace forces will 
range with the Lebanese people to smash the scheme of 
the United States and its followers..."
When the situation grew even more dangerous at the end of 
June 1958, an official Chinese Foreign Ministry commentary 
threatened that if the United States "dare to launch a war 
of aggression in Lebanon and the Arab region, they will 
certainly meet with the resolute counter-blows from all 
peace-loving people of the world.
There was also an explicit link with Taiwan in this 
respect, because PLA men attending the demonstrations on 
the Middle East
"pledged to be vigilant and strengthen military 
training in preparation for the liberation of Taiwan 
at any mpment to deal heavy blows in defence of world 
peace.
The main point from the Chinese angle was probably to show 
that peace could only be won by resolute resistance to 
international aggression and that concessions aimed at 
preventing a conflagration would have the opposite result 
to the one intended. Taken in conjunction with points 
already made about the Chinese view of how to deal with the 
sources of international tension, a very important 
historical analogy seems to be suggested: that of the
period of Appeasement, when an attitude of compromise with 
aggression caused the abandonment of forces which could
63 Renmin Ribao June 18 1958; Xinhua same date
CHINA Government, Foreign Ministry Commentary of June 29, 1958, 
in China Supports... p. 180
Xinhua July 27
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have been built into a front permitting the trend to war to 
be nipped in the bud.
The use of such a theme could only be regarded as a 
significant step in the Sino-Soviet polemic, and we do 
indeed find the term explicitly employed in a major Renmin 
Ribao editorial where it is stated that the peace forces 
must go into action, and "not appease or tolerate the acts 
of aggression..."^
The phrase "peace forces" also probably served another 
function in the Chinese discourse, that of a replacement 
for the Socialist Camp in describing the balance of forces 
in the world system.
This evolution was not unilinear. For brief periods, 
Chinese statements would make sallies in this direction, 
before retracing their steps for a while, and then doing 
the same thing again. This shows that the CPC was moving 
towards an assessment of the world situation where the 
socialist camp would no longer be present as a positive 
force, but had not yet arrived at that point. The period 
in question was actually crucial in this change. Certain 
highly official and necessarily carefully-worded statements 
during the crisis in July 1958 omit mention of the 
socialist camp in discussing the grouping-together of 
progressive forces in contexts where one would expect it to 
be obligatory. The following phrase from the Chinese 
Government Statement of July 16 1958 is a good example:
"Together with the peoples of the Asian and African 
countries and other peace-loving countries and peoples 
the world over, the six hundred million Chinese people 
will give all-out support to the Arab people's just 
struggle."
Remain Ribao ed July 17 1958; China Supports.., p. 205 
CHINA Government, Statement of July 16 1958; ibid p 181-2
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It is true that the socialist camp was hardly an organised 
body, but this was perhaps not the main problem. At this 
particular moment the Soviet leadership actually seemed to 
have veered away from liberalism in the direction of a more 
dictatorial approach, if this is how we are to interpret 
some strong criticisms Khrushchev made of the Yugoslav 
leadership on June 3, followed by the execution of former 
Hungarian leader Imre Nagy on June 17.^® The issue may 
mainly have been one of control over the socialist camp, of 
making it a more organised instrument of the Soviet line. 
And the problem for the Chinese was precisely the content 
of that line.
This was a period in which the Chinese decision-makers were 
in fact experimenting with slightly different models by 
which to apprehend the key features of the international 
system.
The definition of that system was not just a theoretical 
question, but above all a practical one; the nature of the 
forces at work and their relationship to one another was 
inseparable from their practice. The general formulation 
of the East Wind prevailing over the West was not just a 
statement of faith but rather an estimation of the likely 
outcome of concrete instances in which the different forces 
tested strength with one another, and was in turn likely to 
be modified by the experience of such trials of strength.
The CPC's perception of the different actors was thus 
modified in the course of the year 1958 according to their 
behaviour in concrete conflict situations. We have 
examined the case of their view of relations among the
“ On this question see BYRNES R., "Soviet-Chinese Communist 
Relations auid Yugoslavia” in LONDON K. (ed) Unity and Contradiction, 
New York (Praeger) 1962
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Western powers, for example. But in no instance were 
changes of perception so important as in the Chinese 
appreciation of the role of the Socialist Camp.
Beijing's use of the Korean War as a point of reference has 
already been mentioned. The probability is that this 
served another major purpose besides that of domestic 
mobilisation, namely as an object lesson to the Soviet 
leadership about what was felt to be one of the major facts 
about international politics - that international détente 
could only be brought about by winning repeated trials of 
strength with imperialism, and certainly not by pinning 
hopes on the US leadership:
"The Korean armistice was the result of the telling 
blows inflicted by the Korean people and the Chinese 
People's Volunteers upon the United States aggressors 
who could not but concede defeat. . . . [This] was a great 
victory for the forces of peace in testingr strençth 
with the forces of war. This victory exposed American 
imperialism as a paper tiger and greatly inspired the 
peace-loving people the world over, particularly the 
fighting will of Asian and African peoples against 
colonialism. At the same time, it upset the 
aggressive plan of the United States for world 
domination and benefited the struggle for the 
relaxation of tension."**
The points made above about the possibilities for China to 
take advantage of the geographically-overstretched nature 
of the US world position would apply many times over to the 
socialist camp as a whole, if only it could co-ordinate its 
policy. It may even be that the simplistic assumptions of 
the Cold War would have led some observers in the West to 
overestimate the degree of homogeneity within the socialist 
camp, to the advantage of the latter. For example, the
following analysis by A.D. Barnett carries such an 
implication:
** Renmin Ribao July 27 1958 (our emphasis)
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"During 1958, the skill with which they [the socialist 
countries] shifted the focus of world tension rapidly 
from Iraq and Lebanon to Taiwan and then to Berlin, 
keeping the West off balance, illustrated the 
advantages which accrue to an alliance of partners 
facing outward from opposite ends of the Eurasian 
continent.
In practice, the actual policy co-ordination was not there, 
but the "advantages" referred to were obvious enough, and
could hardly have escaped the Chinese leadership.
Struggles in the developing world could obviously not be 
turned on and off as though their capitals were 'under the 
control of international communism' (in the words of the 
Eisenhower Doctrine), but they could be supported by the 
socialist countries to heighten the problems faced by the 
West. One article of the period, for example, quotes a 
leading US decision-maker to the effect that Lebanon, the 
Middle East as a whole, Algeria and the rest of North 
Africa, Indonesia and Latin America were points of great 
danger to the US.^ The question was simply one of
engaging the enemy simultaneously on different fronts, one 
of the most important objective reasons for the 
constitution of a united front grouping practical
struggles. These potential advantages would in turn create 
a strong stimulus for socialist-camp unity, based on 
political principles.
It could be argued that many of these points about how to 
analyse the enemy etc. may not necessarily have been 
directed to the Soviet leadership but could just as well 
reflect 'line-struggle' within China. This dimension was 
undoubtedly present. The whole campaign of study around 
Mao's "Imperialism and All Reactionaries are Paper Tigers" 
served to unite domestic opinion around a certain line, and
BARNETT A.D. Communist China and Asia p. 371
SONG Zhen, op cit.
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thus implicitly to rectify what was considered erroneous
In addition to the general issue of domestic opinion, there 
is the more precise question of possible conflicts of line 
within the Chinese leadership. While Zagoria is probably 
correct in saying that differences in line were mainly on 
domestic issues, it is quite possible that some clashes on 
strategic issues were being hammered out at this time. In 
particular, a crucial meeting of the Military Affairs 
Commission in Beijing closed on July 22 1958, after being 
in session for about two months;?* it is likely that 
important strategic decisions were taken there, and these 
might have an impact upon the kind of lines which were 
being put forward in late July of that year. There were 
moreover specific debates on questions of military line 
which have a certain relevance to foreign policy, as we 
will argue shortly.
However, having said all this, it still appears that the 
main point of reference was a changing perception of the 
role of the Soviet Union and the Socialist Camp. This is 
shown in the fact that at the height of the Middle Eastern 
crisis the Chinese press began to propagate a new image of 
the world balance of forces, with very important positional 
consequences :
"At present, the balance of forces is unfavourable as 
never before to the US and British
imperialists Imperialism has lost its superior
position, not only politically, but militarily as 
well. The world domain of imperialism may be broken 
through at any time or any place. Its front is too 
long to be defended and its leaks are too numerous to 
be stopped up....If the imperialist aggressors, who 
have lost their senses, insist on a test of strength, 
then all those who refuse to be slaves must make the 
necessary preparations." ?*
?* see China Quarterly 1974, p. 758; POLLACK op. cit. p. 88
?* Renmin Ribao ed., July 20 1958; China Supports... p. 214-5 [our 
emphasis].
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This new assessment of the balance of forces, which brings 
together the theme of the irrationality of imperialism with 
that of testing strength, in fact also involved a new way 
of defining the forces within the progressive camp.
It has already been remarked that the use of the term 
"peace forces" tended to serve as a cover for the less 
frequent use of the term "socialist camp". But the term 
"peace forces" was itself an umbrella term encompassing 
what the Chinese had for some time been referring to as two 
distinct forces, namely the forces of socialism and those 
of national independence. We have already seen that one of 
the major modifications in the CPC's model of the world 
system in the period following Mao's talk with Anna Louise 
Strong was precisely the evolution of such an 
understanding.
The basic question for united front policies thus became a 
question of how to build unity between these two forces. 
This remained the case in the period after US armed 
intervention in Lebanon, but the crucial difference is that 
a new terminology now began to be employed, according to 
which the socialist component in this alignment of forces 
could be referred to without specifically identifying it 
with the Socialist Camp as an organised body.
The main new term now used was that of the "socialist 
revolutionary movement." Thus one of the most important 
editorials of the period asserts that:
"The advance of the socialist revolutionary movement 
and the advance of the national independence movement 
in Asia, Africa and Latin America are the basic 
ingredients of our age."
Renmin Ribao ed. July 21 1958; Xinhua same date.
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The implications of such a change are considerable. The 
"movement" referred to is less clearly identified with any 
particular institutional framework, and perhaps implies an 
identification with the actual mobilisation of the masses. 
It could be hypothesised to include, for example, the 
hoped-for upsurge of socialist construction in China’s Leap 
Forward, together with the mass mobilisation of the anti­
imperialist demonstrations. These phenomena, if they were 
seen, at one level, as an expression of China's role in the 
awakening of the Asian-African nations, were also 
undoubtedly viewed as part of a process of regenerating 
communism.
The usage in this new phase appears to be systematic, 
because in the theoretical article by Song Zhen from which 
we have already quoted, also published in July, we find 
similar expressions repeatedly used in characterising the 
new world distribution of forces and also the unity- 
building process which was occurring on this basis.
"In the era of the international proletarian socialist 
revolution, the mutual support and aid between the 
national independence movement and the world socialist 
revolutionary movement are shaping an increasingly 
mighty world political force [shijie zhengzhi
liliang] [the situation of the East Wind
prevailing over the West Wind] not only shows the 
aspect of the socialist revolutionary movement’s 
burgeoning development and the continuous advance of 
the national independence movement, but also the 
aspect of the daily reinforcement of the unity and 
friendly co-operation between the socialist 
revolutionary movement and the national independence 
movement. This unity and relationship of friendly 
co-operation is in essence a relationship of 
revolutionary alliance."
The article stresses that the unity between these two 
currents can be concretized in actions to check the trend 
to war:
"It is just because the imperialist camp is in a 
position of such clear inferiority compared to the
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world forces [sic - shijie liliang] that it cannot 
expect to find a way out in any military adventure, 
and this points to one extremely important fact - as 
the unity of the peace forces becomes more 
consolidated, as the struggle against and exposure of 
imperialism is carried on with increasing resolution 
and in greater depth, so the possibility of halting 
aggression and halting war also grows." *
This argument seems to reflect an image of great potential 
for the forces of socialism, combined with scepticism about 
its existing institutional form, the Socialist Camp. In 
fact, the author only refers to the "Socialist Camp headed 
by the Soviet Union" when speaking of nuclear deterrence, 
and this may indicate that the CPC, losing faith in the 
USSR as in incarnation of the progressive trend, was 
beginning to accept that its role would have to be confined 
to that specific field. If this were true, it might 
provide an interesting insight to clarify the reason why 
the Sino-Soviet summit of July 1958 was almost entirely 
concerned with military questions, to the exclusion of 
other international issues.
PERIOD OF THE MAO-KHRUSHCHEV SUMMIT
These issues came to a head in the last few days of the 
month of July and the beginning of August 1958 after the 
Soviet leadership surprised the Chinese by accepting a 
Western plan for a summit put forward by Harold Macmillan, 
which the CPC had previously described as a "useless 
counterproposal".^® In the period surrounding the Beijing 
summit, the underlying issue was one of the relationship 
between local and global conflict, which was viewed in a 
totally different way by the two parties. Both agreed that 
there was a risk of escalation. The Soviets drew the
SONG Zhen op. cit.
see Manchester Guardian July 27 1958
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conclusion that it was necessary to act responsibly. In 
the words of Khrushchev's letter to Macmillan,
"Having broken out at one point, it can easily flare 
up, like a fire in a strong wind, and grow into a 
world conflagration. All talk of 'little' or 'local' 
wars in these conditions is no more than a naive 
illusion and all hope for a limited nature of military 
operations is deception or self-deception."
For the Chinese, the opening of another front against the 
West meant that "the world domain of imperialism can be 
broken through at any time or any place" The way to
neutralise the risk of global war was to consolidate the 
anti-imperialist forces via practical struggles.
The summit plan was eventually abandoned on August 1 
because of disagreement over terms of reference, but the 
bried period during which it was being seriously discussed 
was also that during which the Chinese and Soviet leaders 
hastily arranged their own summit.
The abandonment of the summit meeting with the West, and 
the actual holding of the Sino-Soviet summit produced a 
marked, but somewhat curious, change in the phrasing of 
Chinese statements about the world situation.
On the one hand there was a sudden switch to restoring the 
theme of the role of the Socialist Camp - a move so abrupt 
that it only accentuates the absence of that theme earlier. 
On the other hand, this move was accompanied by an even 
sharper development of critical themes which now make 
Chinese articles read like a full-scale dress rehearsal for 
the Sino-Soviet polemic.
ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, Documents on 
International Affairs 1958 p. 301
Renmin Ribao ed. July 20 1958; China Supports p 214
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Thus references to the Socialist camp, which had for some 
time been very sparse, suddenly became a central element in 
Chinese articles. The core of the united grouping of peace 
forces, which the CPC consistently saw as an alliance 
between the socialist and nationalist currents, was now 
formulated in such a way that the socialist current in this 
grouping was once again identified in the original form of 
the Socialist Camp headed by the Soviet Union. Renmin 
Ribao described the Soviet Union as "a loyal friend of the 
Middle Eastern people and a great pillar of world peace," 
and the Socialist Camp as 'the bulwark of peace'.^ 
Another major Renmin Ribao article published on July 29 
gave a historical retrospective of all the recent 
initiatives of the Soviet Union in support of the national 
movement and went on to say:
"The imperialists are always slandering the socialist 
countries' sympathy and active support for the 
national liberation movement as 'expansion', 'indirect 
aggression' and 'infiltration'. Being imperialists, 
they indeed cannot understand why the socialist 
countries could have consistently extended such help 
without any selfish aims, and it is not at all strange 
that, because of their past experience in dealing with 
imperialism, certain countries and people who have 
long suffered oppression and aggression, do not at 
once fully understand the active assistance of the 
socialist countries."
This implies a renewed emphasis on working to create the 
mutual confidence necessary to build unity between the 
existing socialist states and the national movements.
However, this new tone of fulsome praise for the USSR in no 
way meant China was abandoning those themes concerning the 
world balance of forces and the need to test strength with 
imperialism locally, which it had been putting forward 
hitherto. All that happened is that the central issue of
Renmin Ribao July 25 1958; Xinhua same date 
Renmin Ribao July 29 1958; Xinhua July 30.
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the relationship between socialist and nationalist forces 
was being examined critically under another angle. The 
same article goes on to say that
'Today in the Middle East another link in the 
imperialist chain had been broken. Tomorrow yet 
another link would be broken in East Asia, Africa or 
Latin America. Now that the East Wind prevailed over 
the West, colonialism and imperialism would not be 
able to escape their final ruin.'^
It seems what the Chinese were really doing was this: while 
selectively praising those initiatives they did happen to 
agree with - for example, weighty publicity was given to 
the fact that the Soviet Union and Bulgaria had held 
military manoeuvres, with the purpose of discouraging 
Turkey from an eventual attack on Iraq®^ - in their more 
general praise of the Soviet Union and the Socialist Camp 
they were in reality making a very strong, and implicitly 
critical, statement about what socialist camp policy ought 
to be.
The fact that the two nations' leaderships were really 
doing their own thing under the cover of apparent agreement 
is reflected in the Communiqué issued after the summit 
which appears as a somewhat uneasy mixture of 'Soviet* 
lines spliced together with 'Chinese' lines. For example, 
it combines a statement to the effect that "the primary 
task at the moment" is to bring about arms reduction and a 
halt to nuclear testing, as well as elimination of blocs 
etc, with a statement that if necessary the peace- and 
freedom-loving peoples will "wipe out clean the imperialist 
aggressors and so establish an everlasting world peace.
Renmin Ribao July 29 1958, op cit 
Renmin Ribao July 29 1958, op cit
CHINA Communist Party and SOVIET UNION Communist Party, Joint 
Communiqué (of the Beijing Summit), text in Xinhua August 3 1958
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The above analysis is confirmed by a remarkable article 
published by Renmin Ribao a few days later, on August 8, 
1958. This article is worth quoting at some length, since 
it sums up in a concentrated way the lessons the CPC drew 
from the Middle Eastern crisis of 1957-8, and in so doing 
strikingly anticipates the style and content of the 
Sino-Soviet polemic of the early '60s. The central issue 
is the line around which to build the unity of progressive 
forces, with its key aspect being unity between the 
socialist camp and the national movement, and in 
illustrating this, links are drawn between the experience 
of the recent conflict in the Middle East and the 
experience of Korea and Indochina, as a background to 
developing theses concerning general issues of war and 
peace.
The article confirms the view that there was a total 
divergence between the Chinese and Soviet leaderships on 
how to prevent local conflict becoming global, and that 
this was seen by the Chinese as a central issue of 
principle. The question was the line around which the 
progressive alignment of forces should be built, and what 
its target should be:
"While advocating peace, we should point out the 
source of the danger of war, the need to unite the 
forces of peace to fight against the forces of war, 
the absolute possibility of victory in the struggle 
and that the imperialist system will be eliminated if 
the war maniacs impose war on the world."
This standpoint is applied specifically to the experience 
of recent international conflicts, including the most 
recent in the Middle East, in the following terms:
"The imperialists like to frighten the nervous with 
the choice between submission or war. Their agents 
frequently spread the nonsensical idea that peace can 
be achieved only by currying favour and compromising 
with the aggressors. Some soft-hearted advocates of 
peace even naively believe that in order to relax
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tension at all costs the enemy must not be provoked. 
They dare not denounce the war provokers, they are 
unwilling to trace the responsibility of war and war 
danger and to differentiate between right and wrong on 
the issue of war and peace. Some groundlessly 
conclude that peace can be gained only when there is 
no armed resistance against the attacks of the 
imperialists and the colonialists and when there is no 
bitter struggle against them. But countless
historical facts have proved that the stand of these 
peace advocates is useless."
The article then sums up the experience of conflicts from 
Korea to the immediately preceding crisis over Iraq, only 
to conclude:
"Had the attitude adopted against the aggressors been 
one of vacillation and compromise, the US and British 
aggressors would have been more arrogant, the flames 
of war might have been spread to the Iraqi Republic 
and the United Arab Republic and another World War 
have broken out."®^
Taking account of the programmatic tone of this editorial, 
we would perhaps be justified in dating the beginning of 
the Sino-Soviet polemic to this particular juncture. The 
overall approach of meeting force with force, growing out 
of the critique of tendencies to appeasement, lends support 
to the hypothesis that the move against the offshore 
islands was intended to demonstrate how a socialist country 
should work in opening up another front against 
imperialism.
But above all, what is particularly significant for our 
purposes are the lessons which the article draws concerning 
the joining-together between socialist and other 
progressive forces, in the context of the issue of war and 
peace. Thus, it is argued, the USA
"tried by all means to obstruct the joining of the 
socialist, anti-colonialist and anti-war forces.
Renmin Ribao August 8 1958; Xinhua same date.
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United States imperialism and its agents have been 
threatening and inducing people to adopt a policy of 
'minding their own business and not bothering about 
others' affairs' on the world issue of peace and war. 
This is aimed at disbanding the forces of peace as 
well as oppressing the isolated and helpless countries 
that fear struggle and oppose the joining of forces."
The above is a strong statement to the effect that 
resolution in opposition to imperialism constitutes a 
decisive condition for the unity and cohesion of those 
forces which were considered to play a positive role in the 
world system.
It will finally be necessary briefly to examine how the 
Chinese leadership assessed the changed parameters of the 
conflict regionally, in the aftermath of the change of 
regime in Iraq.
NEW SPATIAL LOGIC FOLLOWING THE COUP IN IRAQ
Notwithstanding the strength of Chinese insistence upon the 
socialist countries' role in warning off the West, the CPC 
remained true to their basic assessment, expressed in the 
intermediate zone idea set out in the Anna Louise Strong 
interview, that the most urgent issue was centred in the 
developing countries, and pitted them against Western 
imperialism. Their struggle was assessed as a successful 
one, which had the concrete effect of taking the heat off 
the Socialist Camp.
It was thus remarked that alongside the failure of the 
Eisenhower Doctrine and the Baghdad Pact, the plan to 
surround the socialist countries with the "chain" of SEATO 
and NATO had collapsed with the failure of its "link" in 
the Baghdad Pact.^ But this happened because of the 
struggles of the peoples directly affected, and the CPC 
continued to affirm that US military pacts were, in the
PENG Shuzhi op cit
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words of Renmin Ribao commentator, directed "primarily 
against those nations in Asia and Africa which are fighting 
for or defending their independence."
It was in fact emphasised that the direct threat to the 
Soviet Union was less immediate than it had been in the 
different configuration of the international system which 
prevailed at the time of World War II. One article from 
the period proposes the argument that the USA, like Hitler 
and the Japanese before it, is using anti-Soviet slogans as 
a coyer for its real ambitions. But the differences are 
also remarked upon:
"Germany is very close to the Soviet Union, and for 
this reason the German fascists were able to attack 
it. Japan is adjacent to the Soviet Union, but 
because their strength was not as great as Hitler's, 
the Japanese fascists could only attack China and the 
Pacific; before they got as far as the Soviet Union 
they were defeated. The United States is very distant 
from the Soviet Union and they are separated by an 
enormous expanse of territory so that, for this and 
other reasons, the USA would have great difficulty in 
attacking the Soviet Union. The practical
significance of the United States' anti-Soviet war 
slogans in the post-war period is just to suppress the 
American people and use the appearance of 'peace' to 
commit aagression against all countries apart from the 
USSR."
Such formulations can be regarded as foreshadowing the 
concept subsequently advanced in the Sino-Soviet polemic to 
the effect that world 'contradictions' were focussed in 
Asia, Africa and Latin America, and it is interesting that 
they should have been discussed at a time when the Chinese 
had only recently been experimenting with formulations 
which omitted reference to the Socialist Camp in the main 
analysis of the world balance of forces. The underlying 
logic is that the characteristics of the international
Renmin Ribao Commentator Dec. 6 1958; SWB 827/10
BIN Fu, "Guoji 
1958, 22 (Nov 20) p. 11
douzheng zhong di bianzhengfa", Shijie Zhishi
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system are not solely determined by the state of 
Soviet-American relations. The greatest significance of 
events in the Middle East from the Chinese point of view 
was thus probably the maturing of the 'force' represented 
by the developing countries, which was ultimately to 
replace the Socialist Camp in the Chinese analysis as the 
main anti-imperialist actor.
The united front could at one level be considered the 
process of formation of this force as a definite entity, at 
least this was perceived as the objective process which 
could be promoted by means of policies. How, then, were 
the events of July 1958 considered to have influenced this 
process?
At one level there was an overall impression that the 
general movement of developing countries was gathering 
strength. Although the term 'third world' was not yet 
widely used, certain ideas put forward in the context of 
the East Wind thesis anticipate it. Thus, apart from being 
part of the Arab people's anti-imperialist movement, the 
struggles in the Middle East were described as an essential 
tendency of the Asian, African and Latin American 
movements, and of the movement of the world's people.®® It 
is interesting to note in this context that it was round 
about this point in time when a number of Chinese sources 
began to treat Latin America alongside Asia and Africa as 
part of a single current in international affairs.
However, at another level of analysis it is important to 
note that the CPC continued to employ very much of a 
spatial frame of reference in describing the new trend.
It is as if, in the process of struggling to overthrow 
imperialism's geopolitical strategy, the developing
®® SONG Zhen, "Bei yapo minzu biran zhansheng diguozhuyi", Xuexi 
1958, July
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countries could bring to realisation the domino process 
which the adversary feared. Such an outcome was in fact 
implied insofar as those concrete struggles which the 
Chinese defined as forming part of the united front 
necessarily took place in contradiction to a certain 
spatial logic of imperialist policy which to some extent 
determined where anti-imperialist struggles would arise, 
and how they would be related to one another.
In terms of the manner in which the national movements 
contradicted such already-existing Western strategies, the 
deductions drawn about likely future trends in the Middle 
East are not unexpected. Treaty organisations had been 
viewed as a major means of consolidating links between pro- 
Western actors and as a way of co-ordinating their 
collective forces against radical actors. Hence, one 
obvious result of the Iraqi revolution would be to 
undermine the Baghdad Pact as an institution for organising 
US power and co-ordinating those actors favourable to it, 
in a local context. Iraq was seen as having constituted 
the "foundation stone" of imperialist influence in the 
a r e a , w h i l e  the former regime was said to have "sullied 
the name of the Arab states" by its role in the Baghdad 
Pact.*0 Hence the great significance of the revolution in 
removing this important element in imperialist strategy. 
The Iraqi revolution was considered likely "to destroy the 
painstakingly managed Baghdad Pact organisation, thoroughly 
disintegrate the colonialist system and [show] that the 
Eisenhower doctrine was fundamentally b a n k r u p t . I f  this 
key strategy of imperialism were in the process of being 
negated, the outcome might logically be to facilitate the
WU Cheng "Mei Ying longduan ziben zai Zhong Dong di qiong tu mo 
lu", Jingji Yanjiu 1958 8 p. 53
PENG Shuzhi op cit p 31
DENG Tuo op cit.
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building of a new international grouping of progressive 
forces to which China aspired.
A more specific result of the negation of existing 
imperialist strategies would be in terms of the gaming 
models discussed earlier. We have already mentioned, in 
the context of events in Syria and Jordan in 1957, how the 
Chinese perceived the relationship between adjacent areas, 
and argued that a 'domino’-type process was considered to 
occur in both directions: imperialism had its strategy of 
moving to take one country after another step-by-step, but 
the independence movements could reverse this process. 
Following this logic, in the aftermath of the coup in Iraq 
there was an explicit assumption that the new trend in the 
world system would give rise to further changes of regime 
in some states.
Since, according to this reasoning, Jordan and Iraq had 
been used as pawns against Syria, it is not surprising that 
following the revolution in Iraq, there was an assumption 
that Jordan might soon go the same way. The domestic 
cohesion of pro-Western forces might be shaken. It was 
stated that "the victory of the Iraqi revolution is having 
a direct effect on Jordan"^^, and that under the influence 
of events in Iraq, Jordan was "tottering as if about to 
fall".^^ Renmin Ribao pointedly remarked that the
Jordanian people
'know their way out, especially so since the 
establishment of the United Arab Republic and the 
Iraqi Republic."**
LI Fanzhen and CHENG Liangping, "Yuedan, you yi zuo kuai yao 
baofa di houshan", Shijie Zhishi 1958, 17 pp 23-4
WU Cheng, op cit
** Renmin Ribao July 18 1958; Xinhua same date
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In this context. Song Zhen's article in Xuexi dating from 
the same period, gives a more detailed account of the 
Western powers' dilemma:
"If they continue to rely on Beirut and Amman, in that 
case the Lebanese people and Jordanian people will 
inevitably unleash an ever-broadening struggle against 
the foreign interventionists; if they distance 
themselves from Lebanon and Jordan, in that case the 
reactionary Chamoun authorities and King Hussein, who 
rely on the support and provisions of foreign powers, 
will quickly succumb to the battering of the popular 
forces.
But the spatial level of analysis is not only applicable 
within the Arab region as such. Western strategy had a 
wider aspect which could be seen as one of attempting to 
manage the transition from the colonial system in such a 
way that their interests could be maintained. Renmin Ribao 
thus wrote that US intervention in the intermediate zone 
"applies first of all to the colonies and semi-colonies 
which the old British and French imperialists no longer 
find it possible to rule", and there was a corresponding 
assumption of increasing collaboration between the 
Western powers. While this would clearly imply dangers for 
the national movements, it would also heighten 
consciousness, because such collaboration 'will greatly add 
to the awakening of the people of Asia and Africa and 
throughout the world.
In this context, we find that one of the most interesting 
and most concrete predictions the CPC made about the 
results of the Middle Eastern events of 1958 concerned the 
idea of a link with Africa, conceptualised in a markedly 
s pat i a1 manner.
SONG Zhen, op. cit
Renmin Ribao July 29 1958; China Supports,,, p. 232 
Renmin Ribao July 18 1958; Xinhua same date
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THE L IN K  WITH AFRICA
In fact, increased attention paid to this area in the 
Chinese media dates to the early months of 1958. At that 
time, the major assessment of the world situation published 
under the signature of Dong Feng (the East Wind) asserted 
strongly that "Africa has already ceased to be a sleeping 
continent", and that "the whole of Africa is beginning to 
boil, before arguing in an implicitly spatial dimension 
that "The tide of the national independence movement has 
surged from Asia to Africa."^® In this process, the Middle 
East was probably considered to fulfill a crucial 
intermediary role, both historically and also in a certain 
sense geographically. Another article explored these 
spatial aspects in a striking formulation:
"The trend of development of the movement has been to 
develop [fazhan] from Southeast Asia to the Near and 
Middle East, then to expand [kuoda] to Africa; within 
the African continent, first comes North Africa, and 
afterwards it spreads [kuozhan] to central, west and 
east Africa.
The logic of the broadening of the range of forces from 
which the anti-imperialist united front could be built was 
thus clearly seen not merely in a dimension of mutual 
encouragement, but also in terms of geographical 
contiguity.
North Africa, the first area to experience the "spread" 
from the Near and Middle East, was viewed as a distinct 
world-political region with its own characteristics; 
according to a Renmin Ribao article published in May 1958, 
"North Africa's liberation is indivisible", and within this
DONG Feng, "Wanlong jingshen po lang qian jin, Shijie Zhishi 
1958, 8, p 7
JIN Zhonghua, "Ya Fei renmin di da tnanjie", Shijie Zhishi 1958, 
2, p. 13
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Algeria is seen as the "hot-spot" The Dong Feng
article also characterised North Africa as the "front line" 
of the anti-colonial struggle, and Algeria as the "beacon" 
of Africa.
Given this historical-geographical dynamic, it is logical 
that developments in the national movement in the Middle 
East should be seen as having important repercussions in 
geographically adjacent areas. Thus the Suez War, 
according to Dong Feng, already "weakened the imperialists' 
strategic position in West Asia and North Africa." And in 
the period following the events of the summer of 1958 in 
the Middle East, it is not surprising that the Chinese 
leadership looked to a renewed upsurge of the African 
independence struggle. In September, China was to become 
the first socialist country to recognise the Algerian PRG.
November 30 was named as "Imperialists Quit Africa Day", 
and the Chinese Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity said in 
a statement that "Africa, regarded as the 'dark continent' 
in the past, has now become the forefront against 
imperialism" .
This seems to imply a shifting of the focus of struggle 
from the Middle East to Africa in the latter part of 1958, 
but, in terms of the above analysis, it is clear that this 
shift of focus was seen as taking place under the influence 
of events in the Middle East.
The rationale for this was set out in an interesting 
discussion of the meaning and historical significance of
Renmin Ribao, "Ba zhiminzhuyi cong Bei Fei lian gen chan diao". 
May 3 1958
DONG Feng op cit
KHALILI J.M. "Sino-Arab Relations" in Asian Survey 1958 p. 685
CHINESE Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity, "Statement" of 
November 30 1958; Summary of World Broadcasts 818/13
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the term 'Middle East' in the article by Peng Shnzhi, who 
defines the term as relating to an area which possesses a 
natural unity, that of South-West Asia and North Africa. 
This unity is expressed today in political terms:
"the present-day Arab people's national liberation 
struggle has turned into the forward position of anti­
imperialism. It stretches from Morocco and Algeria in 
North Africa, through Egypt and the Sudan and all the 
way to Iraq in South-West Asia, and other Arab areas. 
This anti-imperialist front holds the Afro-Asian 
peoples' struggle closely bound together."
But the imperialists, Peng argues, used the term "Middle 
East" in a special way to cover up the true identity of 
the independence movement and its real boundaries. In the 
nineteenth century they used the term to refer to Iran, the 
outer Caucusus and Afghanistan, and the area on the Eastern 
Mediterranean shore was referred to as "Near East" This 
reflected England and Russia's ambitions in the area. But 
in the twentieth century, when oil ambitions became 
paramount, the term was expanded to include the Near East, 
Egypt, Sudan, Iran, Libya, and West Pakistan. However in 
doing so, the powers were acting like a fool lifting a rock 
to drop it on his own feet:
"if imperialism amalgamates these areas for its own 
base interests, then - with the Arab people's 
liberation struggle constituting the centre of the 
anti-imperialist struggle - it can be predicted that 
they have not only prepared a grave for imperialism in 
area of the Middle East, but also that the African 
area is likely quite soon to become the final 
battlefield in the anti-imperialist struggle".
Concretely, the landmarks in this 'spreading' process were 
considered to be the defeat of British-French aggression 
and then of US aggression against the UAR, the success of 
the people of Iraq in breaking "the chains of the Baghdad 
Pact", the foundation of the Algerian PRG, the defeat of
PENG Shuzhi op cit. p. 28
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US-British aggression in Jordan and Lebanon, and the 
proclamation of independence by Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia, 
Ghana and Guinea.
This provides some insight into how the united front was 
considered to operate in concrete terms. It developed in 
opposition to the historical logic of what imperialism was 
seeking to do at that time, in a definite spatial context. 
The Chinese were hoping that the process of transition to 
a post-colonial order would slip out of control from the 
West's point of view, and they sought to promote the united 
front in such a manner as to maximise these difficulties. 
Hence the significance of the emergence of a new 'front' of 
struggle in the area still under colonial rule.
Even more important, this upsurge in the colonial areas 
occurred at the same time as the West was still in the 
grips of a major problem in another dimension. Thus, if 
one of the West's problems was to retain control over the 
situation in the colonial empires, another was how to find 
a form which would maintain Western interests in those 
areas of the developing world which were already 
independent; this was a particularly crucial issue in the 
longer term.
FORESHADOWING THE CONCEPT OF •NEO-COLONIALISM'
It is in this context that we can examine the emergence of 
a theme which was to have considerable future importance in 
the articulation of an independent Chinese position at the 
time of the Sino-Soviet polemic, namely a set of concepts 
which anticipate what came to be referred to as neo­
colonialism.
CHINESE Committee for Afro-Asiain Solidarity op cit.
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A primary source is a passage bearing every appearance of 
a carefully-formulated programmatic statement which occurs 
in a major Renmin Ribao editorial entitled "Victory Belongs 
to the Arab People", published immediately following the 
most acute phase in the Middle Eastern crisis:
"In the case of those countries which have obtained 
legal independence, wherever this independence is 
still incomplete or not consolidated, the imperialists 
have tried hard to maintain a tight grip on them, 
economically, politically and militarily, or tried to 
force them back into their old subjection. The main 
task before the peoples of these countries is, 
therefore to struggle to obtain national independence 
in the fullest sense of the term"
These ideas clearly anticipate the issue in the early
1960s, where the CPC demarcated itself from the Soviet
leadership over the letter's tendency to depict the 
independence movement as a struggle nearing completion, and 
hence a secondary issue. A number of references to the old 
regime in Iraq, and to other Arab countries, show how the 
Chinese considered their sovereignty to have been 
incomplete, and the struggle to change this state of 
affairs was obviously seen as an ongoing one, and as a 
major issue in world affairs. Reference to Iraq's
dependency on Britain through the unequal treaties from the 
1930s onwards is a case in point. But some of the
debate actually went further, and even touched upon issues 
later raised in the more technical debate on the theory of 
dependency, thus anticipating issues even more far-reaching 
than those raised in the Polemic.
The article by Peng Shuzhi throws some interesting light on 
the reasoning behind the later official line on neo­
colonialism, in that its author sees indirect rule in the
Renmin Ribao Editorial, "Victory Belongs to the Arab People" 
August 3 1958; China Supports... p. 232
DENG Tuo op cit.
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Middle East as a distinct phase in the history of 
imperialism, and also the struggle against this as the 
necessary task of the current phase.
It was, he reasons, the outbursts of popular struggle in 
the inter-war period which "forced the imperialists into a 
position where they had no choice but to change the form of 
their rule with regard to the Arab states". They thus 
instituted an incomplete form of independence in which they 
themselves retained control. "But the net result of this 
was to open up a new stage in the modern liberation 
struggle of the Arab people."
This article is particularly interesting, in that without 
employing the terminology, some of the author's ideas were 
apparently along the same lines as those expressed in later 
references by dependency theorists to peripheral social 
formations being constituted of elements of different modes 
of production under the auspices of central capital. 
Anticipating Samir Amin, Peng argues that far from 
stimulating development, imperialism deliberately 
maintained feudal structures in a number of a r e a s a n d  
even industrial workers are seen as being faced by a 
mixture of capitalist and semi-feudal exploitation. He 
sees imperialism as the main reason for the Arab countries 
being industrially backward, and their socio-political 
development unbalanced.
AWAKENING OF THE EAST
Thus the advances of the national movement were viewed 
under the twin aspects of struggle against formal 
colonialism and against neo-colonialism. These were to
Compare Amin's argiment in Iraq et Syrie, 1960-60, Paris 
(Minuit) 1982.
PENG Shuzhi op. cit p. 29
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become linked in a current of ideas which was just 
beginning to emerge, which was the theme of the awakening 
of the East.
This concept was a latent but significant one, the 
development of which can be traced through documents
such as the report on Cultural Exchange entrusted to the 
Chinese representative at the Cairo Conference where 
emphasis was placed upon the great historical contributions 
the Asiatic people had made to civilisation, and on the 
fact that now "African and Asian countries have become 
masters of their own destiny" . During 1958 it was 
argued in various sources that in historical terms 
Arab-Chinese cultural exchanges had "brought about the 
progress of world civilisation" and that today this
process was being resumed. Analysing the background to the 
Iraqi revolution, in order to explain its significance, it 
was argued that
"it is patently obvious that the so-called Western 
'civilisation' has involved the Arab people in an 
untold depth of affliction".
but that this dismal era had now come to an end. "Economic 
bankruptcy and cultural backwardness" were viewed as the 
legacy of i m p e r i a l i s m . But now, the implication was, 
the historical creativity of the Asian-African peoples 
could develop freely again.
CHU Tu-nan, "Report on Cultural Exchange...", Cairo, December 
27 1957, Survey of China Mainland Press 1682 pp 46-8
ZHÜ Changeai, MA Shuhua and ZHANG Peide, "Zhonguo shi Alabo ge 
guo renmin di zhencheng pengyou", Jiaoxue yu Yanjiu 1958, 8.
GUO Yingde, "Diguozhuyi qinlue Zhong Dong Alabo guojia di xing 
shi", Beijing Daxue Xuebao (Social Science section) 1958, 3, p. 12
PENG Shuzhi, op. cit, p. 25
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There are clear signs of a shift here in comparison even to 
the viewpoint set out in the Anna Louise Strong interview, 
which clearly sees the logic of the struggle in the rest of 
the world as being determined by that between the two 
'camps', and defined as an 'intermediate zone' as a 
function of this. In comparison, the developing countries 
are now seen more as an active force determining the 
overall logic of the system. An interesting link may also 
exist with the abandonment of the traditional emphasis on 
inter-imperialist contradiction. Now, imperialism is seen 
more as a homogeneous entity, pitted in a great struggle 
against the oppressed nations. Again, the lessening 
emphasis on the socialist camp as an institution may 
reflect not just dissatisfaction with concrete Soviet 
policies, but also a sliding towards a somewhat different 
model of the world system. This current of ideas was to 
surface shortly when China became more seriously 
disillusioned with the prospects of the socialist camp as 
a world actor, as with the statement on the tenth 
anniversary of the victory of the Chinese revolution that 
this event "has given the lie to the old reactionary idea 
spread by the Western bourgeoisie - that the coloured races 
are inferio r, that the white peoples alone are superior 
peoples, that the East is backward and the West is advanced 
and so on and so forth."
It was in connection with the campaign around the 
collection of documents on "Imperialism and all 
Reactionaries are Paper Tigers" that Renmin Ribao published 
another striking editorial which could be considered to 
form part of a group of material anticipating the Sino- 
Soviet polemic. It carries more than a hint of a theme 
which were to resurface briefly later on in Lin Biao's 
"Long Live the Victory of People's War" in referring to a 
leading role for the East in world revolution. This
WANG Chia-hsiang, "The International Significance of the Chinese 
People's Victory" in Ten Glorious Years, Peking (FLP) 1959 p. 281
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editorial sets out to answer the views of "those who think 
that the West is advanced while the East is backward", of 
"people who think that the strength of the West is not to 
be despised", and of "some people who still think it is 
best not to nettle the US imperialists, because that will 
put them into even more of a frenzy and so wouldn't be in 
the interests of world peace."
In arguing that "the forces of socialism and the forces of 
national revolution are converging to become an 
irresistible historical current that is violently shaking 
the last bastions of imperialist reactionary rule"^^^, the 
article thus clearly seems to propose a new image of the 
parameters for united front policies, possibly with the 
peoples of the East at the core.
TAKING THE ENEMY SERIOUSLY TACTICALLY
In the latter part of the year, emphasis upon the need for 
boldness with respect to the overall picture of the 
international system was to some extent tempered by 
insistance on taking the enemy seriously in terms of his 
ability to do harm in concrete conflict situations. This 
twofold approach was stressed by Mao at the end of the year 
in a statement which carries interesting implications for 
the analysis of international conflicts^^, to the effect 
that
"...imperialism and all reactionaries, looked at in 
essence, from a long-term point of view, from a 
strategic point of view, must be seen for what they 
are - paper tigers. On this we should build our 
strategic thinking. On the other hand, they are also
Renmin Ribao Editorial: "Scorn Imperialism and All
Reactionaries" Nov 12 1958. Text in PR Nov 18 1958 pp 11-12
The passage was probably also of relevance to domestic issues, 
in terms of correcting tendencies in the Leap Forward to neglect 
concrete constraints.
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living tigers, iron tigers, real tigers which can eat 
people. On this we should build our tactical
thinking.
In terms of the situation in the Middle East, the feeling 
was that a fresh round of struggle was in store. Thus it 
was warned that
•The USA planned to revive the Baghdad Pact, without 
Baghdad, and tie it up with other blocs under US 
control. In addition, it was contemplating a new 
system of aggression more dangerous than the Baghdad 
Pact. The spearhead of its aggression was now aimed 
at the Indian Ocean region.
More specifically, using the positional images embodied in 
domino or weîqî models which we have already discussed, it 
was apparently felt that the successes of the radical 
movement created positions which could themselves now serve 
as targets for the adversary. Thus it was explicitly 
argued that the United States was
"organising a counter-offensive against the Arab 
national independence movement. In order to hit at 
the backbone of this movement - Iraq and the United 
Arab Republic - the USA deems it necessary to hold at 
al 1 costs the strategic kingdom of Jordan which 
borders on both countries."
Thus, despite the optimism regarding the tide of anti­
imperialism, it was thought necessary to stress that the 
positional dimension in the conflict had in no way been 
transcended.
MAO Zedong, Address to Meeting of the CPC Political Bureau, Dec 
1 1958, quoted in footnote to Selected Works Vol IV Peking (FLP) 1969 
p 99
kermin Ribao Commentator, Dec 6 1958; SWB 827/10
Xinhua Commentary November 4 1958 in Summary of World Broadcasts
818/13
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At the same time, emphasis on the overall weakness of 
imperialism was in no way diminished. The topic was, 
however, approached in what was apparently intended to be 
a more 'scientific' framework, and this involved in 
particular amplifying upon the military images - reference 
to 'fronts' etc. - which had been employed in certain of 
the Renmin Ribao editorials in July. An article on 
"Dialectics in the international struggle", published 
interestingly a few days before the Soviet Union stepped up 
international tension in Berlin, gives an explicit 
characterisation of the international strategic weakness of 
the United States from such an angle:
"...from a military point of view their weaknesses are 
fatal ones: their armed forces are scattered, their 
field of operations is extended, their rear is 
distant, their combat strength is enfeebled.
While the above can be viewed as a usage which involves 
importing military terminology into the field of 
international politics, there was also in the closing 
months of 1958 a tendency for major issues of international 
politics to surface within a debate which was ostensibly 
about directly military issues.
Thus an article in the army paper Jiefangrjun Baa entitled 
"The Concept of 'Quick Attacks on Exterior Lines' is not 
Obsolete" drew upon experience of China's Liberation War to 
criticise some people who "say that the combat line in 
modern warfare runs continuously and there are few openings 
through which we can penetrate, encircle and outmanoeuvre" 
and those who were confused by "mysterious views...toward 
American tactics. " The article upholds traditional methods 
of the Chinese armed forces, including the method of
"probing the enemy's strength to feel out the weak 
links and find an opening where we can split it in two
BIN Fu op. cit p. 11
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or slice it into pieces and then pocket and annihilate 
it." 1"
Particularly striking in the context of the hypothesis 
advanced earlier to the effect that the Offshore Islands 
crisis was designed to set up a front in East Asia while 
the USA was tied down in West Asia, is another example of 
traditional Chinese military methods upheld by this 
article, namely to "'stage a feint attack to the east so as 
to attack to the west'".
In terms of this level of analysis it would seem that the 
theme of taking the enemy seriously in concrete struggles 
could be expressed in such phenomena as the concentration 
of US forces through military pacts, positions of strength 
and the 'domino' model of moving against contiguous areas, 
while the concept of boldness with respect to the balance 
of forces at a world level could be taken to relate to the 
adversary's over-extended forces which were open to attack 
at a number of points. In this sense the united front has 
a point of contact with 'front' in the military sense.
Bringing together these different themes was the image of 
a ceaseless dialectic of struggle in which the unity of 
progressive struggles would continuously have to be built 
afresh.
The whole dialectical process of history through which this 
evolution took place was considered to unfold according to 
the concept which Mao had put forward in his article "Cast 
Away Illusions, Prepare for Struggle", to the effect 
that imperialism would go through a cycle of make trouble, 
fail, make trouble, fail, until their defeat, whereas the 
popular forces would go through a process eventually
LIU Cheng, article in Jiefangjun Bao Sept 7 1958; Joint 
Publications Research Service 1357-N pp 10-13.
MAO Tse-tung, Selected Works Vol IV op. cit., p. 428
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resulting in victory. This concept can be considered to be 
related to the idea of needing to win a series of trials of 
strength with the adversary. Typical of the way the CPC 
summed up the lessons of the struggle in the Middle East 
in 1958 is thus an article published late in the year 
which stated that the Americans had already sustained four 
major defeats: Suez, the Syrian crisis of late 1957, the 
revolution in Iraq and the failure of armed intervention in 
Lebanon and Jordan. 'The series of new plots carried out 
recently by the USA shows clearly that there must be no 
relaxation of vigilance against imperialism'; but, if the 
USA persisted, 'a fifth, a sixth and even more failures 
would follow, each more serious than the one before.
123 Dagong Bao Commentator, Nov 24 1958; Xinhua quoted in SWB 823/6,
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CONOLXJS I ON
To understand how united front tasks were conceived at any 
particular time, the essential requirement is to see how 
the CPC apprehended the world system. Their dialectical 
view could be summed up in the proposition that the 
contradictions which give the system its essential 
characteristics are simultaneously the forces which work to 
make it change into something different. On this basis the 
CPC conducted an attempt at a quite sophisticated, multi­
level analysis of the post-War world system and the forces 
for change within it.
The model encompassed elements of both stability - of the 
major rules of the system over a definite period - and 
change. These elements are reflected respectively in the 
continuing reference made to the Anna Louise Strong 
interview - showing that the basic rules of the system 
still applied - and in the "East Wind" concept, which 
emphasised the forces for change.
The rationale for united front policies can be understood 
against this background. Such policies could be defined as 
a multidimensional strategy seeking to maximise the 
potential of the forces for radical change existing within 
a given historical situation, by the specific method of 
accentuating the factors which could make them cohere.
Persistent reference in Chinese sources to the importance 
of unity shows that this was viewed as a key, perhaps the 
key, condition for the radical elements to realise their 
potential. The Chinese leadership both urged particular 
strategies of unity on other actors, and sought through 
China's own policy to show the way. The definition of a 
'force' in this sense could perhaps be that the whole was 
greater than the sum of its parts.
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The united front was not just a 'policy' but a process of 
the identification of forces which objectively shared a 
common cause, and an attempt to promote this process 
through policies. Armstrong's definition of the importance 
of the united front as an orientation is thus correct, but 
this analysis would be strengthened by seeing it not only 
as a policy, but also as the attempted identification of an 
existing trend within the system, upon which that policy 
seeks to build.
The distinction may be clarified with the following 
example. Analysts of the Balance of Power have pointed out 
that this term applies both to a set of system-rules which 
actually operated or were considered to operate, and at the 
same time to a policy designed to further the operation of 
that system. A formal analogy could be drawn with the 
Chinese United Front approach, insofar as it was a 
conscious policy to promote a set of factors which already 
existed as an objective tendency within the system itself. 
The substantive difference with the balance of power - and 
it is an important one - is that the latter sought to 
maintain stability, while China's policy sought to promote 
system-change.
The characterisation of the main 'trend' as an objective 
process is reinforced by the use of images drawn from 
natural forces: tides, currents, winds, not to mention
volcanoes etc. The concept of the East Wind prevailing 
over the West Wind idea was both a statement that such a 
trend to the accentuation of mutually reinforcing popular 
struggles existed, and at the same time a statement that 
conditions were such that advances could be won if this 
trend were to be expressed more formally in united fronts, 
both within individual states and between them.
In this context, the subjective element was accorded an 
essential role. An analogy could perhaps be made with the
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Marxist distinction between a class-in-itself and a class- 
for-itself. The 'force' represented by the 'East Wind' was 
considered to exist in itself, in that various struggles 
which hit at the dominance of the industrial countries 
actually existed. The point was to give the trend identity 
as a trend, both at a conceptual level, in terms of 
consciousness, and at an organisational level.
The notion of a relationship between the subjective and 
objective spheres assumes that the two are not identical. 
Obviously some of the forces with which the CPC sought to 
unite would not have seen themselves as radicals: 
conservative regimes could objectively play an anti­
imperialist role in certain circumstances. This much was 
nothing new, because Stalin had expressed similar ideas in 
his analysis of the role of the Emir of Afghanistan, for 
example. But the converse is - and here the CPC was much 
more original - that they also took account of the fact 
that the subjective was itself a material force. They thus 
paid attention to how the movement for change was 
conceptualised by those most closely involved, as for 
example with the ideology which emerged under the impetus 
of Bandung.
The basis of any action thus had to be the movement as it 
really existed, including the way in which it was 
conceptualised by its own major actors. The particularity 
of the role which the CPC sought for itself in relation to 
the actually-existing movement was perhaps - to paraphrase 
the words of the Communist Manifesto - to have a clearer 
view of its long-term and global (international) 
dimensions.
Unity required, in the CPC's conception, a focus. The 
united front was conceived in quite a concrete manner, and 
emphasis was thus placed upon organisation. The trend at 
an objective level was defined particularly in terms of
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what actors were doing in relation to concrete struggles, 
and at a political level united fronts aimed to promote 
solidarity among actors around definite tasks.
China's own domestic policies fell very much within the 
compass of this model - the attempt to give a radical 
impetus to building socialism, not just in China but as a 
world movement, via the Leap Forward. This was envisaged 
as the concrete focus, a task which could give expression 
to the general world trend in terms appropriate to the 
stage which China's own construction had then reached.
The model of the system encompassed change as part of its 
basic definitions. Hence the framework for united front 
policies was historical. The CPC's historical view 
possessed long-term as well as immediate-term dimensions.
The long-term element could be seen in the idea that the 
growing movement of Asian-African states was a restoration 
of a pattern of international contacts which had existed in 
the pre-colonial period. It could also be seen in the 
ideas for economic co-operation with developing countries, 
which look beyond the horizons of many of the then- 
prevalent development models.
According to this definition, united fronts were not just 
seen as means to an end; the type of solidarity which they 
implied, and the various co-operative mechanisms which 
embodied it, could even be seen as ends in themselves. 
They created new patterns or habits of international 
conduct.
But there was at the same time a very immediate and 
concrete assessment of the tasks which needed to be carried 
out, particularly of conflicts which had to be won. 
Although the views of the CPC do bear similarities to those 
of Western 'realists' or power-theorists, these
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similarities were confined essentially to the dimension of 
•taking the enemy seriously tactically'; within the 
limitations of this dimension, the element of power was of 
crucial importance.
The particular importance of the Middle East in the history 
of that period was assessed both against a background of 
long-term trends, and in connection with the concrete 
conflicts which needed to be won there, in other words, 
trials of strength. In a particular situation, the two 
aspects were closely related - the Western powers were 
considered to be acting to oppose the longer-term trends 
with which China identified, and particular local trials of 
strength grew out of this.
The linkage between long-term trends and particular 
conflicts could be understood in outline in the following 
manner. The old order of international relations was 
coming under threat at Bandung. Nationalism of a type 
which the West at least perceived to be threatening was 
sweeping many areas. It was already evident that the 
colonial system could not be maintained, and by no means 
clear that it could be transformed in an orderly manner. 
The US was playing a far from coherent role, permitting the 
old colonial powers to be defeated at Suez but supporting 
them in other areas (for example, France in Indochina), and 
there was indecision within American leading circles about 
how far and in what form it should intervene directly in 
local conflicts in pursuit of its overall interests. The 
Western economic system apparently had problems in 
structuring itself in such a way as encompass rapid 
technological development, something which Soviet successes 
in the space race exposed.
The process of managing the change to the post-colonial era 
was crucial. There was a tremendous impetus generated by 
the anti-colonial movement, expressed at Bandung, and the
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Chinese were probably correct in saying that the effects 
were still being felt and the impetus was still present in 
the 1957-8 period.
This provided an objective context for united front 
policies. At one level they implied maintaining the 
impetus of the anti-colonial movement and carrying this 
through to face new tasks; at this level the CPC sought for 
example to encourage post-Bandung conferences such as that 
at Cairo, and the movement to erect a new set of regulatory 
principles for the system through reforms in international 
law etc. The other level was that, given the existence and 
carrying-forward of this anti-colonial current, it had to 
be deployed in such a way as to maximise the managerial 
difficulties of the Western camp. It would seem likely 
that the CPC identified the regional dimension as crucial 
for this purpose. Overall, the factors for change could 
be promoted if the developing countries could pull 
together, in a variety of different ways, ranging from co­
operation in their economic construction to military 
challenges in different areas at the same time. In sum, 
the role of actors involved in united fronts was understood 
in two dimensions: firstly, beating the adversary at his 
own game, and secondly pursuing milieu goals aimed at 
altering the rules of the system as a whole.
Once the necessary content of the grouping of progressive 
forces was defined, its actual operation was probably 
defined more in a functional manner - according to what 
actors were actually working for or against - than in terms 
of a priori deductions from the nature of particular 
regimes. The notion of the 'swing of the pendulum' between 
'broad' and 'narrow' approaches to alliance-building would 
in fact appear somewhat simplistic if applied to this 
particular period. As we have argued above, China's policy 
during the period was extremely radical from the point of 
view of assessing the revolutionary potential of the
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situation, but this did not imply a narrowing of the forces 
with which alliance was sought. On the contrary, the 
united front policy was applied in a broad way, precisely 
as a way of maximising the revolutionary potential in the 
world system.
In terms of concrete conflict situations, the notion of 
power as capacity to act, the need to mobilise it to win 
goals, is a familiar theme in Western international 
relations theory and has been widely used by US writers in 
discussing their own country's foreign policy. The Chinese 
employed similar analytical tools in their approach to US 
foreign policy during the period. This can be seen in the 
discussion of 'positions of strength', which could be 
defined on the one hand as an actual way of concentrating 
forces in order to make gains in regional situations, and 
on the other as a crucial psychological factor. The 
negation of this strategy provided a key parameter for 
united front policies, in terms of defeating US policy 
initiatives on the ground. In order to win trials of 
strength it was thought necessary for progressive forces 
too to concentrate forces, and the united front was a tool 
in doing this.
At the most basic level, united fronts were viewed as 
groupings of peoples rather than of regimes. This level 
could be seen in the Cairo conference which established the 
Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organisation, where Chinese 
representatives explicitly said that it was better than 
Bandung because they could deal directly with peoples. The 
state dimension was still accorded enormous importance, but 
this was primarily because of the Marxist-Leninist view 
which the Chinese leadership espoused, according to which 
the state had a unique role as manipulator of power 
(military, political, economic etc.). As the case of Yemen 
showed, even relations with regimes were conceptualised 
primarily as a channel for people-to-people relations.
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Thus the distinction between united fronts from above and 
from below was probably not one which was viewed as 
particularly problematical by the Chinese leadership at 
this period. They would probably have been seen as two 
aspects of a whole.
The popular current was regarded at one level as something 
which permeated state boundaries - as it clearly did in the 
Middle East at that time - and even regional boundaries, as 
in the case of the wider current of solidarity with similar 
movements in other areas of the developing world. At 
another level, the popular current expressed itself, in an 
indispensable way, through the activities of states at the 
level of the deployment of power. A crucial aspect of this 
was the occurrence of trials of strength with the 
adversary.
But again, the Chinese model accepted that the outcome of 
such trials of strength would be influenced by the ability 
of anti-imperialist state actors to mobilise their 
resources more effectively than those in the opposite camp, 
precisely because of their popular base. As an actor which 
looked at the world from a radical point of view, the CPC 
considered that the basis for a rapid 'spreading' of the 
independence movement was the existence of popular forces 
within even states which were part of the 'reactionary' 
camp. This does not entirely contradict the state-centric 
view, because state power was still conceived as the focus 
of contention between rival social forces. But this 
element did make pro-US regimes less secure. A key 
deduction from this standpoint is the importance of united 
fronts grouping social forces within developing states.
In the context of the Middle East as a regional system, key 
issues included the need to counter imperialist strategy in 
a very concrete context, that is the strategy of subverting 
radical actors one by one - hence the importance of domino
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or weiqi models. In this context, the primary level of 
solidarity took as its point of reference the radical 
actors themselves, in this case Egypt and Syria.
To a certain extent, this logic could also be reversed. 
The Chinese adhered to a geopolitical view of the clash of 
forces at a world level. They considered that both their 
own side and the other side could expand their influence to 
geographically contiguous areas. In this sense the CPC's 
views are not entirely dissimilar to the 'domino* theories 
at that time espoused by American decision-makers.
But this was only one dimension of the Chinese approach. 
In a larger sense, the logics of the two sides were not 
considered interchangeable. National independence was in 
accordance with the aspirations of the masses, and so had 
an enduring basis, whereas US positions of strength, 
particularly their military bases, were inherently a source 
of weakness. Bandung had already shown how foreign bases 
and the membership of military pacts could serve as a focus 
for popular discontent.
Solidarity was thus not just conceived at the level of 
support for those struggling in the front line, i.e. Egypt 
and Syria. There was a higher level which immediately 
recognised that the very fact of division into radical and 
conservative camps served the adversary. So an important 
focus of unity was the need to overcome even this division 
and replace it with a broad-based unity. It was not enough 
just for the radicals to unite amongst themselves.
The wider solidarity inherent in the overall world balance 
of forces could itself interact with particular local 
events. An example is the conflict in the Lebanon, where 
the CPC concluded that because of the overall balance of 
forces there was a possibility for a small and weak actor 
to defeat a world power. This could lead to developing new
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concepts which in turn were considered to have a general 
relevance.
Having said this, though, it is important to emphasise 
that, even moving outside the Middle East region itself, 
the Chinese analysis still stressed a very important 
spatial dimension. This is seen in the interesting image 
of the independence movement 'spreading* from the Middle 
East, via North Africa to sub-Saharan Africa.
The developing countries were accorded a status as a 
distinct group and not seen as secondary, still less as 
subordinate, to socialism. The dignity of this status 
flowed partly from the intermediate zone theory which 
asserted that they were the main focus of the world- 
political contradictions which simultaneously gave the 
system its character and generated change within it. At 
the same time, China's definition of the grouping of 
progressive forces retained a very important place for 
socialism, which was in no way submerged within it.
The CPC approached its analysis of the world system using 
the apparatus inherited from the Communist movement of the 
past, and it is interesting to see how they managed, for 
example on a question like relations between the industrial 
powers. To some extent they were able to use old 
categories to encompass a changed content, to some extent 
this was more problematical.
In the specific field of united front questions the CPC was 
breaking newer ground, and this study would suggest that 
they had some success in giving new content to socialist 
theory of international relations in this field.
The concept of a convergence between two distinct forces, 
socialism and national liberation, was a guiding principle 
from which the Chinese leadership never departed during the
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period in question. This was a further major dimension of 
united front activity. In many formulations, the coming- 
together of the forces of socialism and national-1 iteration 
was identified as the key united front task.
The manner in which this was conceived altered 
significantly however. At the outset of the period China's 
role as a socialist country itself possessed an 
organisational context in the form of the Socialist Camp 
headed by the Soviet Union. At the end of the period in 
question this identification was much less clear-cut.
At the outset, the CPC placed almost more emphasis on 
putting forward its line as a basis for a collective 
socialist-camp policy than it did on a specifically 
Chinese policy. This is a fact which is perhaps not 
adequately reflected in some of the literature on Chinese 
foreign policy, although our study has also shown, notably 
in the case of Yemen, that even at this time there was 
another dimension of Chinese policy in which the links 
between fellow developing countries received the main 
emphasis.
Following the Moscow Meeting, a very clear theme was the 
key role in the world system assigned by the CPC to the 
Socialist Camp headed by the Soviet Union. Very definite 
demands and responsibilities were placed upon the Soviet 
Union for neutralising the West's military, in particular 
nuclear, threat. The Chinese view of these
responsibilities clashed strongly with the manner in which 
the Soviet leadership conceptualised the responsibilities 
of a nuclear power.
In no sense did the CPC subscribe to the emerging 
'neutralist' view which saw the two power blocs as equally 
bad, in fact they strongly criticised the Yugoslavs for 
putting such an idea forward. Had such a model been
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adopted, the parameters for united front building would 
have been very different. At the same time, it is 
important to realise that the CPC clearly and explicitly 
regarded the Asian-African movement - it was also during 
this period that Latin America was beginning to be included 
in the definition - as a distinct force in the world system 
which was not expected to submerge itself in the same 
grouping as the socialist countries. Indeed the material 
in this study does not really bear out Shichor's assertion 
that "in the face of persistent western aggression" the 
developing countries "were advised to abandon their 
middle-of-the-road position and co-operate closely with the 
Soviet Union and the socialist camp." However strongly the 
Socialist Camp's role was emphasised, the distinct 
character of the Asian-African grouping was equally 
strongly stressed.
There were important changes in the manner in which the 
socialist element in the world alignment of forces was 
formulated. Some Chinese sources began to experiment with 
new formulations, typically the "world socialist 
revolutionary movement". At the height of the crisis over 
Iraq, immediately prior to the Mao-Khrushchev summit, when 
the CPC was apparently qpiite angry with some aspects of 
Soviet policy, particularly in the military field, Chinese 
sources noticeably downplayed the Soviet role as a world 
force. This was quite a major change, which shows the CPC 
facing up to the possibility of having to adjust themselves 
to a new analysis of the forces in world politics. In the 
most radical phase in 1958 the CPC made some surprisingly 
explicit criticisms of the Soviet line, which clearly 
anticipate points made in the polemic of the early 
'sixties.
While developing what was conceived as a correct foreign 
policy for a socialist state in this period, the Chinese 
leadership also increasingly explored the dimension of its
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role as an Asian country. In this context, the spatial 
dimension of China's policies has to be seen under two 
aspects, which are both very important for understanding 
united front questions.
The first aspect is in terms of the decision to initiate 
the Taiwan Straits crisis at a time when the USA was deeply 
involved in West Asia. While it would be inappropriate in 
the context of a study not essentially focussed on this 
question - and where alternative hypotheses are not 
considered in detail — to assert that this was the primary 
rationale, the evidence we have presented of the CPC's 
global view at the time does argue that the link with the 
Middle East should be accorded greater significance in 
future discussions of the Offshore Islands crisis.
The second aspect relates to the fact that links with the 
Middle East were viewed from one dimension as a 
reconstitution of a historical pattern dating to the pre­
colonial past. This guides us to a very interesting 
dimension of united fronts which can easily be missed: just 
because the policy emanated from a Marxist regime did not 
mean it had no point of reference other than in modern 
class or national politics.
The Chinese affirmed the historical experience of 
international relations as it existed in the pre-colonial 
period, when widespread links existed between Asian-African 
states. This could be considered to imply a dialectic 
whereby the period of European dominance negated this set 
of relationships and they would be restored in a changed 
form through the negation of the negation (using Hegel's 
term), of which the precursor was the Bandung spirit. In 
a sense the pattern of relations among the Asian-African 
states can be seen under two aspects : both as a trend 
within the current system - operating within it while also 
tending to subvert its basic rules of great power dominance
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- and at the same time as a harbinger of a new system of 
international relations which would come into being through 
the decline of the present one.
This gives the united front in international terms an 
altogether different basis from the dimension in which it 
is perceived simply as a tactical approach in response to 
imperialism. The promotion of indigenous agricultural or 
medical techniques as the Chinese have done via South-South 
co-operation is situated in a long time-scale - not just in 
terms of its positive attitude to the past but with respect 
to the future as well, bearing in mind criticisms of growth 
models and inappropriate technology in the development 
experience, which have become much more prevalent since.
The Chinese approach was thus not without some originality 
or contemporary relevance. At the same time, a critical 
assessment would have to address the fact that the CPC's 
prognostications for the international system have turned 
out to be inaccurate in many respects.
An interesting feature of the Maoist model is that it 
allowed for unfavourable outcomes. This makes it appear 
far more realistic, with hindsight, than many Soviet 
models. Both the 'general crisis' theory put forward in 
the USSR in the inter-war period and Khrushchev's theory of 
the gradual triumph of socialism through peaceful economic 
competition were inherently uni inear. The Maoist 
standpoint in contrast placed great emphasis on subjective 
factors. What the 'East Wind' theory said was not so much 
that one side of the balance would inexorably rise and the 
other decline, more that there was a great opportunity for 
the anti-systemic forces, if they could grasp it. "Seize 
the day, seize the hour" was applied as much to 
international affairs as it was to domestic in the Leap 
Forward period.
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It is logically consistent to attempt to realise the 
favourable possibilities in a given situation.
Having said this, there does appear to have been a tendency 
to overestimate forces for change. This was very evident 
in the context of the Leap Forward in domestic policy. If 
it is a reproach which could be made of other forms of 
systems-theory that they neglected elements of change and 
stressed stability, the CPC which was at that time an 
inherently subversive actor within the world system, may 
have been well placed to identify factors for change which 
other observers neglected. On the other hand, the evidence 
suggests that in the atmosphere of the Leap Forward, the 
CPC actually overestimated the factors for change in the 
international system and underestimated factors maintaining 
continuity. The outcome in the Middle East was far less 
decisive - for one side or the other - than the analysis 
implied.
A persistent emphasis on the mass movement became stronger 
during the year 1958 until it came to be considered 
practically the only significant element to be taken into 
account in assessing the characteristics of the period in 
question. Individual cases were studied as a basis for 
understanding the general world trend, in which it was 
believed the role of the masses could reverse more 
conventional definitions of stronger and weaker. This 
tendency became notably more marked as the Leap Forward 
progressed, which would seem to be an example of how 
domestic factors could influence, negatively in this case, 
the realism of foreign policy.
However from our point of view, a particularly important 
weakness of the overwhelming emphasis on the masses was the 
lack of analysis of social differentiation. Some of the 
most important questions of international united fronts in 
fact hinge on how social relations within a country are
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understood. The CPC had real problems in understanding 
social relations within other developing societies, and 
their own internal experience during the period perhaps 
provides some clues.
The Soviet approach, only incompletely criticised under 
Khrushchev, was one which regarded social contradictions as 
an inconvenience, and monolithic society as a preferable 
state. Mao departed from this at a conceptual level in 
viewing contradiction as the life-blood of any social 
phenomenon.
However, the CPC was far from faithful to this approach in 
practice. 'Uniting' presupposes difference. It could be 
defined as a bringing-together of disparate entities, and 
a united grouping no longer exists as such if the 
difference of its components disappears. But homogenising 
tendencies became dominant during the Leap forward - 
particularly on the nationalities question, but also in 
spheres such as the imposition of organisational models in 
rural development. This called into question the whole 
commitment of the CPC to a model encompassing difference, 
and practically deprived the domestic united front of any 
real meaning.
Some of these weaknesses were apparently transplanted into 
the field of studies of other developing societies.
In terms of domestic politics Mao had expressed a view that 
objectively the category of 'the people' differed according 
to each stage, and what was needed was to formulate 
appropriate united front policies.
The Lebanese case illustrates the Chinese view not just 
that sovereignty was important as an issue around which 
united fronts could be formed, but that sovereignty itself 
could be constituted through the coalescence of popular
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forces (in a manner perh s reminiscent of eighteenth 
century ideas of the General Will). Despite the basically 
state-centric view of the Chinese it was felt that, in a 
revolutionary situation, one arrived at a polarization with 
'the people' on one side and isolated pro-imperialist 
'tyrants' on the other.
This approach carries significant dangers. The use of the 
term 'the people' implies the exclusion of those defined as 
the class enemy from the category 'people', and this had 
unfortunate implications from the human rights angle, as 
seen, for example, in the Anti-Rightist movement. As the 
source of an effective interpretation of international 
events the concept also had its weaknesses. At a certain 
level it is tautological. The CPC assumed for itself the 
position of determining what the main lines of demarcation 
were, and then evaluated various forces according to how 
they identified their attitude to this issue.
Such a procedure serves as an alibi for failure to conduct 
an independent evaluation of the actual role of those 
forces.
Yemen illustrates a phenomenon which was to become much 
more common from the time China was able to develop 
relations with a large number of states in the early '70s, 
namely a regime winning support from the Chinese leadership 
by saying what they wanted to hear. If the CPC had adhered 
strictly to the approach of "seeking truth from facts" the 
main point of reference should have been the actual socio­
economic role of different forces in the third world, thus 
moving outside the framework of tautology and accepting the 
- necessary -risk of revealing that the main contradiction 
was analysed wrongly.
True, there were to some extent two distinct levels at 
which discourse was conducted. Public statements including 
Renmin Ribao articles, and even to a considerable extent
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the widely circulated periodical Shijie Zhishi heavily 
emphasised the political approach to united fronts as 
including all forces which identified themselves for or 
against the main positive or negative trends as identified 
by the CPC leadership. Specialist academic publications 
did on the other hand, to a limited extent, attempt an 
analysis of socio-economic trends in developing countries 
against the background of the world system.
It would be a limitation in itself if this important area 
of debate was insulated within a narrow circle and excluded 
from public discussion, but it would not be without a 
certain limited value if the academic sphere were used as 
a 'think-tank' and its research treated as the bedrock upon 
which subsequent policy changes could be made. However, 
the two levels - the level of enquiry and the level of 
official orthodoxy - were vastly unequal: the official
levul overwhelmingly dominated, and in many ways the 
academic articles appear to be burdened with a role of 
feeding arguments in to reinforce the official conceptions, 
rather than generating genuinely challenging perspectives. 
This is of course a problem which affects other foreign- 
policy decision-making systems. The point is simply that 
the Chinese system was supposed to be revolutionary, and 
mechanisms for revolutionising dominant ideas seem to have 
been very weak. Moreover, the system was defined as a 
mass-based revolutionary one, and it is hard to see how 
informed debate could occur when there was no mechanism to 
present conflicting points of view.
Concretely, the two main holes in the Chinese analysis 
would appear to be the following: firstly the neglect of a 
new and sizeable social stratum within developing countries 
which could serve as an intermediary to foreign economic 
domination in the post-World War II situation; and secondly 
a failure to appreciate the depth of contradictions which 
did exist within and between developing countries and which
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could be manipulated in such a way as to divide peoples 
along lines of sectional interests, particularly national, 
ethno-linguistic etc. The later history of the Middle East 
illustrates these points all too well, but the Chinese 
analysis at the time hardly provides a framework which 
anticipated them in any way. To make this point in no way 
implies the invalidity of united front policies as an 
approach, just that such policies could only succeed if 
problems like these were understood and faced up to.
On the question of the analysis of social forces in the 
Middle East, the CPC was careful not to identify itself 
with Nasserism to the exclusion of other progressive forces 
- principally popular forces, but including even monarchic 
forces like Yemen - which might exist separate from or even 
in opposition to Nasser. The CPC tended to hold a 
people-centred view of development strategies, in contrast 
to the view which stressed grandiose projects for their own 
sake. In this sense the weaknesses subsequently exposed 
in the Nasserist model, or specifically in the Aswan dam 
project, would by no means be unexpected in terms of the 
Chinese view in the period in question.
Although it is not stated in such explicit terms, it is 
probably fair to say that Chinese authors did not regard 
nationalism as specifically bourgeois, as the Soviet 
tradition had often done in the past. They considered that 
the assertion of nationhood in Africa and Asia, and also 
the new pattern of relations between states in a particular 
area, was part of an ongoing dynamic of those societies, 
which had been interrupted by the colonial era. This was 
quite an important new element in communist theory. The 
process of contemporary nation-building was also seen as 
an essentially mass or popular phenomenon, as in the case 
of Lebanon.
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The CPC frequently described the struggles in the Middle 
East as struggles against colonialism. This may appear 
puzzling because formal colonialism was not the dominant 
form of great-power influence in the Middle East. 
However, the term 'neo-colonialism' was not yet in general 
use at the time, and what the Chinese were really saying is 
that there was a form of relationship which was in 
substance equivalent to colonialism.
This usage is in a sense far-sighted in that it reflects an 
understanding that the attainment of formal sovereignty was 
not in itself a solution for the third world, and thus to 
a certain extent anticipates the later debate about neo­
colonialism. A very significant aspect of Chinese 
formulations in this period is that they grouped together 
countries at different stages of the independence movement, 
each fulfilling tasks appropriate to the stage it was at. 
The united front was defined in a sufficiently broad manner 
as to encompass not only colonies but also independent 
states striving for the substance of independence - 
defending it not just physically against outside 
intervention, but through economic construction as well. 
Some concepts later included in definitions of 'neo­
colonialism' and 'dependency' are anticipated here. There 
was a major impetus to independence which had been 
frustrated for a long time, and thus constituted a real 
tide in international affairs. Having built up for such a 
long time, this movement would not be content with stopping 
short at some stage of attainment of formal independence. 
The demand was to realise this in the form of a qualitative 
shift in the direction of new principles of international 
relations - as anticipated at Bandung.
At the same time, the Chinese analysis on this question can 
also be considered oversimplified and inadequate. It did 
not reflect the differences inherent in the switch to 
neo-colonial relationships, mainly the change in class
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relations in the countries concerned, relations which are 
themselves conditioned by the form of that country's 
insertion in the international division of labour. Judging 
by the material analysed in this study, Chinese authors 
scarcely anticipated the ideas introduced into the debate 
about "dependency". Hence they found it difficult to see 
that new social strata could come into being in the third 
world which combine elements of dependency with elements of 
real decision-making power. They tended to adopt a fairly 
simplistic analysis of imperialist influence, regarding 
pro-Western strata as narrow "cliques" without any coherent 
social basis.
This analysis could yield a superficially coherent view of 
events in the particular period under consideration, such 
as the Lebanese crisis in 1958, but it would not hold water 
in the longer term. The traditional Maoist analysis of 
classes put forward in the early stage of the Chinese 
revolution was considerably more sophisticated in 
comparison to the tendency of the Communist international 
during that period, which had tended to swing between two 
one-sided poles of analysis, either to stress the class 
aspect, or to stress nationalism and equate this with the 
bourgeoisie. But in the post World War II era, the Maoist 
model would certainly need further refinements if it was to 
make sense of the new types of emerging class relations in 
the third world. The material suggests that it was 
difficult for Chinese theorists to make the necessary 
breakthroughs. This is probably to be attributed partly to 
the atmosphere created by the anti-rightist movement of 
1957, which promoted dogmatism and discouraged people, to 
put it mildly, from sticking their neck out or questioning 
established patterns of thought. Thus on many occasions 
the specialist articles, which should have been breaking 
new ground theoretically, instead tended to stick to 'safe' 
areas and flesh out the official line.
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This can be considered an unfortunate lost opportunity, in 
that Chinese policies did contain a number of interesting 
and promising lines of thought which had potential for 
further development, but in many cases did not receive it. 
In international relations or world-political terms, one 
can consider a state 'revolutionary' if the guiding 
principles of its line seek to provide an alternative to 
the established pattern of power relations. In this 
respect the Chinese position had limitations: the CPC
decision-makers were limited by the 'power-theory' 
framework, at least to the extent that it was difficult for 
their model to accoirjmodate issues such as the ecological 
perspective, the particular role of women in the world 
system, the contributions of indigenous peoples, and (to 
some extent) the qualitative approach to development. 
Still, given these limitations, Chinese foreign policy did 
during the period in question set itself against the whole 
structure of great-power dominance of the world system and 
attempt to promote a more plural approach to international 
relations which opposed intervention and plunder by the 
powers and upheld the rights of small nations to determine 
their own options and exercise an effective decision-making 
power within the world system.
The material surveyed in this study does present a picture 
of a comparatively rich and varied system of ideas aiming 
at an 'alternative' approach to international affairs. 
From today's standpoint, in a system where elements of 
solidarity are very much pushed into the background, the 
united front ideas highlighted by China at that time are 
still worth studying. The CPC was not wrong in referring 
to the possibility of a major restructuring in the 
direction of new structures of dominance, a process which 
has involved very complex struggles, in the course of which 
the dominant actors appeared on a number of occasions to be 
quite uncertain and on the defensive. Was the CPC then 
wrong in saying that this outcome could have been
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prevented? It is clearly impossible to say, but at least it 
can be argued that for an actor with the radical commitment 
of the CPC at that time, it was logical to try.
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